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ABSTRACT
The Fabianization of the British Empire: Postwar Colonial Summer Conferences and
Community Development in Kenya and Uganda, 1948-1956
Joseph M. Snyder
This dissertation examines the influence of the Fabian Society on Britain’s postwar
colonial development regime between 1948 and 1956. This study demonstrates that a primary
vehicle for the “Fabianization” of the British Empire was the Cambridge Summer Conference
series, particularly the conference convened in 1948. Held on the “Encouragement of Initiative
in African Society,” the conference devised a policy framework of community development
based on a model of mass education long-favored by Arthur Creech Jones, former chair of the
Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) and then Secretary of State for the Colonies.
While the findings of this study attest that Fabian influence (“Fabianization”) during this
period produced tangible development projects that concretely impacted social welfare in the
colonies, the results suggest an ambiguity surrounding the relative success of “Fabianized”
development. The findings indicate that “Fabianization,” dependent upon the processes of
negotiation which transpired between the African communities being “developed” and the agents
responsible for change, and the ability of those agents to inspire and motivate the indigenous
populations, was at best partial, even in ideal circumstances.
This study demonstrates that, despite Creech Jones’ appointment to the Cabinet as
Secretary of State for the Colonies, severe challenges remained for the realization of Fabianfavored designs. The most intransigent of these hindrances included the sterling crisis of 1947
and that posed by inertia and resistance in the territories, which emanated from both colonial
officialdom as well as the indigenous populations.
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INTRODUCTION
This dissertation is concerned with the influence exercised by the Fabian Society (a
dynamic referred to in this study as “Fabianization”) on Great Britain’s colonial development
policy following the Second World War, and with the character and nature of that influence. It
examines the evolution of Fabian perspectives on colonial policy beginning in the early twentieth
century, when the Society was forced by circumstance to adopt a position on the empire, through
the formulation and articulation of a Fabian vision of social-imperialism and trusteeship that
rejected the dominant Chamberlainite doctrine of imperial trusteeship.1 It then explores how this
was related to contemporary Labour Party policy and how the Fabian vision came to fruition
following the ascendance of the Fabian luminary Arthur Creech Jones as Secretary of State for
the Colonies in 1947. The aim is to provide a more nuanced understanding of Fabian influence
not only in the shaping of Britain’s colonial development policy, but most importantly in its
practice.
I make the following claims in this dissertation: First, the role of the Fabians in forging
postwar colonial development policy was neither straightforward nor predetermined. Despite the
popular notion, as expressed by Nicholas Owen,2 that they had an unprecedented opportunity to
do so, it is quite clear that the Fabians’ ability to influence policy was limited. Most
immediately, the exigencies of postwar economic retrenchment obliged by the sterling crisis of
1947 had the effect of rationalizing much colonial development in terms of offsetting looming
fiscal emergency.3 As a result, the types of social development projects long-favored by the

1

That is, the variant of imperial trusteeship formulated by Joseph Chamberlain, Secretary of State
for the Colonies, 1895-1903.
2
Nicholas Owen, “Critics of Empire in Britain,” in The Oxford History of the British Empire:
The Twentieth Century, ed. J. M. Brown and Wm. Roger Lewis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999).
3
The Second World War devastated Britain’s economy. In the period between 1938 and 1945,
for instance, Britain’s external debt skyrocketed from £500 million to £3.355 billion while, during the

2

Fabians were marginalized as peripheral to more pressing development concerns. Moreover,
constitutional restraints embedded within the structure of colonial administration itself
circumscribed Creech Jones’ already-narrow field of action. As the secretary himself
acknowledged in 1950, he could not govern the territories by fiat; rather, he had to devise
strategies that encouraged territorial participation. Forced into an unenviable position as
negotiator-in-chief, Creech Jones’ circumstances were made all the more intractable by the fact
that many political appointees in the colonies were conservatives who, as David Goldsworthy
has observed, had a stake in resisting his reformist agenda. Gradually, but inevitably, this
resistance had a cumulative suppressive effect on many of the Fabians’ designs.
My second claim is that, despite these constraints, the Fabians managed to exercise some
positive influence on Britain’s postwar colonial development enterprise, both in terms of policy
formulation and practice. In keeping with Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton,4 I hold that
evidence of this influence has been obscured by a historiographic tendency to emphasize the
failure of such large-scale mechanized development projects as the East African Groundnuts and
West African Poultry Schemes. Costly at a time when it could ill-be-afforded (and, therefore,

same period, the value of its reserves of gold and dollars was nearly halved, falling from £864 million in
1938 to about £453 million by October 1945. By the end of the war, Britain was nearly bankrupt. See:
C. S. S. Newton, “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan,” The
Economic History Review (New Series) 37, no. 3 (August 1984): 391-408; Rohland Schuknecht, British
Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers,
2010), 193-283; Allister Hinds, Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958
(Westport: Greenwood Press, 2001), 37-68; Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, Doctrines of
Development (London: Routledge, 1996), 254-294; Billy Frank, “Labour’s ‘New Imperialist Attitude’:
State-Sponsored Colonial Development in Africa, 1940-51,” in The British Labour Movement and
Imperialism, eds. Billy Frank, Craig Horner and David Stewart (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge
Scholars Publishing, 2010), 107-129; Alex Sutton, The Political Economy of Imperial Relations: Britain,
the Sterling Area, and Malaya, 1945-1960 (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015), 55-93; Clive
Whitehead, “The Impact of the Second World War on Education in Britain’s Colonial Empire,” in
Education and the Second World War: Studies in Schooling and Social Change (New York: Routledge,
1992), 151-158.
4
Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton, “The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa,”
Journal of Historical Sociology 4, no. 2 (June 1991).
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high-profile) and initiated by a Labor regime whose Colonial Office (CO) was under the
headship of a Fabian, the collapse of these projects fitted well with the contemporary
conservative narrative that, pace Newman, worked toward the delegitimization of postwar stateplanning, particularly considering then-nascent geopolitical and ideological reconfigurations
between Russia and the West.
Third, to move beyond this obscurantist tendency and locate evidence of the substantive,
tangible effects of Fabian-influenced colonial development initiatives following the war, I argue
that it is first necessary to examine the work of the CO’s postwar Summer Conference series on
African Administration. In doing so, I borrow from and extend a premise of John Holford’s
study on postwar colonial education, in which he argues that the series was initiated by Creech
Jones to “help win the colonial service” to his policies.5 Unlike Holford’s survey, however, I
take as my point of departure the conference of 1948, the focus of which was the Encouragement
of Initiative in African Society. The decision to focus on the 1948 conference stems from the
rhetorical and ideological genealogy of the community development policies formulated by the
conference, which were derived from the prewar work of the CO’s Advisory Committee on
Education in the Colonies (ACEC), the efforts of which culminated in the 1944 report Mass
Education in African Society. The chief architect of the report was Creech Jones, who, by 1948,
had garnered a reputation both at home and in the colonies as an ardent devotee of mass
education. I therefore hold that, in terms of a springboard for “Fabianized” colonial development
policy, the 1948 summer conference is best positioned for its realization.

John Holford, “Mass Education and Community Development in the British Colonies, 19401960: A Study in the Politics of Community Education,” International Journal of Lifelong Education 7,
no 3 (1988), 167.
5

4

Linking colonial policy formulations and initiatives with Fabian influence leads to my
fourth and final claim, wherein I argue that examining how the policies formulated at the 1948
summer conference were carried forward to practical effect in the colonies uncovers the depth
and character of “Fabianization.” In doing so, I bring together the second and third claims made
in this dissertation and extend them. For tracing mass education (framed alternatively as
community development at the conference) through to its practical conclusion reveals that, as
noted by C. L. Riley, Fabian influence on colonial development policy was “quietly effective.”6
To achieve this, I follow the efforts of two conference attendees who not only played vital roles
in the deliberations at Cambridge, but subsequently devised strategies to implement the
initiatives in the colonies themselves: P. E. W. Williams, Commissioner of Social Welfare in
Kenya and chairman of the group responsible for defining community development at the 1948
Cambridge conference, and Andrew B. Cohen, conference chairman and later governor of
Uganda Protectorate. The result is to complicate the preponderant image of large-scale
development failure which dominates the historiography.

Dissertation Method
This study is explicitly interested in understanding the nature of Fabianized colonial
development policy and practice. The primary method adopted is documentary research,
particularly CO archival materials, those of the Labor Party, and those of the Fabian Society and
its Colonial Bureau. Documentary research for this dissertation was carried out in the British
National Archives, Kew; the Weston Library, Oxford University; the Fabian Society Archives,
London School of Economics; the Labor Party Archive, People’s History Museum, Manchester,
Charlotte Lydia Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers:
British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa” (PhD diss., University College London, 2013), 30.
6

5

England; the Institute of Education, University College London; and the microfilm collection of
the Kenya National Archives, Bird Library, Syracuse University, New York.
Consultation of these records provided the necessary perspective on the relationship
between the Fabians, their policies, and policy-formulating machinery; the British Labor Party
and its colonial policy initiatives; and the “official mind” of the British state and its colonial
governments in Africa in the period immediately before, during, and after the Second World
War. The range of primary documents collected from the archives and used in this dissertation
includes: correspondences between members of the Fabian Society and various local, national,
and colonial government bureaucrats, functionaries, and elected officials; government
memoranda and interdepartmental correspondences; field reports from Community Development
Officers and Social Welfare Workers; departmental annual reports; conference minutes; and
other written materials. The range of secondary documents collected from the archives and used
in this dissertation includes: published accounts in newspapers and periodicals; and other written
materials.
Though these documentary research methods provide the necessary details on the
relationship between the Fabians, the Labor Party, the CO, and colonial governments, and
colonial policy formulation and implementation, it accounts only for the British perspective. The
views shared in this material are oftentimes prejudicial, being framed by the paternalistic
discourse typical of colonial powers even when propounding such antithetical notions as selfgovernment and independence. An effort has been made to recover the African perspective on
British development efforts, but the material necessary to do so was unavailable at the time
principal research was conducted. For example, it is possible that the Local Native Council of
Machakos District, the site of the Machakos Betterment Scheme in Kenya, deliberated aspects of

6

the scheme. However, the minutes of the council, if they exist, are not part of the Kenya
National Archive collection housed at Bird Library, Syracuse University. Moreover, Uganda
local government archives, where material on local response and reaction to community
development schemes resides, have experienced a precarious existence. Until recently (2016),
the Uganda National Archives had neither the space nor manpower to collect, catalog, and
preserve the material from the country’s many provinces. As a result, much historical paperwork
has remained in the hands of local government authorities where, in several districts, archival
material has been stored in conditions ill-suited for their preservation and use.
The future study of this subject lies in the recovery and inclusion of this material.

Significance of the Research
Although Labor’s rise to power in 1945 stimulated a political and practical atmosphere in
Britain that provided the Fabian Society with what Owen has referred to as an “unprecedented
opportunity” to influence colonial policy, the historiography lacks a balanced, considered
deconstruction of that role. Moreover, and despite the existence of several trends in the
literature, it is evident that there is no consensus as to the depth or character of Fabian influence.
While I hold no pretentions toward consensus-building, this dissertation represents an attempt to
salvage (in part) the complexity and scope of Fabian influence on Britain’s postwar colonial
development policies. To do so, this dissertation takes as its point of departure the notion of a
“Fabianized” British Empire, parsing the framework of Fabian influence by examining the
community development-based policy formulations articulated at the CO’s 1948 Summer
Conference on African Administration and their subsequent implementation in Africa.

7

This dissertation also challenges the historiographic tendency to ascribe colonial
development failures under the Labor regime to the Fabians, a trend that has produced a largely
negative scholarship dominated by conservative opinion generally hostile toward socialistinspired state planning—this, despite evidence that Fabian-influenced development in the
colonies was also, to borrow from C. L. Riley, “quietly effective.” Furthermore, the propensity
of scholars such as Susan Cooper, T. E. B. Howarth, and Paul Kelemen to emphasize the failure
of large-scale development projects in both East and West Africa (the groundnuts scheme in
Tanganyika and the poultry scheme in The Gambia, respectively) has obscured the real and
tangible Fabian-influenced development projects that impacted social welfare practices in the
colonies.
So considered, the findings of this dissertation carry forward the work of such scholars as
Riley and I. C. Jackson,7 providing a necessary nuanced counterweight to a biased historiography
inclined to emphasize postwar colonial development’s large-scale failures. The cacophonous
criticism that has subsequently redounded from this narrative has managed to either marginalize
or drown out entirely evidence of the success of postwar state planning as directed by a Labor
regime whose CO was, at the time, under the guidance of a leading Fabian (if not the leading
Fabian). To an extraordinary degree, this has to do with the very nature of those successes,
which tend, in the last, to be unexceptional, inconspicuous, and ordinary. The effect has been to
perpetuate a theme of the basic unsoundness of socialism and state planning as, of course,
embodied by the Fabians.
Further, the findings provide insight into several opaque aspects of postwar colonial
development, including: the evolution of Fabian Social Trusteeship, from its origins at the turn
Riley, “Monstrous Predatory Vampires;” I. C. Jackson, Advance in Africa: A Study in
Community Development in Eastern Nigeria (London: Oxford University Press, 1956).
7

8

of the twentieth century to its postwar culmination in what the Fabians called the “Social
Foundation of Trusteeship;” the dynamic negotiation that unfolded between the FCB, the CO,
and the colonial governments before and after the Second World War, complicating the notion
that the success of Fabian-favored colonial development initiatives was irretrievably associated
with the majority-status of Labor; and the persistence of institutional restraints on
“Fabianization” despite the long-standing relationship between the Fabians, the Secretary of
State, and the Labor Party, indicating that the success or failure of any given initiative was
almost always critically dependent on buy-in on the part of the territorial governments.

“Fabianization”
The “Fabianising [sic] of the British Empire,” in the esoteric parlance favored by the
contemporary Leftist press, first appeared in 1947 to herald the appointment of Arthur Creech
Jones to the Labor cabinet as Secretary of State for the Colonies. It is noteworthy that for the
socialist literati, it was Creech Jones’ apotheosis that signaled the onset of “Fabianization” rather
than Labor’s 1945 electoral victory and the subsequent inundation of Westminster by MPs,
secretaries of state, under-secretaries of state, private secretaries, and even a premier who
identified on some level as “Fabian.” The distinction is not insignificant. Before 1947, it
implies, the Fabian agenda in matters imperial was inhibited; after 1947, Fabian influence in the
framing of colonial affairs and the implementation of colonial policy was unfettered.
Before we can arrive at an understanding of how Fabianization was to be achieved
through the vehicle of the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration, we must first
come to terms with how it is connected with the notion of Fabian influence. We are not here
concerned with “influence” of the textbook variety—such as the conversion of a decision-maker

9

by some other individual, or by a group, to a point of view which the decision-maker had not
previously held. That the evidence for “influence” is purely circumstantial precludes any such
proposition. Rather, this dissertation elaborates a dynamic identified by Goldsworthy: a
relationship in which the views of certain prominent Fabians and the decision-maker were
already so close that what went on was chiefly a matter of reminders, memoranda, or of
suggesting details to fill out mutually-accepted plans.8
Creech Jones explained this very dynamic in a letter to Dr. Rita Hinden, who, at the time,
had solicited his feedback on a manuscript of the Fabian Colonial Bureau’s pamphlet Socialists
and the Empire. “The Bureau,” he explained in his critique of the manuscript (which he also
faulted for being “lame” and “uninspired”), “offered to the Party constructive ideas which when
the war was over needed to be implemented. It also strengthened certain tendencies in colonial
policy which compelled action during the war years, thus by the time the war was over social and
economic programmes were being launched, political development was proceeding, and many
postwar problems were being surveyed.”9 Thus, such ideas as were expressed by the Fabians
vis-à-vis affairs colonial were already part of the contemporary ideological firmament. They
lacked only sufficient impetus, due in large part to circumstance. And after spending five years
as chairman of the FCB, the organ chiefly responsible for researching and formulating colonial
policy recommendations on behalf of the Labor Party, Creech Jones was certainly in a position to
know.

David Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961: From “Colonial
Development” to “Wind of Change” (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 130-131.
9
Arthur Creech Jones to Dr. Rita Hinden, April 24, 1946, Bodleian Libraries, University of
Oxford [hereafter BLUO], MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau [hereafter FCB]
25/1
8
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There continued to be a stream of “constructive ideas” from the Bureau on how current
issues might be dealt with even after Creech Jones took up his position at Whitehall.10 As
Goldsworthy notes, the relationship between the secretary and the Bureau existed largely on the
level of “close personal friendship, finding expression in Creech Jones’ private, rather than his
official, correspondence, and in his frequent confidential discussions,” particularly with Dr.
Hinden, the secretary of the FCB, on both day-to-day and long-range problems.11
The following excerpts from correspondences between the Secretary of State and Dr.
Hinden prove illustrative of both aspects of Goldsworthy’s point. In March of 1947, Dr. Hinden
wrote to Creech Jones, noting that:
On 21st October, 1946, I addressed to you on behalf of my Committee a letter putting
forward certain proposals for action designed to win the confidence of the colonial
peoples and to encourage a less suspicious attitude than that which now prevails in some
of the colonial territories. You will remember that we proposed the holding of a colonial
conference in London which would give the opportunity of making certain
pronouncements regarding economic planning and race discrimination, and for
enunciating the outlines of this Government’s colonial policy. We also raised inter alia
the question of the appointment of governors.
You replied to us on 24th October, 1946, that our proposals were receiving your
consideration and you would communicate with us in greater detail at some later date.12
Creech Jones replied to Dr. Hinden’s query on April 16, 1947, explaining:
I have studied your suggestions with great interest and find that several of them are
matters which I have had in mind for some time past and with which I am hoping to make
progress this year. … I need hardly say how greatly I am fortified by your interest in the
framing of colonial policy.13
This postscript appears in Creech Jones’ hand at the bottom of the typewritten letter:
Perhaps I had better meet the Committee sometime to talk about some of these things.14
10

Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 134.
Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 135.
12
Rita Hinden to Arthur Creech Jones, March 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 25/2.
13
Creech Jones to Hinden, April 16, 1947, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 25/2.
14
Ibid.
11

11

This collaborative penchant framed the relationship between the Bureau and the
Secretary of State throughout his tenure. When coupled with the Fabians’ long-standing
association with the Labor Party, which by 1947 had witnessed the inclusion of several
prominent Fabians on Party advisory committees, this bond has done much to fuel a tendency
among scholars to amalgamate and conflate Labor’s colonial policy with that of the Fabians.
Indeed, it is precisely this dynamic that led K. O. Morgan to observe in Labour in Power that the
CO was “In many ways…the Fabian Colonial Research Bureau writ large.”15
While Morgan’s perspective is to a considerable extent justifiable, for our purposes it
tends toward abstruseness; for the relationship between the Party, the Bureau, and their former
chairman was nowhere near as straightforward as it implies. Nor even, as Goldsworthy has
noted, was it at all times understood to everyone’s satisfaction. To begin with, Fabian efforts
were often frustrated despite their long-standing association with Creech Jones. Indeed, when,
on several occasions the Bureau expressed views that differed from those of Creech Jones, it
found itself “pressing against official resistance,” particularly when it drew attention to aspects
of policy that compromised the Party’s principles as articulated by the minister himself.16 When,
on other occasions, the Bureau received written responses from the CO it deemed unsatisfactory,
it requested informal meetings with officials at Whitehall—which were only sometimes granted.
A further constraint on Fabian influence lay in the colonies themselves. By virtue of
constitutional convention, colonial governors could only be encouraged to vouchsafe initiatives
promulgated by the CO. They could not be compelled, as Creech Jones himself conceded in the

15

K. O. Morgan, Labour in Power, 1945-1951 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), 205-

16

Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 140.

206.

12

1950 Fabian pamphlet The Way Forward: “you cannot in Whitehall dictate the changes you want
in the Colonies.”17 Successful implementation of initiatives which emanated from the ministry
depended therefore on constant cooperation and, to borrow from Monica M. Van Beusekom,
negotiation between the CO and the in-situ regimes.18 For the Fabians and their like-minded ilk,
this reality was made especially thorny during the postwar period; for although government
witnessed the arrival of a Labor majority at Westminster in 1945, this ideological sea-change
was not mirrored by a similar alteration of colonial circumstance. Indeed, the colonies remained
largely in the hands of what Creech Jones referred to as “unimaginative reactionaries”:19
conservative appointees whose interests were served by resisting the Secretary’s policies. 20
The picture that develops of the relationship between the Fabians, Creech Jones, the CO,
Labor, and the territorial governments is, therefore, a complicated one, belying the simplistic
notion of a Fabian-dominated CO whose minister acted as little more than the Bureau’s cipher.
Indeed, it is quite clear that, regardless of their aspirations following Creech Jones’ appointment,
the Fabians could take nothing for granted.

Sources
My work is based to a considerable extent on the following source material: British
government records, most especially those produced by the CO, held at the British National
Archives, Kew (NA). This includes archived papers concerning the Colony and Protectorate of
Kenya and the Protectorate of Uganda. In addition, I used Hansard to examine British
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Parliamentary debates on colonial policy; this material is available online via the UK
Parliamentary Service. I visited the collections of the Weston Library, Oxford, where I explored
the papers of Arthur Creech Jones (ACJ), the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), Patrick Williams
(PEW) and Thomas G. Askwith (TGA). This material not only helped me to develop an
understanding of the relationship between the CO and the FCB, but also between the Bureau and
the Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP) and Labor’s National Executive Committee (NEC). The
papers of Williams and Askwith provided essential detailed clarity on the connection between
the 1948 Summer Conference and Kenya’s postwar community development regime. For
information on the origins and perspectives of the prewar Fabian Society, I used extensively the
digital holdings of the Fabian Society Archives (FSA) made available online by the London
School of Economics and Political Science (LSE). This includes the diary of Beatrice Webb
(nee Potter) and the Minutes of the Fabian Society. I also used the archives of the British Labor
Party, which reside at the People’s History Museum and Study Center, Manchester; this
collection includes the archived papers of the NEC and the PLP. I explored the collections
housed at University College London (UCL); I was able to access the archival holdings of the
Institute of Education’s (IOE) Department of Education in Tropical Areas, which included the
Annual Reports of Uganda Protectorate’s Department of Community Development.

Summary Review of Relevant Scholarship
This dissertation fits between several historical fields; in addition to British imperial
history, modern African history, and the associated field of colonial development scholarship, it
also shares space with the following historiographies: the history of the Fabian Society, the
British Labor Party, and British Socialism.

14
Development is amorphous, prompting David Simon to conclude that it “defies definition.”21
This resistance has led other scholars to broadly frame development as an outcome-driven, purposefullydirected process,22 one which rests somewhere between development as “means” and development as
“goal.” Complicating matters is the fact that “development” is freighted with controversy.
Applied incautiously, “development” suggests a “hierarchy of nations and communities” in which
those at a more advanced stage are duty-bound to “modernize” those that are less advanced.23 This
Whiggish view of progress imposed on the history of economics, international relations, and social
change is captured in W. W. Rostow’s The Stages of Economic Growth. In Rostow’s postwar view, the
modern Free West constitutes the apex of development. Nations and communities expressing a stage of
lesser development relative to this model ought to aspire to it, with the goal of achieving social evolution,
optimistic economic growth, and (of course) modernization through state direction.24 This is
Modernization Theory, and it is the closest scholars get to an “orthodox” view of development. It is also
the subject of much criticism and the point of origin for myriad development heterodoxies.
Bjorn Hettne, for example, takes to task Modernization Theory and addresses both the fluidity
and controversy of development. He argues that a “critical approach” to development is necessary not
only because the term itself is contested, but also because much of development practice is “rooted in
colonialism” and therefore contains “a good measure of paternalism, not to speak of arrogance and
racism.”25 Further, Hettne condemns orthodox development theory as the “intellectual origin” of
“underdevelopment” and proposes instead “another development,” one which would “transcend the
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European model” and “create a new kind of development thinking.”26 This model would be “egalitarian,”
“self-reliant,” “eco-,“ and “ethnodevelopmental.”
This “alternative development” theory argues against the Eurocentric view of development as a
top-down, externally-imposed process.27 Instead, it sees progress as part of what the International
Foundation for Development Alternatives (IFDA) has called a “third system.”28 This “third system” is
the segment of the population that has reached a kind of “critical consciousness,” a new awareness of
their role in society characterized by the view that the essence of history is an endless struggle in which
people try to master their own destiny. In this “humanist,” quasi-Marxist paradigm, agency rests not in
the hands of state bureaucrats, but rather it is manifested locally, at the community level.29 So conceived,
the process of alternative development is mapped thusly: first, development is an endogenous process;
that is, it stems “from the heart of each society, which defines in sovereignty its values and the vision of
its future;” second, it is “self-reliant,” meaning each society relies primarily on its own “strength and
resources in terms of its members’ energies and its natural and cultural environment;” third, it is
ecologically sound; lastly, it is based on structural transformation, which is necessary for realizing the
“conditions of self-management and participation in decision-making.” As such, alternative development
is development from the bottom-up: it is divorced from external, state pressure and has as its goal the
restoration of initiative to a nation’s disempowered sectors – which happens also to be most of the
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population. Furthermore, unlike Modernization Theory, alternative development proposes no silver
bullet, no “universal path” that, if followed, makes a nation or community “developed.”30
As this dissertation will show, the Fabianized model of colonial development rests somewhere
between Rostow’s Modernization Theory and the “alternative development” approaches discussed above.
This juxtaposition was on marked display at the CO’s 1948 Summer Conference on African
Administration, which produced the following definition of mass education/community development:

We understand the term “mass education” to mean a movement designed to promote
better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on
the initiative of the community; but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, it
should be aroused and stimulated by special techniques designed to secure the active and
enthusiastic response of the community. Mass education embraces all forms of
betterment. It includes the whole range of community development activities in the
districts, whether these are undertaken by Government or unofficial bodies; in the field of
agriculture by securing the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better
methods of farming and care of livestock, in the field of health by promoting better
sanitation and water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity
welfare; and in the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as
by the extension and improvement of schools for children. Mass education must make
use of the cooperative movement and must be put into effect in the closest association
with local government bodies.31
While this definition accepts the possibility of endogenous (“bottom up”) community
development (i.e. “better living…on the initiative of the community”), it is couched in the
paternalistic language of midcentury Eurocentric development discourse. Failing local-level,
“spontaneous” initiative, it is to be “aroused” by Europeans (“top-down”) who, through the
agency of Mass Education/Community Development Officers, demonstration teams, and
centralized training centers, can “stimulate” indigenous initiative and thus achieve “progress.”
Significantly, progress as envisioned here is facilitated by the very same institutions that were
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critical to the development of self-government in England in the nineteenth century:
cooperatives and local government bodies.
This dissertation is not concerned with defining colonial development; rather, it
acknowledges and adopts the term “colonial development” as it is broadly accepted and
understood in the prevailing contemporary historiography.32 For our purposes, “colonial
development” is understood to describe a process or series of processes which are meant to
either: a) result in the more efficient exploitation of the economic assets of a colony; b) provide
for the social betterment of colonial subjects (through, for example, local-level initiatives
concerned with the improvement of health, education, and welfare as imposed by the imperial
power); or c) a development regime which combines aspects of both (in whole or in part). This
definition shares space with the work of Riley and Michael Jennings, both of whom
acknowledge that “it is not always possible to isolate instances of ‘economic’ development from
those of ‘social’ development.”33
At the nexus of these considerations lies the Fabian Society, its Colonial Bureau, the
British Labor Party, and the so-called colonial development offensive of the immediate postwar
period. Historically, scholarly output concerned even tangentially with the subject of Fabian
influence on postwar colonial development policy has tended to be reflexive, dismissing Fabian
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influence as part of a vague but growing disillusionment with Labor’s state-directed colonial
development regime, the administration of which lay to a considerable extent in the hands of
Creech Jones in his capacity as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.
Privileged by opponents of Labor’s ambitious postwar “colonial development offensive,”
the central conceit of this critique, as Cowen and Shenton have noted, is to invoke the costly
failures of the East African Groundnut Scheme and the Gambia Egg Scheme as the “ultimate
exemplars” of the sheer folly of the program of postwar development. The attendant orgy of
excess and cynicism, meticulously and dutifully documented by Labor’s own bureaucrats and
condemned by Conservatives who bemoaned Labor’s socialism (often, as Murphy has noted,
after the fact34), is meant to bring to an end the debate surrounding Labor’s development regime
and, by extension, the soundness of “Fabianized” state planning. As Susan Cooper has written:
“[Labor] had already made a mistake with the groundnut scheme in East Africa: no good done
for morale there. Instead they turned to food, to schemes for relieving shortage…. In doing so,
they accidentally touched a spring of absurdity revealing perhaps more than anything else the
strength which had resisted the series of catastrophes that had gone before.”35
With little variation, such criticism has been oft-repeated over the past sixty-odd years,
producing a scholarship shot-through with a contrarian perspective. Indeed, decades after
Cooper’s verdict, T. E. B. Howarth wielded the very same stick with which to beat the postwar
planners. “Even the most paralytic Parliamentary opposition,” he wrote, “could scarcely have
failed to make some capital out of mistakes of this magnitude, and the Conservatives were now
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beginning to recover a measure of their old confidence.”36 Meanwhile, Hugh Thomas observed,
“The groundnut scheme, in retrospect, seems to have been an object lesson as to how not to run a
public undertaking.”37 It was this propensity to which M. Newman referred when he wrote in
John Strachey, his biography of the Fabian-influenced Minister of Food and shepherd of the
groundnuts scheme: “When [Strachey] died in 1963, many obituary writers were more interested
in recalling groundnuts than in discussing his theoretical contributions to socialism.
This…reflected the success of a contemporary right-wing campaign to exaggerate the affair once
it became clear that it was an area on which the government was vulnerable.”38
Despite the apologist minority, a largely ungenerous view persists in the historiography,
and further examples are legion: John Lonsdale’s “East Africa,” Anguibou Yan Yansane’s
Development Strategies in Africa, Philip Murphy’s Party Politics and Decolonization, and
Michael Havinden’s and David Meredith’s Colonialism and Development: Britain and its
Tropical Colonies, to name a few.39 It is arguable, however, that it is nowhere expressed more
vividly and comprehensively than in Paul Kelemen’s article, “Planning for Africa: The British
Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 1920-1964.”40 Kelemen not only takes to task
earlier justifications for Labor’s postwar colonial interventionism—rejecting both the welfarist
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and sterling-imbalance arguments—but, like D. K. Fieldhouse before him,41 characterizes the
“Fabianizing of the Empire” as “exploitative of the colonies,” arguing that it had more in
common with Joseph Chamberlain’s colonial estates doctrine than with anything Sydney and
Beatrice Webb had envisioned.42 More recently, a trend has emerged in the historiography in
which the Fabians are accused of cloaking their erstwhile imperialism with a mantle of social
betterment in order to perpetuate the very empire they ostensibly opposed. This tendency has
manifested assertions that the Fabians “stopped short” of calling for the independence of
Britain’s colonies and that the FCB believed the future of the British Empire lay not in
independence “as such,” but in a relationship “defined by looser bonds.”43 As propounded by
Riley, the argument suggests that the Fabians were at best lukewarm toward the notion of
colonial independence and sought, instead, the reform of the empire, not its dissolution.
While to a point such perspectives are justifiable, particularly considering the sterling
crisis of 1947 and the related work of the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and the Colonial
Development Corporation (CDC), these trends have done little to advance the argument beyond
the narrowly-construed, voguish anti-imperial sentiment and criticism that has marked the
subject of postwar British imperialism in general, and Fabian-influenced colonial development in
particular, since the 1950s. For their part, Murphy, Lonsdale, Fieldhouse, and Havinden and
Meredith have adopted virtually the same analytical framework based on the same set of
assumptions: first, a high correlation between Fabian-favored, welfarist initiatives and official
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colonial practice (as distinguished from policy). Second, they privilege the phenomenon of
large-scale, mechanized postwar development in the colonies necessitated by fiscal exigency
which marginalizes (or outright ignores) the small-scale, community-level engagement projects
designed to motivate native initiative and progress identified by Creech Jones as the fulcrum of a
successful colonial development regime. Meanwhile, Riley oversimplifies the Fabian position
on colonial independence. First, the looser bonds to which she refers are doubtless a reflection
of the Fabians’ penchant for gradualness; that is, the belief that the development of colonial
people’s democratic institutions—trade unions, cooperatives, local government, political
associations, and so forth—was necessary if the “advance to freedom” was to be accompanied by
what the Bureau saw as “social justice,” with its concomitant educational, economic, and civil
equality.44 The logic for doing so, as will be demonstrated, was reference back to Britain’s own
historical experience. It was, after all, these institutions which were the basis of Britain’s own
parliamentary democracy. In effect, this was the Fabian touchstone for self-government, with
the fatal flaw being that the ideological DNA which lay at the back of British parliamentary
democracy was not necessarily compatible with conditions in colonial Africa. However, to view
the development regimes derived from these notions, with the intention of arriving at selfgovernment at some unfixed date, as red herrings across the path of immediate self-government
is off the mark.45
Further, I contend that the contemporary historiography has perpetuated an obscurantist
view of postwar colonial development, the majority of which was designed not to usher forth a
revolutionary change in the condition of Africans in great bursts of innovation made manifest by
mechanized modernity (like the groundnuts scheme), but rather to unfold gradually at the local
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level as a means of stimulating the desire amongst Africans for their own progress. This
distinction, I argue, is not semantic pettifogging; rather, it lay at the heart of the colonial
development enterprise as imagined by Arthur Creech Jones and, at least for Creech Jones and
the FCB, was the axis on which ultimately its success or failure pivoted. As Creech Jones
himself reminded the governors of Britain’s African territories at the 1948 African Conference in
London: “It is for this reason that in recent colonial policy we have sought so strenuously to
promote voluntary service and mutual aid, we have talked much about breaking through
ignorance by community education, about extending mass education and literacy, and
encouraging individual and community initiative.”46
It is this same collaborative hinge (or lack thereof) that in 1950 Dr. Hinden identified as
the prima ratio of colonial development in a letter to Robert Brady, author of Crisis in Britain.
Dr. Hinden wrote that, in the “working out of the ten-year development plans, many Colonies
have drawn in Committee after Committee of local people to advise them…. The point is made
in every debate in Parliament; and in the individual ‘community-development’ plans in different
parts of Africa consultation has gone down to the lowest levels. It is mainly in the big
Development Corporation schemes—such as groundnuts—that consultation has been entirely
lacking….”47 Like Creech Jones, Dr. Hinden envisioned “true” colonial development as a
cooperative effort defined by a bottom-up approach centered on African villages and
communities, rather than the “big” development schemes whose implementation lay outside the
purview of the CO.
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This singular aspect of the postwar colonial development regime, characterized by
modest, decidedly unsexy and inexpensive schemes (relative to such large-scale industrial
projects as the production of eggs in West Africa) concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its
most basic level, remains overlooked and chronically underserved by contemporary
historiography. It is in this regard that my work shares historiographic space with Riley, whose
research on postwar colonial development in Africa likewise challenges the tendency of the
scholarship to emphasize high-profile failures by arguing that, in a number of key areas,
especially “health, education, and social welfare,” development was “quietly successful.”48
Perhaps nowhere is the effort at “quietly successful” colonial development more apparent
than in the efforts of the Fabian Colonial Bureau. The members of the FCB observed a particular
version of socialism which, very early in the development of the Fabian Society, came to be
known as “Fabianism.” Fabianism, to borrow from M. Margaret McCarran, is a socialist
“mentality” exemplified by members of the Fabian Society either individually (as, for example,
lecturers, politicians, or journalists) or as an “anonymous cohort” of devoted workers “for Social
Democracy.”49 As such, it is endowed with a collectivist social theory and is distinguished by a
belief in the evolutionary and peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism through nonrevolutionary “gradualism”:50 that is, the bringing about of socialism not through the direct
action or violence promoted by orthodox Marxism, but rather through research and, ultimately,
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the permeation and penetration of Britain’s political classes. Fabianism, pace Terence Qualter, is
the “gospel of state-socialism rather than anarchist-socialism.”51
While inarguably accurate, this tidy definition is nonetheless disingenuous, for it
bequeaths coherence to the amorphous ideological heritage which lay at the back of Fabianism,
the wellsprings of which—like modern British socialism itself—lie deep in the history of
Victorian society.52 Indeed, when considered philosophically, Fabianism—no less than its great
contemporaries, liberalism and socialism—is manifestly an agglomeration of au courant
“plebeian and middle-class radicalisms.”53 So considered, it is, contra-Ernest Barker,54 neither a
“compact” nor “hermetically-sealed” package of traditions;55 instead, historians generally agree,
Fabianism’s pedigree exhibits a mongrelized intellectual genealogy that has, at various times and
to varying degrees, compassed, inter alia: the (quantitative) utilitarianism of Bentham, the
(qualitative) utilitarianism of J. S. Mill, the (ethical) positivism of Auguste Comte, the social
reform of Robert Owen, the ethical socialism embodied by the work of such intellectuals as T. H.
Green, the rent theories of David Ricardo (filtered through Stanley Jevon and Henry George to
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suit England’s industrial context), the political reforms of the Chartists, and even the socialism of
Marx.56
It was these selfsame radicalisms which, throughout the nineteenth century, generated a
near-constant source of pressure to not only reform parliament, but also address the problems
created by commercial society and industrialization—especially poverty and large-scale
unemployment, which were “not susceptible to political solutions as such,” but required “new
schemes” of economic organization, such as collectivism.57 As H.C. G. Matthew and M. Taylor
have quite rightly observed, it was owing to this climate of social and economic expectation that
a series of “incremental” reform measures to redress such long-standing grievances as workingclass enfranchisement and labor organization took hold in Great Britain, producing by
midcentury something like a “rapprochement” between the existing political order, reformminded liberals, and (the now-ageing) radicals.58 These conditions subdued, but did not
altogether suppress, criticism of the political system as a whole.59 The reconciliation, such as it
was, was short-lived; for in the 1880s, agricultural and industrial depression dovetailed with both
the growing popularity of Marxian socialism on the Continent and the coalescence of what Jon
Lawrence has described as a still-“vibrant radical subculture”60 in Great Britain to produce a
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“socialist revival.”61 It was against the backdrop of this late-Victorian recrudescence, set amidst
riots of the unemployed and strikes by phossy-jawed matchgirls, militant dockworkers, and other
unskilled laborers, that Fabianism was born.62
An exercise in parsing Fabianism is an exercise equally in confirming Michael Freeden’s
admonishment that “ideologies are modular structures, frequently exhibiting a highly fluid
morphology.”63 And indeed, despite having been founded in 1884, the Fabian Society lacked a
coherent program for some time. In point of fact, although the Fabians later formally repudiated
the “catastrophic insurrectionism” of the Marxian school,64 a number of earlier Fabian works—
those published before a distinctive “Fabian approach” had “jelled,” to borrow from Busky—
suggest something like a voguish (and lingering) flirtation with Marxism: Fox and Gordon, for
example, read Marxism in Facts for Londoners (1889) as well as Sidney Webb’s English
Progress Towards Social Democracy (1890), while Sweezy labors extensively over evidence of
Marxism in George Bernard Shaw’s chapter “Economic,” which appeared in the Fabian
bestseller Essays in Socialism in 1889.65 But when, the following year, the Fabian Executive
Committee published the Bernard Shaw-penned tract What Socialism Is, it disclaimed Marx’s
rigidly deterministic class-based division of society. According to G. Foote, the Fabians had
come to believe that Marx was “fundamentally wrong” about the nature of profit and that the
capitalists exploited the workers and adopted instead the alternative view that the “real” class
struggle was between the “idle owners” and the “producers”—that is, those who did nothing to

Adelman, The Rise of the Labour Party, 1-2; Claeys, “Political Thought,” 197; Lawrence,
“Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain,” 172.
62
Sally Alexander, Women’s Fabian Tracts (Abingdon: Routledge, 1988), 3.
63
Michael Freeden, Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996), 88.
64
Paul W. Fox and H. Scott Gordon, “The Early Fabian-Economists and Reformers,” The
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue canadienne 17, no. 3 (Aug. 1951): 317.
65
Ibid., 244.
61

27

earn their money and those who did all the work.66 The tract’s policy prescriptions did not end
there; for it not only confirmed the Fabian pivot away from anarchism, the source of much
debate and, thus, friction since 1886, in favor of state collectivism,67 but it likewise invoked
worker enfranchisement (and with it, the spirit of Chartism) as a means of banishing the
“propertied classes from the House of Commons.”68
For all this, What Socialism Is reflects the larger pattern of ideological maturation
underway among the infant society since 1887, the year the Fabians issued the programmatic
tract The True Radical Programme. A discursive riposte to The Official Liberal-Radical
Programme, The True Radical Programme brought together a number of nineteenth-century
radicalisms and, as A. M. McBriar notes, constituted them as the “sum and substance” of early
Fabianism.69 “Amplified” and “modified” by subsequent tracts throughout the 1890s, most
notably in the tract, The Workers’ Political Program, this foundational ideological schema called
for, inter alia: parliamentary and local government reform (echoing the Chartist movement’s
calls for adult suffrage, annual parliaments, and payment for MPs); the “progressive” taxation of
the unearned income or “economic rent” (i.e. profit) of the idle classes to be redistributed to the
laboring and poorest members of society (a notion of “leveling down” drawn and adapted from a
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variety of sources, including Ricardo, George, and Jevon-via-Wicksteed70); collectivism and
state interference (as embodied by appeals for the municipalization of land to compete with
private industry and the nationalization of such key industries as railways, elements which
suggest the influence not only of Ricardo’s Theory of Rent, but also T. H. Green’s evolutionary
approach to social development and the New Liberalism71); and the state-directed reform of
workhouses and the provision of compulsory education (a notion of “leveling up” society drawn
partly from Owenite social reform, with its effort to create a “new moral world,” and, once again,
New Liberalism72).
If, as McBriar posits, The True Radical Programme manifested the earliest programmatic
Fabianism, it would have remained little more than an amalgam of reformist radicalisms had it
not been for the prescriptive formulations of Sidney Webb. For it was Webb73 who, according to
Mark Bevir, believed that the peaceful transition from capitalism to socialism could be achieved
only by working through England’s traditional democratic institutions, a framework of
representational government he extended to include not only the institutions of local government,
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but also trade unions and cooperatives.74 For Webb, democratic England, suitably reformed and
(more) broadly enfranchised, would, in time, produce a political class receptive to the ideas of
socialism. The slow-moving “permeation” of this sympathetic group by “experts” (e.g. the
Fabians) would result in democratic institutions that gradually acquired increasingly progressive
accretions, such as a regulatory capacity over industry. In this way, Webb believed, industry
need not be commandeered; rather, it need only be administered by a minister of government or
“specialist” whose role it was “to establish an integrated, cooperative, and thus efficient
organization.”75 This same collectivist state would “enforce” social “duties” through taxation, a
process which would, ultimately, yield public provisions for such things as education, museums,
parks, and health services.76 Thus Webb, and, eventually, the Fabians, equated socialism with
the efficient, cooperative, and coordinated organization of society achieved through state
activity. This reflected not only Webb’s peculiar form of utilitarianism—which produced a
socialism “limited to practical efforts to modify the existing…order”77—but also his belief that
the principle of natural selection, much on the Victorian public’s mind since Darwin’s Origin of
Species, taught that more efficient societies thrived.78
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Fabian Society had welded together various
elements of then-current radicalisms and emplaced them as the struts and armatures of their own
ideological framework, one calculated to realize the “dream of the Socialist on sound economic
principles, by gradual, peaceful, and constitutional means.”79 In the broadest possible sense,
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then, fin-de-siècle Fabianism sought not only to extend democracy and improve the machinery of
democratic government, but to expand government powers in a way that yielded “positive
government action” as a means of promoting social and economic equality.80 It was a vision of
(J. S.) Millite utilitarianism and Comtean positivism in that it was designed, in the last, to secure
“the greatest happiness of the greatest number” through state-directed activity. The end result
was a vision of social democracy that persisted, in one form or another, as the basis of Fabianism
for the next half century.
The principles embedded within Fabianism had considerable future implications,
particularly when extended to the British Empire. As we shall see, the society at first struggled
to reconcile Fabianism with the domestic exigencies inspired by empire. Formulated to address
the specific domestic grievances that had arisen in late-Victorian England, Fabianism’s sphere of
interest all but excluded imperial or colonial policy considerations. The advent of the Second
Wave of Industrialization, however, and the international economic competition it stimulated,
especially from Germany, threatened the global economic dominance Britain had enjoyed since
at least the end of the eighteenth century. As a result, the domestic industrial context came
increasingly to the fore of imperial policy considerations, both at the level of officialdom and
within the Fabian Society itself. At first, the Fabians responded by hewing closely to the proimperial policy stance of Whitehall, as expressed in Joseph Chamberlain’s Imperial Estates
Doctrine. Progressively, however, the more conscientious members of the society recognized
the exercise of this policy, or “social-imperialism” as it was known, as fundamentally
exploitative of colonial subjects. This realization prompted a considerable revision of official
Fabian policy, one formulated initially by (Lord) Sydney Olivier in the tract Imperial Trusteeship
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(1929). This was the beginning of the gradual evolution of the Fabian Society’s colonial policy
recommendations which incorporated, as Kelemen notes, a “social democratic model of
development.”81 By 1950, the evolution of the Fabians’ social trusteeship, which framed
indigenous African interests as paramount and emphasized community betterment in terms of
health, education, and welfare, culminated in “The Social Foundation of Trusteeship,” a
prescriptive framework intended to guide not only imperial governance, but colonial
development as well.

Outline of Chapters
The first chapter considers the early development of the Fabian Society and concludes
with the advent of the South African War. While it examines the origins of the society, notably
the place of the Fellowship of New Life in the Fabian heritage, especially close attention is paid
to the early formulation of Fabianism and the ideological DNA which lay at its back. In the
second chapter, this dissertation explores the deepening affinity between the Labor Party,
effectively born with the creation of the Labor Representation Committee in 1906, and the
Fabian Society. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the processes and ideological
proclivities which brought the Fabian Society and Labor together. We witness, first, the depth
and breadth of Fabian permeation insofar as it informed Labor’s official policy and, second, the
maturation of the Society as it struggled through a period of intellectual stagnation and nearextinction only to witness, in 1938-9, an ideological rebirth. In chapter three, the evolution of
Fabian perspectives on imperial trusteeship are explored, alongside a discussion of Fabian
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influence of colonial development policy during the Second World War. While Fabian efforts at
permeating political elites of the Coalition Government manifested changes in both mass
education and colonial cooperative policy before the end of the war, the “welfarist agenda”
which lay at the heart of Arthur Creech Jones’ favored policy initiatives was seriously
undermined by the sterling crisis of 1947. The chapter elaborates the impact of this crisis, and
the concomitant pivot toward large-scale mechanized agricultural production (in the form of the
East Africa Groundnut Scheme and the West Africa Egg Scheme), while also exploring the
establishment and work of the FCB between 1940 and 1945. Chapter four explores the
“Fabianization of the British Empire.” It takes as its point of departure the vehicle arguably bestpositioned to achieve this, the 1948 Colonial Summer Conference on African Administration.
The nucleus of this conference, the second of three convened while Arthur Creech Jones was
Secretary of State for the Colonies, was mass education/community development. As such, it
connects Creech Jones’ earlier work with the CO’s Advisory Committee on Education in the
Colonies (ACEC), and the report which resulted, Mass Education in African Society, with the
postwar colonial development initiatives enacted while the Fabian and former chairman of the
FCB was in a position to determine and guide official policy. The conference is discussed at
some length, fleshing out the connections between the organizers and leaders of the conference
and the Fabian Society, along with the results of its deliberations. These policy formulations—in
effect, a reimagining of mass education as community development—are then examined as
implemented in two of Britain’s East African colonies: Kenya and Uganda. Here, we witness
not only the evolution of a pair of closely-associated community development regimes, but also
the multiplicity of indigenous, colonial, and metropolitan factors which ultimately helped
influence the shape and efficacy of community development as realized on the ground. The
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conclusions drawn at the end of the chapter, which consider some of the chief ideological and
practical flaws embedded within community development, notably the paternalistic reliance on
motivating African initiative and the broader implications this had for community development,
are augmented by a concluding chapter. This concluding chapter sets out to examine some of the
contradictions of Fabian colonial development designs, chiefly those surrounding the question of
colonial independence, and considers whether or not the intention of the Fabians was autonomy
for Britain’s African territories, or rather something like a reformed imperialism. Included is a
section which posits the notion, refracted through the globalization of community development
during the Cold War and the new, hegemonic position of the United States in international
affairs, that the Fabianization of the British Empire could only ever be “partial,” to borrow from
Dr. Hinden.82 The final section unpacks and assesses the notion of “partial” Fabianization with a
discussion of this dissertation’s findings and argues that sufficient evidence exists to determine
that Fabianized community development was “quietly,” if relatively, successful.
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CHAPTER 1: 1880s-1899
On the Origins and Early Evolution of Fabianism: Ideological Refractions of LateVictorian England’s Reformist Zeitgeist, from the Socialist Revival to Social-Imperialism
For the right moment you must wait, as Fabius did most patiently, when warring
against Hannibal, though many censured his delays; but when the time comes you
must strike hard, as Fabius did, or your waiting will be in vain and fruitless.
—Explanatory Note, Why Are the Many
Poor?, Fabian Tract No. 1 (1884)1

Introduction
A product of the late-Victorian socialist revival, the selfsame crucible of ideology from
whence Marxism exploded with such portentous vigor, the Fabian Society formed around a
nucleus of radicals determined to “do something” about the manifold political, social, and
economic injustices wrought on the English working-class by industrialization. Just what that
“something” was, however, remained frustratingly elusive for several years. Indeed, it was not
until the end of the 1880s that the Fabians promulgated something like a comprehensive
philosophical framework on which to hang their particular “brand” of socialism, which they soon
unimaginatively called “Fabianism.” An admixture of contemporary Victorian-era ideologies—a
kind of “-isms” All Sorts that included, inter alia: socialism, liberalism, positivism, Chartism,
and utilitarianism, all seasoned copiously with an overarching sense of social justice—nascent
Fabianism was first, last, and foremost, a domestically-oriented ideology. Bent toward rectifying
industrialism’s more egregious inequities as manifest in the cramped dwellings of England’s
soot-choked streets and the factories in which their inhabitants daily toiled, Fabianism’s
prescriptive formulae adamantly excluded the empire as a variable in its arithmetic. Until, that
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is, the South African War of 1899 forced a revision. The result was a calculus whose insular
solution yoked the socialist cause at home—reform for the working class—to the Fate of Empire
abroad. The upshot was a Fabian-favored paradigm of social-imperialism that aligned the
society with Westminster’s pro-imperial (and anti-Boer) agenda.
This development, for all its practical implications in terms of Fabian designs, was not
without consequence. For an irreparable schism soon formed within the society and fractured it,
prompting the attrition of its most ardent anti-imperial progressive elements, including J. Ramsay
MacDonald. Having been vacated of dissenting voices, the Fabian executive then promulgated
Fabianism and the Empire, the society’s first official manifesto vis-à-vis matters imperial. In
doing so, the Fabians effectively cemented their somewhat ignominious position as the only
prominent socialist group in Britain to support the government’s blatantly imperialist war effort
in South Africa. With few exceptions, notably the great Tariff Reform debate of 1906, the
Fabian executive did not invest itself or the society in imperial politics for the next twenty-odd
years—that is until 1929, when the society published Imperial Trusteeship. Written by Sydney
Olivier, the tract revoked Chamberlainite trusteeship, the exploitative system which hitherto was
an essential operational feature of Westminster’s (and, by extension, the Fabians’) socialimperial model.
In time, these formulations were folded into the principal rubric of Fabianism, the
adherents of which had, by the middle of the twentieth century, come to be defined as observing
a collectivist social theory and as being distinguished by a belief in the evolutionary and peaceful
transition from capitalism to socialism through non-revolutionary “gradualism;”2 that is, the
bringing about of socialism not through the direct action or violence promoted by orthodox
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Marxism, but rather through research and, ultimately, the permeation and penetration of Britain’s
political classes. Fabianism is, in other words, a “gospel of state socialism rather than anarchistsocialism.”3
This chapter examines the origins of the Fabian Society and its core philosophy,
Fabianism. It takes as its point of departure the convergence of Victorian-era ideologies and the
industrial conditions which inspired them. We witness how these circumstances created a sense
among certain segments of England’s middle-class population to “do something” about the
injustices visited upon the working-class by industrialism. The Fabian Society was, manifestly,
an epiphenomenal byproduct of this desire, which reached an apex during the so-called socialist
revival of the 1880s. By the end of the decade, the young men who constituted the Fabian
Society formulated a non-revolutionary, anti-anarchic socialism that came to represent the
foundational ethos of Fabianism. This chapter includes an exploration of Fabian efforts to
influence (“permeate”) Britain’s fin-de-siècle political discourse and how these efforts,
inescapably informed by the upheaval of the Liberal Party and the South African War, resulted in
the society’s first forays into imperial policy formulation.

Fabian Origins: In the Beginning—The Supernatural and the Fellowship of the New Life
Society for Psychical Research. Haunted House Com(mittee).
–Fabian Society Executive Committee
Minute Book, 23 December 1885 – 21
January 1887
It may perhaps seem unusual that a minute book of the Fabian Society’s Executive
Committee should have written at the top in the fluid, upright hand of Edward Pease, the
3
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society’s long-serving secretary, a heading that is so strikingly phantasmagoric. And yet, the
Executive Committee’s Minute Book from 1885 begins with precisely this heading, albeit
scribbled out. The obvious question is, why? What, if anything, does Thomas Linehan’s
portrayal of the Fabians as “scientistic”4 have in common with the dubiously spiritualistic
Society for Psychical Research (SPR)? A number of straightforward—and dismissive—
explanations do in fact present themselves: it is a reused minute book and is therefore a
curiosity, but indicative of nothing; hastening, the secretary forgot himself and belatedly
corrected his error or, perhaps the Fabian Society was briefly—if incongruously—affiliated with
the SPR. The answer, we find, is rather more compelling and revealing, not only of the Fabians
but indeed the era that gave birth to them, than implied by any of these explanations.
In his study of British Socialism and its influence on the arts in the late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth centuries, Ian Britain notes that the origins of the Fabian Society are “a matter of
dispute.”5 While it is undoubtedly true that the circumstances are rather more opaque than
transparent, history nevertheless presents us with a moment, fleeting to be sure, when
complementary strands of Victorian-era popular, political, and metaphysical culture met and
fused, forging a kind of intellectual nexus from which would spring a few years later the
imperfectly-formed nucleus of the Fabian Society. That moment we can trace to an intriguingly
un-Fabian-like milieu: a darkened, purportedly haunted house in London’s still-gentrifying
Notting Hill neighborhood. There, huddled in the bleak interior of the unoccupied house, sat two
future founder members of the Fabian Society in the “foolish hope that we might perceive
something abnormal”: Edward Pease and Frank Podmore. The circumstances which brought the
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two men together that evening were their mutual interests in spiritualism and psychical research,
the controversial Victorian obsession with testing the objective reality of spirit manifestations.
That Pease would go on to serve as secretary of the SPR’s Haunted House Committee testifies to
the depth of his interest—and explains why, sometime later, he used an old committee minute
book to record a series of meetings of the Fabian Society executive between 1885 and 1887.
Yet the pursuit of the supernatural was not atypical for members of Victorian England’s
intellectual elite broadly alive to the potential locked away in mesmeric, psychical, and
spiritualistic phenomena.6 As Michael Cox and R. A. Gilbert explain:
The Victorian age seems to be invested with a peculiar quality of difference…that is
reflected in its ghosts. It was an age shaped, perhaps more than any other previous
period, by the forces of transition. … With the shadow of change falling across virtually
every area of life and thought, the receding past became a focus for anxiety, and in
literature the ghost story offered a way of anchoring the past to an unsettled present by
operating in a continuum of life and death. In the ghost story, obligations do not cease
with death, and the past is never a closed book. What has been can be again, though
often terribly transformed. For a progressive age…the idea of a vindictive past held an
especial potential for terror.7

This gothic preoccupation with psychical forces reflects, as Daphne du Maurier put it, an
“anxious, weary time”8 during which Britain’s ideological breakwaters, mortared together by the
politics of laissez-faire capitalism, were fatally undermined and, in some cases, overcome by the
revolutionary changes that were afoot. And although the troubles of the past stalked the
darkened recesses of the Victorian consciousness like some formless beast, “future consequences
of present actions”9 haunted contemporaries to no less degree—and with electrifying effect. For
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quixotic men like Pease and Podmore, this culminated in a reunion of sorts in Chelsea in the
autumn of 1883, when the two men found themselves attending the same lecture by Thomas
Davidson, an American émigré.
A “peripatetic and pretentious scholar of humble Scottish birth,” Janet Oppenheim
explains, “who collected disciples as he roamed,”10 the wandering Davidson returned to London
full of interest in the philosophy of Rosmini11 and on a mission to form “a small society of likeminded persons for the reorganization of individual life, and thereby the gradual uplifting of
society to higher levels.”12 Watchwords such as “uplift” and “reorganization” cast against the
ghastly tableau of social inequity characteristic of the late-Victorian industrial age were a virtual
tripwire for the morally-sensitive amongst the English middle class. And Davidson’s idealism
was no less than manna for some in this umbrage-prone group, which sat at the table of the
country’s recent bleak industrial past and supped on a veritable a-la-carte menu of ethical
socialisms—from the work of Robert Owen and men like T. H. Green and William Maclure to
the Rochdale Pioneers—intended to correct the worst ravages of industrialization. Like these
and many others, Davidson was that quintessential man of ideas the Victorian age produced in
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such abundance: an evangelist of ethical socialism orbited sun-like by “a number of people
interested in religious thought, ethical propaganda, and social reform.” Included among these
adherents were many who constituted the nucleus of the early Fabian Society: Podmore and
Pease, of course; but also Havelock Ellis, Hubert Bland, and Percival Chubb.13
The chief concern of the so-called “Davidsonian Fellowship”14 was not in fact the dread
past, which so haunted contemporaries, but instead the forging of that most alluring of antiindustrial Victorian ideals: a socialist-utopian future shorn of the industrial age’s grievous social
injustices.15 And although Davidson did not himself linger long in London before returning to
Italy,16 the company he gathered around him—marshalled by Chubb, Davidson’s very own John
the Baptist—was inspired to hold a series of meetings at which they debated the essence of
Davidson’s grandiose vision: the creation of a brotherhood devoted to the attainment of ethical
perfection in its members and, ultimately, throughout all society.17 What emerged was the soidisant English Fellowship of the Vita Nuova, the founding principle of which was the alleviation
of the deformities plaguing Victorian society through the “subordination of material things to
spiritual things.”18
Almost immediately, the nascent brotherhood fractured. The obvious religious and
ethical essentialism prescribed by the founding principle triggered impassioned rejections by
such would-be adherents as Frank Podmore, who saw in the unregulated operation of the
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Victorian economic system the harsh tangible means by which the English working class was
oppressed, condemned to an unimaginably grim existence chained to Britain’s industrial engine.
Thus, on December 16, 1883, Podmore wrote to the society’s secretary, the orthodox
Davidsonian Chubb,19 that “some of us, after talking the matter over, find that we cannot
subscribe to the resolution…. At the same time we wish to have a society, only on more general
lines.”20 Two weeks later, Podmore addressed a similarly-veined letter to Davidson confessing,
“I feel so uncertain what is meant by religion, that I do not like to use the word—at present. I
wish to learn: & I have not yet learnt enough to enable me to sympathise with the creed of the
Fellowship heart & soul."21 Increasingly for some, the solution lay not in the existentialist aim
of “being something,” but in the materialist aim of “doing something;” in the creation of a
brotherhood “which will not necessarily be exclusive of the ‘Fellowship’” but invested with a
character that emphasized materialist solutions to the ills that tormented Victorian society.22
Appalled, Podmore’s rhetoric managed to justify Chubb’s suspicions concerning the
now-hereticated materialists, whom he derided to Davidson as “not of the right fibre for a
movement such as ours” and would later condemn as “merely materialistic, atheistic, aggressive”
socialists.23 Nevertheless, there would be no turning back as the fissure between the two
groups—the orthodox Davidsonian acolytes and Podmore’s secularists—opened wide, and from
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it sprang the “more socialist” Fabian Society.24 The timing was not coincidental; for in
Podmore’s labored, moralizing justification we glimpse the uncomfortable juxtaposition of belief
and doubt that helped stir the ideologically complacent late-Victorian middle-class from a
decades-long reverie. The age of the great “socialist revival” was at hand.

Changes Afoot: Radicalism, the Socialist Revival, and Early Fabianism
In a sense, the socialist revival signals both an ideological terminus as well as an
embarkation; for on the one hand, it marks the end of the rapprochement that had characterized
relations between the existing political order, reform-minded liberals, and radicals ever since the
1850s. Indeed, despite the persistence of a still-“vibrant radical subculture,”25 centered primarily
on “obscure” working men’s clubs “dominated” by Marxian socialists from the Continent, it had
been a remarkably inactive period for nearly thirty years, at least in terms of organized socialist
movements in Great Britain.26 On the other hand, however, the socialist revival portends the
emergence of a decidedly more volatile revolutionary movement, one set amidst economic
depression—and its multitudinous precipitates, including riots of the unemployed and strikes by
phossy-jawed matchgirls, militant dockworkers, and other unskilled laborers—and infused with
political disillusionment.27 It was this paroxysmal context which gave rise to the Fabian Society
and, in time, its socialist “mentality,” Fabianism.28
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It was a profound wellspring, yet the Fabian Society that celebrated its inauguration on
January 4, 1884 possessed nothing like a coherent ideology. Beyond its members’ general
aversion to the Fellowship of the New Life’s resolution and a more pragmatic approach to
addressing society’s ills,29 it remained, as Podmore implied in his letter to Chubb,
philosophically indeterminate. 30 This vagueness, coupled with the founding Fabians’ lingering
affinity for both Thomas Davidson and the Fellowship, is perhaps responsible for Norman and
Jeanne MacKenzie’s observation that the society had been “casually” founded in 1884.31 Yet
neither the correspondences nor the early resolutions of the Fabians fully justify this assessment;
for if nothing else we find a straightforward—even if idealized—sense of purpose already
present in January 1884: “the association’s ultimate aim shall be to help on the reconstruction of
Society in accordance with the highest moral possibilities” and that, “with the view of learning
what practical measures to take in this direction the Society should…delegate some of its
members to attend meetings held on social subjects, debates at Workmen’s Clubs, etc., in order
that such members may in the first place report to the Society on the proceedings, and in the
second place put forward, as occasion serves, the views of the Society.” 32
From this, it is evident that the Fabians had at the very least staked out the locus of their
interest, the working class, and framed the-albeit-cautious means by which they hoped to achieve
their aims: influence and infiltration, practices which presaged the educative “permeation”
which eventually became emblematic of Fabianism. In the short-term, however, the society’s
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early resolutions were ambiguous; but a lack of clarity, arguably typical of most (if not every)
new Victorian social clubs, ought not to be equated with an unpremeditated foundation.
Some three months later, the society voted to form a pamphlets committee and took the
decision to start issuing booklets “as occasion might arise.”33 Why are the Many Poor?, the first
of these tracts, tacked into the rhetorical headwinds of the debate surrounding what Thomas
Carlyle referred to as the “Condition of England” by asking the central question which troubled
the conscience of the reform-minded late-Victorian middle class. The Fabians’ humdrum
solution to Carlyle’s problematic was sheer polemic: “You who suffer think of this also, and
help forward the only cure for these evils. The time approaches when Capital can be made
social, and be no longer left at the disposal of the few, but belong to the community for the
benefit of all. … The power is in your hands, and soon the chance of using that power will be
yours also. Neglect that chance, and you and your children will remain the victims of
Competition—ever struggling—ever poor!”34
Despite its lackluster rhetoric, this bombast indicates some of the ideological genealogy
which lay at the back of nascent Fabianism. First, the society is clearly alluding to the Reform
Bill of 1884, which extended the franchise among working-class men. Virtually from the outset,
then, Fabian philosophy compassed the radical reformism of the Chartists, which had been in
abeyance since the 1850s. Moreover, the influence of early Victorian ethical socialism is
likewise evident, particularly the work of the social reformer Robert Owen and the moral
philosophizer T. H. Green, who coincidentally counted Carlyle among his favorite authors.35
Indeed, it was Owen who, writing some forty years earlier in his Book of the Moral World,
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prophesied: “Are there any who have yet considered the extent of the new, most inferior, and
degrading circumstances created within the last half century by the competitive increase of the
new manufacturing system of Great Britain? No: this knowledge, so valuable to man to acquire,
has hitherto been hidden from him—it is yet unknown to him. But the dawn of the day of this
knowledge approaches—the destruction of the causes of man’s misery, and the advent of his
happiness, draw nigh….”36
Meanwhile it was Green who, even after the passage of the Second Reform Act in 1867,
assiduously campaigned for the further extension of the franchise to “include artisans and town
laborers.” A vocal advocate of the continued reform of the electoral system, Green saw the
extension of the vote as a “contribution to greater citizenship.” As he explained in a speech on
“Parliamentary Reform,” “citizenship only makes the moral man;…citizenship only g[ives] that
self-respect, which is the true basis of respect of others, and without which there is no lasting
social order or real morality.”37
Benefiting from a porous ideological membrane, early Fabianism’s absorptive syncretism
readily incorporated both Chartism and ethical socialism into its burgeoning program. Taken
together, this helps us to understand why Owen’s desire to “build a ‘new moral world’”—or, at a
minimum, an environment that would systematically encourage the development of “‘social’
qualities” 38—and the sentiment embedded in Green’s philosophy—which anchored the ability of
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the poor to realize their potential to democratization and reform—feature so prominently in
many of the society’s earliest doctrines.39
Yet despite being embedded in a social system which simultaneously reinforced the
exploitative evils of early industrialization while encouraging a belief that class conflict was
essential to the regeneration of a new, moral society, few of the Fabian Society’s middle-class
founders had any practical experience in or with the radical politics of the age. Hubert Bland, for
instance, was a twenty-eight-year-old failed businessman who “spent his leisure energetically
attending advanced societies devoted to arts, crafts, literature and politics.” For his part,
Podmore was an Oxford-educated clerk at the Post Office and a lukewarm spiritualist at best.
Pease, meanwhile, was a stockbroker fascinated in equal measure by spiritualism and H. M.
Hyndman’s “social revolution.”40 Absent an immediate interest in controversial issues like land
reform or the increasingly volatile Irish question, the first Fabians were cast unflatteringly as
poseurs by the contemporary radical and socialist press, which scoffed at their pretensions and
damned them as “radical philanthropists with vague, melioristic aspirations.”41 This critique,
leveled by Justice, the organ of Hyndman’s “avowedly Marxist”42 Social Democratic Federation
(SDF), and the ultra-radical Republican, signals the general uncertainty which dogged the
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Fabians’ early program, the ideological broad strokes of which were painted in a lecture
delivered by George Bernard Shaw to the society in May 1884.43
Recruited by Bland, the itinerant Bernard Shaw, whom the socialist activist and SDF
member, William Morris, called “one of the clearest heads and best pens Socialism has got,” had
for a time been linked to Hyndman’s SDF.44 In an atypical pique of pragmatism, however,
Bernard Shaw abandoned Hyndman’s fiery socialism and, when called upon, penned a
foundational declaration for the Fabians that downplayed the Marxian fantasies of militant
workers, barricades, and upheaval so gleefully imagined by the zealot Hyndman and his more
ardent sentimentalists. As Bernard Shaw later recalled, “we knew that a certain sort of oratory
was useful for ‘stoking up’ public meetings; but we needed no stoking up, and, when any orator
tried to process on us, soon made him understand that he was wasting his time and ours.”45
The product of this quintessentially Shavian legerdemain was a Manifesto that struck a
decidedly middle-class, non-fanatical socialist tone for the society. As far as position papers go,
it was a rousing piece of propaganda, dense with the kind of high-minded rhetoric and anticapitalist pomposity favored by the more genteel Victorian middle-class reformers and their
ciphers. From prophesying the inevitable division of “society into hostile classes” to pointing an
accusatory finger at the maldistribution of wealth as evidence that the veneer of fairness had
been well and truly stripped from the façade of laissez-faire capitalism, Bernard Shaw hit all the
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right notes. 46 There was, however, one niggling problem: nowhere did the Manifesto mention
the claims and aims of the working class, the oppressed demographic whose position was so dire.
Indeed, anything that might have resonated with this group, be it trade unionism or cooperation
or wages or even hours of labor, escaped the querulous pen of the nimble-minded Bernard Shaw.
These are noteworthy deficiencies, which Pease, some thirty years later and in full apologist
mode, attributed partly to the society’s early fixation with “abstraction, Land and Capital,
Industry and Competition, the Individual and the State” and, at least in the case of the
cooperative movement, open hostility towards certain working class concerns.47 As a result, the
early Fabian program lacked much substance that could recommend it to an audience beyond
ideologues, revealing a disconnect between early Fabian rhetoric and the reality of England’s
working class. In the immediate term, this glaring disparity rendered the Fabians susceptible to
charges of “elitism.”48
Two things happened in 1885 to alter this state of affairs. In November, the SDF was
humiliated and its cause done irreparable harm when the scheme to finance two of its London
general election campaigns with Tory money—a marriage of convenience between the
conservatives and Marxists designed to split the vote in contested constituencies and thus ensure
Tory victory—backfired. Although such conduct was not entirely beyond the pale of propriety
in the context of Victorian English politics, the coupling was, according to Bernard Shaw, an
“utter abomination” to radical sensibilities. Indeed, for many it was impossible to imagine a
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more ideologically incongruous arrangement, particularly the insurrectionist wing of the SDF
which, having repudiated political action altogether, was appalled at the revelation that the
Federation had colluded with a political party. Shocked and disillusioned, many who had
sacrificed their reputations abandoned the SDF. In their response to the controversy, the Fabians
sharply denounced the SDF for behavior “calculated to disgrace the Socialist movement in
England.” 49 Thus, the same year that ended with the embarrassment of the SDF found the
Fabians unexpectedly occupying a dubiously situated moral high ground.
Ensconced as they were, the Fabian Society members who chastised the perfidious
radicals could look back on 1885 as a transformative year. Not only did the society now count
amongst its members such socialist luminaries as Annie Besant, Sidney Webb, and Sydney
Olivier, but it could pride itself in its gradual abandonment of abstraction and utopian idealism.
As early as March, for example, the Fabian executive formed a committee to examine “and
report upon the working of the Poor Law,”50 with special reference to “figures and assertions
recently cited and made by…Gov[ernment] officials to disprove the allegations of great distress
among the workers.”51 In June, following his visit to the strike-affected Denaby Main Colliery
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in Yorkshire, J. H. Watts reported on the conditions of the miners and the families he found
there. Meanwhile, and as papers on “Socialist Reconstruction,” “Socialism and Political
Liberty,” and the “Master Key of Social Reform” circulated among its members, the society set
about organizing a conference to be held in 1886 to discuss the “aims and methods of
Democracy.”52 Though minor, these changes signal an important step in the society’s early
evolution towards a more fundamental awareness not only of the condition of England’s working
class, but also the Fabians’ own position in the overarching debate.
Throughout the following year, the Fabians worked to secure a more pragmatic and
utilitarian footing in the discourse surrounding the working-class movement. On the one hand,
the society articulated a refined—albeit still vague—position vis-à-vis the condition of England
question by publishing What Socialism Is,53 a tract in which both surplus value54 and the
tendency of wages to a minimum55 were mentioned and the work of trade unionism was alluded
to. The society also assumed a more active role in the dialogue surrounding the grievances of the
working class by hosting “An Eight Hours Working Day,” a debate in which several socialist
organizations participated, including the SDF.56 Rounding out their wheelhouse of interests that
year, the Fabians did the inevitable: they turned to the fraught realm of politics. Thus, in June,
the society convened a three-day conference of radicals and socialists in London to examine that
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great socialist triad of land utilization, capital utilization, and “Democratic policy.”57 It was the
Fabians’ hope that the conference would act as a catalyst and create the kind of ideological
atmosphere in which a common basis could be found “on which Radicals, Socialists, and Social
Reformers of every kind may cooperate to form a Democratic organization for practical work in
and out of parliament.”58
While the conference did not have the hoped-for salubrious effect—in fact, it nearly cleft
the society in two—it nevertheless resulted in the creation of the Fabian Parliamentary League
(FPL) as a separate body within the society. Designed as a vehicle for those who favored
“Parliamentary action” and as an “instrument whereby the forces of Radicalism and Socialism
might be united in the criticism and initiation of practical steps towards their common goal,” the
League’s mandate was, as Sidney Webb audibly sighed, “the result of a compromise between
two schools of opinion…so as not to commit the Society at large to political propaganda.”59 The
schools represented a pair of rival, although not mutually-exclusive, political strategies:
Charlotte Wilson’s anarchist-influenced “party of action,” which worked to draw like-minded
elements away from the Liberal Party so that it might create the “nucleus of a Socialist party in
Parliament;”60 and Webb’s “party of education,” wed thoroughly to his tactic of “permeation,”
which sought not the creation of a socialist party in Parliament, but rather favored working
within the existing Liberal Party to promote “Collectivist Socialist” policies.61 While the
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compromise that resulted in the creation of the League had not been arrived at easily, for the
debate that occurred prior to its agreement caused the manager of Anderton’s Hotel, the
meeting’s location, to send notice to the Fabian executive “that the Society could not be
accommodated there for any further meetings,”62 the debacle over the FPL—and the
uncomfortable anarchist-Fabian marriage that resulted—seems to have been little more than a
storm in a teacup. For by April 1888, the League was reabsorbed as the Political Committee of
the society, and the remnant anarchists either apostatized and converted or left the society
entirely.
Despite its brief existence, the FPL produced several documents that proved significant to
the long-term development of the society, both in practical and ideological terms. Indeed, as
Bernard Shaw later recalled, it was the League’s foundational Manifesto which provided the
“sketch”63 of what later came to be understood as “Fabian tactics.”64 After all, the FPL was an
avowedly apolitical entity dedicated in part to the research and propagandization of the “political
questions of the day” with the ultimate goal of encouraging advancement toward “the Socialist
ideal.”65 This, arguably, is the quintessential definition of the Fabian mission throughout most of
the twentieth century. Moreover, the League’s True Radical Programme, intended as a
discursive riposte to The Official Liberal-Radical Programme of 1887, was a nexus of
nineteenth-century reformist radicalisms and, as McBriar notes, constituted the “sum and
substance” of early Fabianism.66 “Amplified” and “modified” by subsequent tracts, this
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foundational ideological schema called for, inter alia: parliamentary and local government
reform (here, echoing again the Chartist movement’s calls for adult suffrage, annual parliaments,
and payment for MPs); the “progressive” taxation of the unearned income or “economic rent”
(i.e. profit) of the idle classes to be redistributed to the laboring and poorest members of society
(a notion of “leveling down” drawn and adapted from a variety of sources, including Marx,
David Ricardo, J. S. Mill, Henry George, W. Stanley Jevon, and Philip Wicksteed67);
collectivism and state interference (as embodied in appeals for the municipalization of land to
compete with private industry and the nationalization of such key industries as railways,
elements which suggest the influence not only of Ricardo’s Theory of Rent, but also T. H,
Green’s evolutionary approach to social development68); and the state-directed reform of
workhouses and the provision of compulsory education (the complementary notion of “leveling
up” society drawn partly from Owenite social reform and New Liberalism).69
The Fabians’ philosophical maturation into one of late-Victorian England’s foremost
socialist societies was confirmed with the tracts What Socialism Is (revised by Bernard Shaw in
1890) and The Workers’ Political Programme (published in 1890). While the latter was little
more than a modified recapitulation of The True Radical Programme, signifying, in effect, the
Fabian executive’s official arrogation of the work done by the now-defunct FPL, “What
Socialism Is” did considerably more: in the first place, it formalized the Fabians’ rejection of
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Marx’s rigidly deterministic class-based division of society and the revolutionary upheaval it
anticipated. The Fabians, Foote notes, had come to believe that Marx was “fundamentally
wrong” about the nature of profit and that the capitalists exploited the workers and adopted
instead the alternative view that the “real” class struggle was between “idle owners” and the
“producers”—that is, those who did nothing to earn their money and those who did all the work.
In addition, What Socialism Is confirmed the Fabian pivot away from anarchism (a largely
academic exercise, since this was all but accomplished in practice with the reabsorption of the
FPL in 1888) in favor of state collectivism.
This early programmatic Fabianism would have amounted to nothing more than an
amalgam of au courant radicalisms had it not been for the prescriptive formulations of Sidney
Webb. The society’s “leading theorist,” Webb believed that the peaceful transition from
capitalism to socialism could be achieved only by working through England’s traditional
democratic institutions,70 a framework of representational government he extended to include not
only the institutions of local government, but also trade unions and cooperatives.71 As Webb
saw it, democratic England, suitably reformed and (more) broadly enfranchised, would, in time,
produce a political class receptive to the ideas of socialism. The slow-moving permeation of this
sympathetic group by “experts” (e.g. the Fabians) would result in democratic institutions that
gradually acquired increasingly progressive accretions, such as a regulatory capacity over
industry. In this way, Webb believed, industry need not be commandeered; rather, it need only
be administered by a minister of government or “specialist” whose role it was “to establish an
integrated, cooperative, and thus efficient organization.”72 This same collectivist state would
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“enforce” social “duties” through taxation, a process which would, ultimately, yield public
provisions for such things as education, museums, parks, and even health services.73 Thus,
Webb, and, eventually, the Fabians, equated socialism with the efficient, cooperative, and
coordinated organization of society achieved through state intervention. This reflected not only
Webb’s peculiar form of utilitarianism—which produced a socialism “limited to practical efforts
to modify the existing…order”74—but also his belief that the principle of natural selection, much
on the Victorian public’s mind since Darwin’s Origin of Species, taught that more efficient
societies thrived—while those encumbered with disorganized systems withered and died.75
By the turn of the twentieth century, the Fabian Society had welded together various
elements of then-current radicalisms and emplaced them as the struts and armatures of their own
ideological framework, one calculated to realize the “dream of the Socialist on sound economic
principles, by gradual, peaceful, and constitutional means.”76 In the broadest possible sense,
then, fin-de-siècle Fabianism sought not only to extend democracy and improve the machinery of
democratic government, but to expand government powers in a way that yielded “positive
government action” as a means of promoting social and economic equality.77 It was a vision that
married (J. S.) Millite utilitarianism with Comtean positivism designed, in the last, to secure “the

Bevir, “Sidney Webb: Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy,” 235.
Pierson, British Socialists, 331-332.
75
Webb, Towards Social Democracy?, 29.
76
Bernard Shaw, The True Radical Programme.
77
McBriar, Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 25.
73
74

56

greatest happiness of the greatest number”78 through state-directed activity.79 The result was a
statist conception of development and social democracy that had both national and imperial
ramifications; for not only did it serve as the basis of Fabianism for the next half century, but it
also framed what, as of 1950, the FCB called the “Social Foundation of Trusteeship”—the
society’s particular postwar model of late-colonial imperial governance and colonial
development.

The Fabians and Fin-De-Siècle Britain: The Tumultuous 1890s
At the confluence of these developments we find a burgeoning working-class populism
among the Fabians, a transformation reflected in the prodigious propaganda and proselytizing
campaigns which characterized the society’s output in the late-1880s. Indeed, through 1889 the
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Fabians’ omnivorous intellect yielded a rather considerable crop, including lecture series80
delivered at radical and liberal clubs or sponsored by sympathetic societies81 which covered a
range of topics from “The Politics of Labour” and the “Eight Hours Bill” to the “Trades Union
Movement” and “Cooperation and Labor.”82 Moreover, individual papers, such as Sidney
Webb’s detailed discussion of economic science, which examined the impact of the extension of
voluntary cooperation on industry, were shared between society members to galvanize interest
internally.83 Articles were published, including Edward Pease’s “The Labour Federation,” which
appeared in the Fabians’ journal, To-day, and Beatrice Webb’s (nee Potter)84 article on the
sweating system for Nineteenth Century, so as to extend awareness of Fabian views among the
socialist community at large.85 The society even prepared bills to be introduced in Parliament,
notably the Eight Hours Bill.86 The output of this prolific period, clearly a product of the
evolving Fabianism, culminated in 1889 with The Fabian Essays in Socialism, a collection of
earlier lectures on the condition of industrial England that were formatted for publication.
Within two years, sales of the Fabian Essays reached some 27,000, a bonanza which not only
marked the beginning of the Fabian “boom”87 between 1890 and 1893, but also had the effect of
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reinforcing the society’s growing reputation as the moderate socialists par excellence of the
Victorian Age.88
Had the essays been written in 1890 instead of 1888, however, the authors would have
acquired from the great trade union upheaval of 1889 a fuller appreciation of the importance of
trade unionism than they possessed just two years before. For the decade of the 1880s was a
profoundly complacent one in the annals of late-Victorian trade unionism, characterized by what
Paul Adelman refers to as the “ostrichlike” torpor of the trade union “old gang.”89 Having
achieved a modicum of hard-won legislative and political recognition during the 1860s and
1870s, the Trades Union Congress (TUC) did the incomprehensible: it hung up its Phrygian cap
and promptly buried its head in the smug quagmire of self-satisfaction. And there it stayed,
refusing to confront the profound problems of rapid technological change, demarcation disputes,
and unemployment that by 1889 threatened labor.90 Indeed, stalwarts of “Old Unionism,”
including George Shipton, MP and the secretary of the London Trades Council, and George
Howell, former secretary of the TUC, were steadfast in their opposition to popular movements,
such as the Eight Hour Day.91 The result was a kind of broad-spectrum laissez-faire pacifism
that manifested itself at the level of Parliament, where trade union MP’s were content to be, in
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Friedrich Engels’s memorably contemptuous phrase, “the tail of the Great Liberal Party.”92 Such
circumstances exposed “Old Unionism” and its avatars to increasingly vitriolic criticism from
within its own ranks, which denounced both it and them as “useless” and little more than
“charitable institutions for doling out funds for sick and superannuation, thus relieving the upper
and middle classes of poor rate….”93 The calculus of official apathy and sustained criticism
inflamed the membership at the level of the unskilled laborers, fracturing the ranks and clearing
the way for the “New Unionism,”94 an outcome Shipton gravely warned would “be the active
agent of their ruin.”95
A conservative craft unionist from London, Shipton was no stranger to the revolutionary
intransigence of which unskilled laborers were capable. For barely a year had passed since, in
his capacity as mediator during the London matchgirls’ strike at Bryant and May’s,96 he
witnessed a working-class victory achieved, “for the first time in many years,” “not by the wellorganized Trade Unionists, but by the class of workers whose very weakness was a source of
strength.”97 A precedent had indeed been set, of course, but for the new generation of labor
leaders, men like the future “father” of the Independent Labor Party (ILP) Henry Hyde
Champion, New Unionism was hardly the harbinger Shipton prophesied. It was, instead, the
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instrument of labor’s rejuvenation and its defenders needed only point to the most spectacular
manifestation of the New Unionism to stifle the millennial ravings of Shipton and the picayune
“old gang:” the Great London Dock Strike of August 1889. Arguably the most spectacular of
the strikes by unskilled laborers to grip London, from his vantage point at the head of the strike,
John Burns described the scene in the most evocative contemporary terms imaginable: “This,
lads, is the Lucknow of Labour, and I…can see a silver gleam, not of bayonets to be imbued in a
brother’s blood, but in the gleam of the full round orbs of the docker’s tanner.”98 Later,
Champion reflected that it was “The greatest struggle between Capital and Labour that this
generation of Englishmen has seen” which “ended in the victory of the weaker side.”99
Amidst the welter of revolution engulfing the Port of London, the Fabian Society seems
oddly voiceless. Indeed, the group took no official role in the Dock Strike and, in fact, the
Executive Committee seems not to have met at all between July and September of that year.
Filling the void created by the society’s official silence were elements from its more aggressive
“right wing,” including Will Crooks, Ben Tillett, and Tom Mann,100 all of whom were leaders of
the strike and harsh critics of the “Old Unionism.”101 Moreover, many Fabian sympathizers were
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very much alive to the significance of these events, including Beatrice Potter, who “eagerly read
every detail” published in the papers and noted in her diary that, “Commercially and financially,
an extended labor disturbance in London is far more disastrous than in any other part of
England…therefore an organised labour party would have in London a lever for working its own
will that provincial labor does not possess.” Even given this, however, she ruefully added that
“It is doubtful…whether, even if the Dock [Companies] capitulate, the great struggle of 1889
will effect [sic] any permanent advance.” Potter’s ambiguity aside, the London Dock Strike was
symptomatic of growing labor discontent; for less than two months later, trade unionists were
actively working toward the “empoverishment [sic]” of manufacturers by forcing a stoppage of
work.102 Labor unrest, it seemed, had once again become “the order of the day,”103 prompting
Westminster to appoint the Royal Commission on Labor (1891)104 charged with investigating
“relations between employer and employed” in England.105
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Though the downturn that soon buffeted England’s industrial economy dampened the
spirit of working-class radicalism evinced by the Great Dock Strike, the volatility that lay at its
heart soon found expression in the political landscape of fin-de-siècle Britain. For the hitherto
dominant Liberal Party ran aground on questions of empire and Irish Home Rule (and, as we
shall see later, free trade and protectionism).106 Languishing throughout the 1890s in protracted
bouts of opposition, the Liberal Party was consumed by internecine strife as William Gladstone’s
principal successors—Lord Rosebery, William Harcourt, and John Morley—vied for supremacy.
The upshot of this political cannibalism was a largely rudderless Liberal Party and Unionist
Government until 1898. In the meantime, the decade bore witness to increasing working-class
activism and Fabian permeation—a subtle process whereby the society attempted to influence
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political discourse without becoming political. Instead, the society acted as a clearinghouse,
gathering and distributing information on a range of topics that particularly interested them with
the intention of massaging the contemporary narrative. To this end, Fabians attended the Liberal
Party’s Newcastle Conference;107 presented papers at workers’ conferences on such topics as
“The relationship between cooperators and trade unionism;”108 engaged in lecture series hosted
by labor organizations, significantly at the Bradford Labor League; prepared new tracts on The
Workers’ Political Programme, The New Reform Bill, Reform of the Poor Law and Organisation
of the Unemployed; and corresponded regularly with members of parliament, including
Gladstone himself.109
Arguably the most suggestive of the Fabians’ efforts during these boom years came in
1892, with the publication of Bernard Shaw’s Fabian Election Manifesto. The subject of heated
debate internally since January of that year and finally published in the run-up to the general
election in July, the manifesto did not so much make the Fabian case for an independent labor
party, as a case against the Liberal and Conservative Parties.110 In the text, Bernard Shaw railed
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against the “Tyranny of our Party System.” He excoriated the Conservatives, “the party of
privilege” then in power, for their “scandalous” disregard of the working class, their sanction of
state interference only as a means of suppressing trade unionism (this, rather than intervening to
alleviate the causes of unionism’s discontent), their failure to extend the voting franchise to
include agricultural laborers, and their “denial of payment to Members of Parliament.” He
likewise castigated the Liberals, the party in opposition, for “practically” abandoning the
working class, their “persistent” ignorance of the condition of workers, refusing to adopt the
“vitally important” reform measure of “Payment for Members (of Parliament),” and their
enduring “servility” to the laissez-faire economic principles of Gladstone. Bernard Shaw was no
less vociferous in his denouncement of the working classes, which he upbraided for their
“political apathy.”111 Developing on this sort of theme of equal opportunity chastisement, Shaw
then dug his rhetorical boot heel into the neck of the “labour men,” criticizing them for their
policy of affecting meaningful political change by “swamping the Liberal Associations with
Socialists and Radicals.” Warming to his subject, Bernard Shaw then sniffed that this was a
“paltry substitute for the straightforward action of a genuine Working Class party, supported by
Working Class subscriptions and completely independent of both Liberal and Conservative
aid.”112
This is a telling turn of phrase, for it is precisely the reverse of the Fabians’ policy since
1887. Indeed, the Fabians had to this point demurred when the question of an independent labor
party came up, preferring, instead, to hew closely to Sidney Webb’s admonition that “the time
was not ripe for the society to give much encouragement to the attempts that were being made to
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form a Labour Party.”113 For Webb believed that the mere threat of a third party would
sufficiently motivate the Liberals to gradually adopt a more progressive policy, thereby
eliminating the need for a true party of labor. Thus, until 1892, Fabian designs were chiefly
limited to the permeation of the Liberal Party, a process begun immediately following the party’s
promulgation of its Nottingham Program in 1887. Bernard Shaw’s manifesto signaled a break
from all of this, albeit a muddled one: for in the general election, and in clear defiance of both
the society’s apolitical stance and Webb’s stricture, the Fabians directly supported Ben Tillett,114
the independent labor candidate in East Bradford, while at the same time contradictorily backing
the Liberal John Morley against the independent labor candidate in Newcastle. When the
election results were returned, in which three labor men were elected and others—including
Tillett—polled well, it laid bare the costly implications of the Fabians’ indecisive and hamhanded intervention: a new labor movement was manifesting itself politically, and it threatened
to leave the Fabians behind.115
Initiative now passed to the nascent Independent Labor Party (ILP), which convened its
foundation conference at the Bradford Labor Union’s hall in January 1893. The result of a
meeting of ILP representatives led by the Bradfordian W. H. Drew116 during the Trades Union
Conference in Glasgow in September 1892, Bradford was the first clear indication of stronger
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“cooperation between socialists and trade unionists”—a development confirmed by the fact that
the party’s leading figure was the Fabian J. Keir Hardie, himself a former miner.117 When the
Fabian executive in London received Drew’s invitation to the congress, it agreed to send Bernard
Shaw and W. S. De Mattos as delegates only on condition that “doing so does not hamper our
independence.”118 This is an instructive caveat; for not only does it reveal that the society was
determined to guard against any encroachment on the swathe of ideological middle-ground it had
staked out, which privileged permeating the Liberal Party, but it also speaks to the Fabians’
distrust of the ILP, which Bernard Shaw ruefully jibed was “nothing but a new SDF with
Champion instead of Hyndman.”119 Most troublingly, it also indicates that the outcome of the
1892 general election had brought no clarity to the tangled Fabian position—a stance many of
the district Fabian Societies were so unwilling to forgive or forget, it prompted a mass provincial
apostasy.120
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This bitterness found expression at the foundation conference on one especially
provocative occasion. Several hostile delegates had interpreted the society’s caveat, which
appeared in the circular Workman’s Times under the Bernard Shaw-penned article, “The
Bradford Conference: From the Fabian Point of View,” as indicating it would actively work to
prevent the formation of a national ILP. This dubious if understandable interpretation of the
Fabian position triggered a challenge to the London Fabian Society’s credentials, particularly
those of the always-incendiary Bernard Shaw. During the debate that followed, one speaker,
inflamed to the point of paroxysm, began a general protest over the Fabian executive’s
involvement in John Morley’s Newcastle campaign, the outcome of which had snatched victory
from the teeth of the Newcastle Labor Party. In the ensuing chaos, Bernard Shaw was debarred
from the house floor and straightaway took up a “strong enfilading position in the gallery,” from
whence he launched a violent and vitriolic defense. Although the London Fabians ultimately
won the vote of confidence, these events signaled a grim beginning to the year for the society.
Indeed, within a few months, most of the provincial Fabian groups had either reconstituted
themselves as ILP branches or were now closely associated with the party.121
It was increasingly obvious that the heady popularity the society had once enjoyed was
ebbing—and with it, the potential for a terminal slide into irrelevancy. Coupled with the gradual
realization that the Liberal government had no intention of legislating along the lines envisaged
by the Newcastle Programme, which in turn threatened the status of the men in the society who
had backed it, notably Webb and Bernard Shaw, the Fabian executive was gripped by a new
sense of urgency.122 By now thoroughly disillusioned, Webb wrote to Graham Wallas,
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effectively abrogating his earlier pro-Liberal position. “The time has come,” explained Webb on
September 12, 1893, “for a strong tract showing up the Liberal Party, and advocating as many
decent Labor candidates as possible.”123
The result was “To Your Tents, O Israel!,” a jointly-penned treatise in which both
Bernard Shaw and Webb heaped scorn on Gladstone’s cabinet for their collective failure to
“make good the professions of friendliness to Labor which gained its majority at the General
Election of 1892” and recommended that “the working-classes, through their trade
organizations…take matters into their own hands at the next general election by sending fifty
working men as independent Labor members to Parliament.”124 Unsurprisingly, Webb’s volteface affronted the party’s ministers who had hitherto looked upon the Fabians with a benevolent
eye; for many of them now stood accused of failing to introduce legislation the society deemed
suitable.125 Thus, from the moment “To Your Tents, O Israel!” appeared in Fortnightly Review
in November 1893, the Fabians all but doomed their plan of working through the Liberals to
achieve their aims.126 As Pease later observed in his History of the Fabian Society: “At this
point the policy of simple permeation of the Liberal Party may be said to have come to an
end.”127
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Meanwhile, the Fabians found it no less difficult to convince the ILP of their sincerity, a
task further complicated by the publication of A Plan of Campaign for Labor. In the tract, the
Fabians outlined the scheme by which they hoped to secure victory for Labor candidates in the
upcoming general election. The plan hinged on two essential elements: first, financing achieved
through the collaboration of the TUC and, second, a compromise in which the trades councils
and the socialist parties worked in tandem to decide on suitable candidates. For the ILP, the
farce had been revealed, for it now appeared that the Fabians were unwilling to support Labor
candidates where progressive or liberal candidates were running—a circumstance independent
Labor rejected outright. At the same time, not only did the TUC balk at the proposal, but it also
refused to throw its exclusive support behind the ILP. For the Fabian executive, it was déjà vu
all over again: the ILP’s failure to secure the TUC rendered it unreliable, confirming the society
in its belief that independent labor action was “futile.”128 Clearly, both the ILP and the senior
Fabians—Webb, Bernard Shaw, Pease, and Wallas—found the idea of electoral alliance
repugnant. Importantly, this position was not universally shared by all members of the
executive, a difference of opinion that would have significant ramifications.
For their part, Sidney Webb and the pro-Liberal wing of the society (including Beatrice
Webb, Pease, Bernard Shaw, and William Clarke) found none of this especially disconcerting,
for a timely upheaval in Gladstone’s Liberal government—almost always in the offing—
virtually delivered the Liberals into the hands of the Fabians.129 When Gladstone’s “blubbering
Cabinet” collapsed under the weight of a series of debacles between 1893 and 1894, including
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Home Rule and naval expenditure, it brought to power Lord Rosebery, an imperialist130 and
committed social reformer who “wished to see as much as possible of the Gladstonian past
wiped off the slate.”131 Perhaps “To Your Tents, O Israel!” did less to shatter the hopes of the
society’s pro-Liberal faction, for many of Rosebery’s keenest political allies—including
Haldane, H. H. Asquith, and E. Grey—were intimates of the Fabians from as early as 1891.132
Hope in the Liberal Party was resurrected in the bosom of the Fabians.
As events would prove, however, it was to be a short-lived recrudescence. For by spring
1895, it was clear that the Liberal government under Lord Rosebery had “virtually ceased to
function.”133 In her diary, Beatrice Webb described the debauched indolence into which
Rosebery’s moribund administration had slipped, concluding with a passage from a conversation
she had with Haldane. 134 Taking in the long view, the thoroughly-disaffected Haldane lamented
that “Rot has set in. There is no hope now but to be beaten and then reconstruct a new party.”135
It was not long before Haldane’s dire prediction was realized; for in June, Rosebery’s
Government was defeated on a snap vote over army supply, under ordinary circumstances seen
as nothing more than a vote of confidence in the then-secretary-of-war, Sir Henry CampbellBannerman. Instead, Rosebery, demonstrating the umbrage-prone naiveté that informed his
headship, treated the vote as a censure of his entire government, a sentiment which prompted
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him and his ministers to resign.136 In short order, Lord Salisbury formed a new Unionist
coalition of Conservatives and Liberals which carried Whitehall through to the general election,
in which the Unionists trounced the competition in a “landslide” victory.137 In a stroke, the
Fabians’ would-be allies in the Liberal Party, the “Roseberyite” Liberal-Imperialists
(“Limps”),138 men such as Haldane, Asquith, and Grey, fell from power and became the
opposition. In a matter of weeks, the Fabians’ had lost their last best hope of influencing Liberal
policy.
Yet all was not lost; for in Haldane’s fortuitous turn of phrase documented by Beatrice
Webb, the game was indeed afoot to “reconstruct” the Liberal Party. Acting as intermediary,
Haldane enrolled the Webbs and Bernard Shaw as experts at permeating political parties—a
development that drew the Fabians deeper and deeper into the factional struggle which at the
time embroiled the Limps. The intensification of this relationship, which no doubt helped
influence both the “collectivist” mentality and “progressive social reform” which characterized
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the “New Liberalism,”139 had grave consequences for the Fabians, for it commingled with their
own internal division between the pro-ILP wing of the society140 and the Fabian old guard, who
now stood accused of intrigues with the Liberal-Imperialists. In the context of political volatility
seasoned with suspicion and distrust, the society had exposed itself to the toxicity of Liberal
Party politics.
Though a catastrophic split of the Liberals had already occurred when Gladstone
committed himself to Irish Home Rule in 1885, the first formal split of the Liberals in Parliament
happened in 1900 when the anti-imperial, pro-Boer faction demanded the censure of the LiberalUnionist Government then in power over its handling of the South African wars.141 This
immediately antagonized the pro-imperial faction of the Liberal-Imperialists who, led by the
former “Roseberyites” Haldane, Grey, and Asquith—all of whom had close personal ties with
Sir Alfred Milner, the High Commissioner of South Africa and, as such, the man responsible for
prosecuting Britain’s war against the Boers—joined with the government lobby and defeated the
resolution calling for their censure.142
The bifurcation of the Limps in Parliament paralleled a schism in the Fabian Society. As
Beatrice Webb recalled in a diary entry from October 30, 1899, the arch-imperialist Haldane told
her that “the Liberal Party is completely smashed.” Further, “The cleavage goes right through
the Liberal Party into the Fabian society. Shaw, Wallas and Whelan being almost in favour of
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the war, J. R[amsay] MacDonald and Sydney Olivier desperately against it, while Sidney [Webb]
occupies a middle position—thinks that better management might have prevented it but that now
that it has begun recrimination is useless and that we must face the fact that henceforth the
Transvaal and the Orange Free State must be within the British Empire.”143
It was, as Pease noted in his History, as if “the left and right wings of the Fabians joined
hands in opposition to the centre,” a verdict made manifest at the Members’ Meeting held on
December 1, 1899.144 A lengthy resolution was introduced by S. G. Hobson—followed by an
equally long amendment by Bernard Shaw who, on behalf of the Fabian executive, tried to
“persuade Hobson to withdraw his resolutions in favor of something with regard to which there
was some chance of unanimity.”145 Despite their length, the resolutions are worth reproducing
here in their entirety, for they represent the fundamental positions of the Fabian Society at
arguably one of its most crucial moments. Hobson moved:

That in view of the character and tendencies of the political and economic ideas which
have conduced to the present South African war, involving as they do embittered
antagonism to industrial Democracy and to Socialist principles, the Fabian Society deems
it essential to the furtherance of its special aims and within the scope of its work to
declare: 1. That the war is not caused by the Franchise quarrel but by the British intention to
establish supremacy from the Cape to the Zambesi clashing with the set purpose of the
South African Republics to maintain their independence;
2. That the Society is therefore not called upon to criticise either the Outlanders’ political
claims or the Boers’ policy in regard thereto;
3. That no justification for the war has been shown; and that the plea that it was
inevitable, if British paramountcy in South Africa were to be preserved, can only satisfy a
debased national conscience informed by incapable statesmen;
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4. That the Imperialist passion of the moment, the chief cause and support of the war, has
swept aside all interest in liberal ideas; has distracted the attention of the country from
domestic progress; has debased the conscience and lowered the democratic spirit of the
English people; has effected a sinister cooperation between professional financiers and
the military power; and in consequence threatens to involve us in political
responsibilities, which we cannot meet save by the establishment of militarism as the
predominant element in our national life.
The Fabian Society therefore resolves, through its Executive, its publications, and by all
available means, strenuously to work for the revival of a sane democratic public temper
as the necessary basis of all Socialist progress.
Bernard Shaw’s motion proposed amending Hobson’s resolution along the following
lines:
That in view of the character claimed for the South African War by the Government as a
disinterested struggle to secure democratic institutions for the Outlanders of the
Transvaal, the Fabian Society ventures to remind the public:
1.That the time has gone by for regarding the acquisition of a parliamentary vote as alone
worth a war. If it were, about a third of the adult male population of these islands, and all
the adult women, would be justified in resorting to armed revolution.
2. That Democratic Institutions in the modern sense imply: a. The recognition of public rights in the natural resources of the country, and the
effective safeguarding of these rights against aggression from the private
corporations and individual speculators to whom it may be advisable to grant
concessions for commercial purposes.
b. The protection of wageworkers by legislation making due precautions for their
health and safety compulsory.
3. That the country is therefore entitled to expect that in the event of the war being carried
to a successful issue, the Government will take steps to: a. Secure the rights of the Transvaal population in the valuable mines of the Rand
by either placing them in public hands, or else exacting in royalties their full
economic rent to be expended on public works for the development of the
country, after recoupment of a reasonable share of the expenses of the war
b. Impose a stringent Mines Regulation Act for the protection of miners of all
races and their fellow workers underground.
4. That failing the above Imperial precautions, the only effect of victory will be to
deprive the Transvaal of its present institutions under the Boer Republic, and make it the
prey of the commercial speculators of all nations and races whose avowed object is to
make private fortunes out of the mines without regard to the public welfare. Such a result
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would expose the British Government to the charge of being the dupes of these
speculators, and of having spent the nation’s blood and treasures, and outraged humanity
by a cruel war, to serve the most sordid interests under the cloak of a lofty and publicspirited Imperialism.
5. And finally, since the spokesman and newspapers of both our political parties, without
a single exception, declared before the war that the constitutional grievances of the
Outlanders must be remedied in any case, every member of these parties, whether he
approves of the war of believes that it might have been avoided by more skillful
diplomacy, is bound to insist that the advance in liberty and good government for which
were are professedly fighting shall not be lost sight of in the hubbub of party
recrimination, theatrical patriotism, and financial agitation.
The Fabian Society pledges itself to do its utmost to recall public opinion to the realities
of the situation as set forth above, and to abstain from factious expressions which can
only introduce party divisions on a matter which demands and admits of complete
unanimity among disinterested and politically conscientious Englishmen.146
There is a sharp contrast between these two resolutions.147 For Hobson, who
marginalized the issue of the Outlanders’ franchise in the Transvaal (the circumscription of
which being a key component in Paul Kruger’s efforts to consolidate Boer power as a check
against the growing clout of British mining interests on the Rand, and thus a grievance partly
motivating some of the violence precipitating war), the question was one of balancing the
autonomy of the Boer Republic against the establishment of British supremacy from the Cape to
the Zambesi. Bernard Shaw’s political calculus, meanwhile, held out no such gratifying
illusions. Instead, his amendment assumes that the war against the Boers will be “carried to a
successful issue”—hardly a surprising sentiment given the ardent jingoism that polluted the
politics of the age. As such, Bernard Shaw’s motion is concerned chiefly with recommending to
the British government things it should do after its victory.
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Tellingly, neither the resolution nor the amendment was carried at the meeting. Stymied
but determined, the executive recognized the need to consult its membership to decide whether it
should make “an official pronouncement…on Imperialism in relation to the War” to begin with.
Thus, in February 1900 the society sent the “Referendum on the Transvaal War and its bearings
upon the Socialist Movement” by postal ballot to its members and, to no one’s surprise, the
caucus revealed a divided membership. 148 On the one hand, there were those who argued that
“the Society should resist aggressive capitalism and militarism, thus putting itself into line with
international socialism, and that expenditure on the war” would postpone social reform at home.
On the other hand, there were those who “contended that the question was outside the province
of the Society” and warned “that a resolution…might have a serious effect on the solidarity of
the Society itself.”149 In both instances, the Fabians tacked closely to the insular, domesticallyfocused agenda they had privileged since the society’s inception. Yet, when the time came to
vote, a majority of Fabians favored the government’s imperialist position in South Africa.150 The
attrition that followed not only “sheared off [the Society’s] most politically aggressive spirits,”

148

The referendum, as worded by J. Ramsay MacDonald, was divided into two different sections
and members were encouraged to vote on both. Division I asked for members to indicate whether or not
they were in favor of “an official pronouncement on the war being made by the Fabian Society” with this
caveat: “In the event of the ‘noes’ being a majority, that will settle the matter.” Division II asked
members to decide whether or not to condemn the war “to be the result of capitalism…and declaring that
it is necessary that the Socialist movement should strenuously oppose the national temper which attempts
to justify this war, or…a resolution applying socialist ideas to the settlement when the war is over – e.g.
the nationalization of the mines on the Rand…” In any event, the result of the “Transvaal War Poll”
mooted further debate: 259 voted “no” in Division I, while 217 voted “yes.” Thus, the society voted to
make no official pronouncement on the war. See: Minutes, FS, November 17, 1899-June 26, 1903,
January 12, 1900, LSE FSA C/8.
149
Pease, The History of the Fabian Society, 72-3.
150
Minutes, FS, November 17, 1899-June 26, 1903, February 23, 1900, LSE FSA C/8. This was
a very complicated affair for the Fabians. Bernard Shaw, for his part, disliked empire and imperialists,
but nevertheless worked to ensure amity among the Fabians, as is demonstrated by the response both
inside and outside of the society to his Fabianism and the Empire; while Sidney Webb, if Beatrice Webb
is any judge, agreed politically with the imperialists, but emotionally sympathized with the Boers. See:
BWTD, January 2, 1901-February 10, 1911, October 30, 1899, LSE FSA PASS/1.

77

including J. Ramsay MacDonald and J. A. Hobson, but “most of its union and Radical
members,” as well.151
The rump of the society that remained, which included Sidney and Beatrice Webb,
Charles Charrington, and S. G. Hobson, was thus compelled to stake out the Fabian position visà-vis empire by publishing Fabianism and the Empire: A Manifesto of the Fabian Society.
Written by Bernard Shaw, this provocative pamphlet represented the Fabians’ first published
foray into the tempestuous waters of British imperial policy, which helps explain why more than
half of its hundred pages were dedicated to domestic, rather than international, issues.
Nevertheless, as Clarke observes, the “aim” of the manifesto was to “give imperialism a socialist
rationale.”152
Fabianism and the Empire steered no middle ground. Directed against both the laissezfaire individualism of “unteachable Liberal[s]…bound by Cobdenite tradition”153—a swipe at
free-trade “Little Englanders” like Sir William Harcourt and John Morley, who, according to The
Fortnightly Review, “out-Cobdens Cobden”154—and those industrialists whose solution was to
deal with foreign competition by imposing duties on imports155—a position favored by the
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protectionist Joseph Chamberlain—the Fabians argued that Britain was at a crossroads, and the
choice before it never more existential. Would Britain be the “centre and nucleus” of a global
empire in which inclusion was viewed as a modernizing “privilege?”156 In the end, could that
very same empire also be an instrument for socialism? Or would the empire, which appeared
listless and weak, burdened by outdated institutions and caught between a Liberal Party that was
in ruin and a Conservative Party empowered only in the absence of a viable alternative, lose its
colonies and be reduced to a pair of isolated, insignificant islands in the North Sea?157
For the Fabian theoreticians, the answer to saving the empire lay in attracting the “best
elements from all political circles” (handily sidestepping the muddle-headed and incompetent
Liberal and Conservative “old guard”) by combining a strong imperial policy with a “dynamic”
but “nonrevolutionary” social reform program.158 Or, as the Fabians saw it, a variant of
Bismarckian social-imperialism159 which framed an external solution (the empire) to an internal
problem (improving the condition of the most depressed classes of the archipelago) with the
ultimate goal of “influencing the future domestic program” of the government in power.160
Doing so required subsuming the centrifugal forces—i.e. individual, parochial, and class-based
barriers—which had dominated England’s nineteenth century political discourse within a
unifying communal framework of both national and imperial interest.161 Crucial to achieving
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this, as witnessed in Germany, was the adoption of a system of state socialism designed to
convince Britain’s working-class that its interests were inseparable from those of the nation—
hence, the manifesto’s prescriptions, which reeked of Fabianism: the taxation of “unearned
income” (and the public provisions it would provide),162 further reform and subsequent
democratization of the electorate (some 3.6 million adult males still awaited enfranchisement, to
say nothing of 11 million women),163 and an array of moral and social reforms that targeted the
working-class (including the end of both the sweating system and “starvation wages,” two of the
more egregious offenses wrought by the capitalist system, and the adoption of national
minimums in terms of wages, sanitation, and housing).164
Above all else, however, what the Manifesto emphasized was collectivism, a key
principle of Fabianism since the society’s earliest days, and one particularly favored by the
Webbs. Collectivism, in the imperial context, called for the most efficient and least wasteful
“means of advancing British interests” through the “intelligent direction of the imperial economy
by experts”165—lest, as Bernard Shaw feared, “trade be exterminated” by competition from more
efficient states.166 Such a dire prognosis meant the state had to do more than simply engage in
social reform at home; it had also to assume regulatory control over factories and bring industry
under “abler direction.”167 Doing so would not only put an end to the “parasitic industries”
whose owners’ ruthless exploitation of labor had so destabilized the state, but make industry
more effective and competitive.168 This obliged not only a significant capital investment on the
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state’s part to “organize industry at home,”169 but also, in time, the establishment of an
“industrial British fleet” to replace the “lines of commercial privateers” whose ships
monopolized the transport of British manufactured goods abroad.170 It was, in other words, to be
a comprehensive collectivization of industry managed by the government and its cadre of
experts.
The Fabians believed this model of social-imperialism, sustained by the ideology of
“national efficiency,”171 which unified local, central, and imperial machinery into an “organically
working whole,”172 would not only secure the empire—and, therefore, the long-sought social
reforms—but also lay a foundation for “International Socialism.”173 This it would achieve by
“making the British flag carry with it wherever it flies a factory code and a standard of life
secured by a legal minimum wage…. It is not enough for trade to follow the flag when the flag
has followed irresponsible explorers who purchase concessions from tribal chiefs who do not
know what concessions mean: civilization must follow the flag. And it is becoming more and
more our concern that no flag that does not carry a reasonable standard of life with it shall be the
flag of a Great Power.”174
Thus, taking in the broad view of the imperial landscape from Clifford’s Inn, the Fabians
effectively doubled-down on empire—or at least a self-contained version of empire consonant
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with Fabianism, which married social reform and efficiency at home to Britain’s imperial destiny
abroad.175

Conclusion
As with the British Empire, the 1890s was a profoundly restive decade for the Fabians.
The society had formed, broken apart, and re-formed alliances with the Liberal Party as and
when the party’s own internal configuration seemed to favor the Fabian tactic of permeation.176
But even when the relationship between these two groups seemed to have reached a nadir, the
upper echelons of the society—the Webbs, Bernard Shaw, Pease, and Bland, for example—never
fully broke with the Liberals, even in the face of A Plan of Campaign for Labor. Perhaps
ungenerously, then, we can read the society’s flirtation with the ILP as nothing more than the
manifestation of anti-Liberal spitefulness. The fact that the staunch core of the Fabian old guard
made insouciant overtures to nascent labor that did little beyond antagonize it, from imposing
unreasonable demands on its relationship with the TUC to hedging its bets in elections that also
featured progressive or Liberal candidates, arguably testifies to this.
After several tumultuous and humbling years initially spent oscillating between factions
of the Liberal Party and then between the Liberals and labor and then back again, the Fabians
understood that they were best served by adhering to an apolitical principle. So it was that, in
1896, the society published Fabian Electoral Tactics in which they did two things: first, they
declared that the society “does not seek direct political representation by putting forward Fabian
candidates at elections;”177 and, second, they positioned themselves to advance the cause of
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whichever candidate was most likely to further their social reform agenda—regardless of party
affiliation. At the level of principle, this remained the Fabian strategy for a decade; in practice,
however, such a policy of benign disinterest proved—and would continue to prove—elusive and
fractious, as the Fabian executive election of 1900 made apparent.178
Nevertheless, the society had, by the end of the century, succeeded in articulating a core
philosophy of Fabianism that would, over time, prove both malleable and resilient. It is, in fact,
this very same ideology—and the tortuous social, political, and economic paths wended by the
Fabians to create it—which Bevir credits with being instrumental in the “transition from the
radicalisms of the nineteenth century to the social democracy of the twentieth.”179 Indeed,
Fabianism was an ideological bridge linking the two, bringing together Britain’s traditional
democratic institutions with au courant progressivism through the subtle, non-revolutionary
permeation of the political classes, from Westminster down to the local vestry. The Fabians’
goal was, of course, reform—specifically of the conditions which had motivated the radicalisms
in the first place—but it was also a great deal more than that: for in achieving these reforms
through “collective administration” and the “collectivist organization of society” prescribed by
Fabianism,180 Britain would gradually arrive at socialism through the selfsame traditional
democratic institutions—this, rather than the destruction of the state. As we have seen, this
design had taken on imperial as well as domestic dimensions, a development which would have
significant future implications.
In the meantime, however, the Fabians were drawn inexorably into the decade’s most
pressing imperial problems as they themselves became casualties of the South African War.
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Indeed, the decisions made by the Fabians earlier in the decade came back to haunt them rather
spectacularly in 1899. So much so that, in the end, the battlefields of Mafeking and Kimberley
were strewn not only with the bodies of Afrikaner settlers and British soldiers—along with the
ambitions of more than a few of the Cape’s more notorious political aspirants—but also
whatever naïve illusions the Fabians had about the insularity of their agenda and ideology.
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CHAPTER 2: 1900-1939
From “Benevolent Passivity” to Policy Architect: The Ebb and Flow of Fabian Fortunes—
From the British Labor Party to the New Fabian Research Bureau

Introduction
Stung by the fractious political entanglements of the late-nineteenth century, particularly
the debate surrounding the South African War, the Fabian Society sought to avoid political
controversy that could threaten its recrudescent and clearly fragile unity. As we shall see, when
confronted by the arch-imperialist Joseph Chamberlain and his crusade for tariff reform, the
society steered a largely rhetorical course, emphasizing vague “alternative policy”1 solutions that
targeted the uninspiring middle ground between the antipodean poles of free trade and
protectionism. In the immediate term, then, Fabian policy initiatives tended toward the parochial
while expressing little innovative spirit in the realm of imperial thought.
In the meantime, the Fabians, along with the Independent Labor Party (ILP) and the
Social Democratic Federation (SDF), were invited to help create a body to represent the interests
of labor in parliament. The Labor Representation Committee (LRC) which resulted became, in
1906, the British Labor Party. The Fabians showed little interest in the new entity beyond what
Edward Pease described as “benevolent passivity.”2 Yet of all of Labor’s founding socialists, the
Fabians alone supported the party’s pro-government position when the First World War broke
out in 1914. This proved decisive, for it brought the like-minded society into intimate and longstanding collaboration with the party, a process which secured its position of influence over
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Labor. Indeed, as discussed in this chapter, the Fabians were enormously influential not only in
the formulation of Labor’s new constitution of 1918 and its related policy documents, such as
Labour and the New Social Order, but also in its annual party programs, including Labour and
the Nation (1928) and, to a lesser extent, Labour’s Immediate Programme (1936).3
Yet in the period following the First World War, Britain’s contemporary unemployment
crisis, stoked as it was by disappointing industrial performance, exorbitant inflation, and a
largely stagnant international context, created conditions that made many key elements of
Fabianism unworkable—chiefly its favored “socialism by gradualness.”4 At the same time, the
Fabians slowly descended into a period of intellectual “senility.”5 The stagnation of the twenties
was carried over into the frustrating thirties, which witnessed the formation of the New Fabian
Research Bureau (NFRB). An independent body, the remit of the NFRB was devoid of the
Fabian political and electoral activities and was intended solely to “follow the Fabian tradition of
Socialist research,” an ambit that ranged from guaranteed wages to constitutional reform. 6 Its
subsequent output between 1932 and 1938 was comparable only to that of the pre-War Fabian
Society, yet the Bureau’s apolitical stance did not outlast the temporal bookend of that six-year
period, for in 1938 the NFRB and the Fabian Society were amalgamated, the event that
revitalized the Fabian Society.
This chapter examines the circumstances which brought together the Fabian Society and
the Labor Party between 1899 and 1939. It takes as its point of departure the South African War,
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which catalyzed the Fabians’ early, pro-imperial perspectives on empire, signaling what would
become a provocative trend for the society. Indeed, the correspondence of the Fabian position
with that of Whitehall in 1899/1900 mirrored that of the society when war broke out in Europe in
1914. As we shall see, this alignment of interests did much to shape the Fabian Society’s
fortunes in the twentieth century. For, on the one hand, it aligned the society with the pro-war
Labor Party, while, on the other, it alienated the anti-war ILP, the body which had hitherto been
the dominant ideological force in terms of party policy formulation. These circumstances
nurtured and encouraged an affinity between the Fabians and Labor which, after the Second
World War and the electoral rise of Labor in 1945, proved pivotal in terms of the potential for
realizing the Fabianization of the British Empire. The nuance of these earlier developments is,
therefore, essential to our understanding of later events. Necessarily, this chapter explores some
aspects of the evolution of Fabian thought in relation to the colonial empire, but its emphasis is
on the degree of Fabian permeation on Labor ideology.

The South African War and British Socialists: The Fabians, the SDF, and the ILP7
In the closing years of the nineteenth century, the issues that increasingly came to
dominate British national politics were all connected with imperial expansion, particularly in
Africa. In 1895, for example, the collapse of the Jameson Raid in South Africa revealed not only
the iniquity of the British South Africa Company (BSAC) and the magnate Cecil Rhodes, the
raid’s “chief conspirator,” but also the depth of the cancerous malfeasance which characterized

7

Arguably the definitive account of the events leading up to the South African War is Iain R.
Smith’s The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902 (London: Longman Pearson, 1996). In
addition to Smith, Martin Meredith’s Diamonds, Gold, and War (New York: Public Affairs, 2008) as
well as Frank Welsh’s South Africa: A Narrative History (New York: Kodansha International, 1999);
Thomas Pakenham’s The Boer War (New York: Random House, 1979) help to put the flesh on the bones
of this section of the study.

87

Whitehall’s relationship with the British administration at Cape Colony.8 Indeed, Jameson’s
“underbred business” in the Transvaal laid bare the complicity of such figures as Hercules
Robinson, the British High Commissioner at Cape Town, as well as that of Joseph Chamberlain,
the Liberal-Unionist Government’s newly-installed Colonial Secretary who, once assured of
success by Robinson, agreed with the movement to secure British interests in the South African
interior.9 These revelations created a public relations nightmare for the British government,
which following the debacle stood exposed as bullying, bungling imperial provocateurs. That
the South African Committee of Enquiry investigating the BSAC’s folly was defanged while
London “white washed” Cecil Rhodes, who at the time of the raid was also prime minister of
Cape Colony,10 is testament to the political economy of the age.11
Events, however, soon conspired to intensify British involvement in Africa. For barely
two months after the Jameson Raid, the BSAC was once again mired in conflict, this time in the
form of the 1896 Matabele Uprising, a murderous tit-for-tat game in which white settlers were
massacred by Ndebele soldiers and Ndebele soldiers were butchered by the heavily armed forces
of the BSAC. As the colony of Rhodesia got off to a bloody start, Chamberlain convened the
1897 Colonial Conference in London, a vaguely arranged meeting designed to solicit feedback
from the premiers of the self-governing colonies on various topics, including the potential for
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federation and the colonial contribution to the British naval fund.12 Little more than a year later,
in September 1898, General Sir H. H. Kitchener led the combined Anglo-Egyptian Army in a
vengeful slaughter of thousands of Muslim Dervishes at the Battle of Omdurman in Sudan. In
the ghastly, industrial horror which followed “Shrapnel whistled and Maxims growled savagely.
From all the line came perpetual fire, fire, fire, and shrieked forth in great gusts of destruction.
… The dervish army was killed out as hardly an army has been killed out in the history of
war.”13 Omdurman, as had been hoped, was the ultra-violent means by which the British
avenged General Charles Gordon who, along with the British forces under his command, was
annihilated on virtually the same spot thirteen years earlier. Days later, the dreadfully effective
Kitchener was dispatched to Fashoda, where the crisis that marked the climax of Anglo-French
imperial competition in Africa unfolded.
This near-constant series of crises and conflicts culminated in the South African War of
1899, a difficult, large-scale colonial war waged by a truculent nation in defiance of the world.
The profundity of this dynamic was no more competently expressed than by Bernard Shaw, who
captured perfectly the sense of unyielding British public sentiment for the war in a letter to
George Samuel in December 1899: “The Boer and the Britisher are both fighting animals. …
Do you expect me solemnly to inform a listening nation that the solution of the South Africa
problem is that the lion shall lie down with the highly-armed lamb in mutual raptures of
quakerism, vegetarianism, and teetotalism? … Now—and here I am going to deliver a piece of
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exquisitely English wisdom—either the Boers will lick the British in this campaign, or the
British will lick the Boers.”14
This is not to say that Bernard Shaw felt some especial affinity for the empire or, for that
matter, its imperialists. Rather, as he wrote to the playwright and fellow Fabian Edward Rose,
empire “is the disease that kills civilization, and...as [William] Morris put it ‘no man is good
enough to be another man’s master.’”15 Nevertheless, behind the cynicism of the paradigmatic
piece of Shavian wit above lay the fast-flowing current of national sentiment, itself fueled ever
more egregiously by copious amounts of incendiary propaganda meant to stoke the fires of great
British race patriots and imperial zealots everywhere.
At the nexus of this cause lay the hydra-like tendrils of jingoistic and aggrieved
officialdom. For privately, Chamberlain was determined to bring the Boers to heel following the
Jameson Raid debacle—and in the high summer of 1899, he had in his grasp a nettle of
provocation. After enduring weeks of torturous negotiations surrounding the question of British
immigrant (“Uitlander”) franchise in the Transvaal, during the course of which he was inundated
with increasingly frantic reports from Cape Town,16 Chamberlain minuted the following: “It is
clear that we cannot go on negotiating for ever and we must bring matters to a head. The next
step in military preparations is so important and so costly that I hesitate to incur the expense…so
long as there seems a fair chance of a satisfactory settlement. But I dread above all the continued
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whittling away of differences until we have no casus belli left, although the Boers may claim a
partial diplomatic victory and be as disagreeable and intractable in the future as in the past.”17
To effect the hoped-for punishment of the Boers, the Colonial Secretary had already
installed at the Cape the necessary instrument: Sir Alfred Milner, a cultural Darwinist described
by Beatrice Webb as “intolerant,” “sore,” and “bitter.”18 Like Chamberlain, Milner was an archimperialist who believed that the British race was the greatest of all governing races, a succinct
characterization that hardly does Milner’s hidebound narrow-mindedness justice. For in his own
words, Milner was “a British (indeed primarily English) Nationalist. If I am also an Imperialist,
it is because the destiny of the English race, owing to its insular position and long supremacy at
sea, has been to strike fresh roots in distant parts of the world. My patriotism knows no
geographical but only racial limits. I am an Imperialist…because I am a British Race Patriot.”19
The Prime Minister Lord Salisbury loathed Milner and “his jingo supporters,” whom
Salisbury was rightly convinced would “force the Government to make a considerable military
effort [in South Africa]—all for a people whom we despise, and for something which will bring
no profit and no power to England.”20 No matter; for in the end, the provocative hawks and
crowing jingoes, carried aloft on an upsurge of national sentiment stiffened into resolve by
foreign expressions of sympathy for the Boers, particularly from Germany and Russia, got their
war.
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The South African War caused a remarkable realignment of friendships and hostilities
among the British socialists. We have seen of course how the war coupled with the Fabians’
neglect of foreign policy to open an ideological chasm within the society. Months after the split
and before Fabianism and the Empire was published, the Fabian executive sent a cyclostyled
letter to its membership with what reads like a self-justifying assurance: “we steered the Society
safely through a rapid in which it might have been wrecked by a party pronouncement on the
war.”21 Numerically, perhaps, the assurance was correct; the society had not, after all, been
“wrecked.” Yet, the fact that the assurance appears in a paragraph above a reminder that the
upcoming Fabian executive election featured candidates who opposed the imperialist progovernment view belies any sense of equanimity within the society. It seemed much remained at
stake for the Fabians in a matter that would not be settled until the appearance of Bernard Shaw’s
uncharacteristically tactful and delicately-balanced manifesto.
For all this, the Fabians were not the only prominent British socialists22 to reckon with
the South African War. The fact that they were one of the few socialist groups to actively side
with the government, however, bequeathed to the society a certain ignominy amongst its fierier
socialist peers. For its part, the SDF denounced imperial expansion because it smacked of
capitalist iniquity, whatever its context. For such leading figures of the SDF as H. M. Hyndman,
who criticized the Fabians for their “championship of the capitalist gang and their agents” in
South Africa,23 the war was an especially flagrant example of the sneer-inducing intimacies to
which capitalism and imperialism were prone; for it was clear that the war’s catalyst was the
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greed of the Randlords and the rapacity of the mining speculators who were desperate to lay their
hands on part—any part—of the Witwatersrand windfall. In fact, an article which appeared in its
rabble-rousing journal Justice in December 1899 made clear the SDF position: “Those
speculators of the City, helped by Chamberlain, have egged the Boers on to war, and they
deserve the reprobation of the whole of humanity.”24 It would be an error, however, to infer
from this anything like altruism on Hyndman’s part; for underlying such criticism and
protestation was the decidedly less magnanimous reality of his pervasive bigotry. Indeed, above
all else Hyndman conceived British intentions in South Africa as “part of a great project for the
constitution of an Anglo-Hebraic Empire in Africa,” chiefly because Rhodes’ company was
financed by Jewish financial capital and his business partner was Jewish, the potential for which
caused no small amount of handwringing amongst Hyndman and his cadre of anti-Semites.25 So
motivated, the Marxian SDF remained committed anti-Imperialists—a stance it shared with J.
Keir Hardie’s Independent Labor Party (ILP).
As with the SDF, the ILP—which spent the latter part of the 1890s developing an attitude
toward international matters largely derived from a synthesis of Marxist sources and left-wing
“Little England” liberalism26—condemned as tyrannical Britain’s grasping imperial
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machinations in the South African interior. Indeed, as early as July 1899 the National
Administrative Council (NAC) of the ILP protested the manner in which the government was
conducting negotiations with the Transvaal, which the council argued were designed to do little
more than provoke war “in the interests of unscrupulous exploiters.”27 By January 1900, the
jingoes got their way and Britain found itself once again enmeshed in a war, only this time
amidst the vastness of the South African veldt. J. Keir Hardie, now fully embarked on a proBoer, anti-imperialist propaganda campaign, harshly rebuked the imperial government in his
speeches and, in an article that ran in the January 6 edition of the Labour Leader, moved to
position the ILP in opposition to the hawks in Whitehall and Cape Town, writing that “As
Socialists, our sympathies are bound to be with the Boers. Their Republican form of government
bespeaks freedom, and is thus hateful to tyrants, whilst their methods of production for use are
much nearer our ideal than any form of exploitation for profit.”28
Some three months later, the NAC took its cue from Hardie and denounced the unsavory
actions of “Big Englanders” like Chamberlain, Milner, and Salisbury. Remit in hand, the council
proposed the following resolution for the First Annual Conference of the Labor Representation
Committee (LRC): “This Congress, believing the harrowing war in South Africa to be mainly
due to the corrupt agitation of the Transvaal mine-owners, having for its object the acquisition of
monopolies and a cheap supply of coloured and European labour, protests against the destruction
of the two Republics as being contrary to all our ideals of national political justice, and
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respectfully invites the Government to endeavor to terminate hostilities by offering to submit to
arbitration….”29
The ILP’s unabashed pro-Boer, anti-imperial sentiment (“We are…dead against any
further extension of the British Empire” the ILP News trumpeted dogmatically30) stands in stark
contrast to the posture of the foreign policy neophyte Fabians, who reconciled themselves with
the government’s cause by framing the British Empire as the fulcrum of a social-imperial
paradigm. They were not, however, British socialism’s only martially-inspired apostates; for
Robert Blatchford, the founder and editor of the exceptionally popular socialist publication
Clarion, had likewise come to terms with the idea that the empire, gently massaged by the oiled
and responsible hands of appropriately-designated ideologues, could be an entirely appropriate
vehicle for the fulfilment of socialism’s aims. To this end, in the weeks following the start of the
South African War, Clarion unveiled a strategy that, with cloying voguishness, recalled the
Fabians: a marriage of socialism and imperialism. The blissful outcome of this ideological
coupling was pointedly expressed in an article that appeared in the November 11, 1899, issue of
Clarion: “The distinction between Socialist Imperialism and the other sort is that our aim is, not
to filch from our neighbours, but to benefit them; not to increase international rancor by taking
advantage of weaker States, but to promote the fraternisation of the peoples by extending to all
the advantages we ourselves enjoy … To develop the world’s blessings for the world’s benefit,
to work unceasingly for the prosperity of the human race even more than for the glorification of
our own nation—that is the Imperialism of Socialism.”31
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As stimulating as such pronouncements of harmony undoubtedly were, at best they
produced an ambivalent honeymoon—and at worst one that was thoroughly disappointing to the
newlyweds. For “Numquan,” the pseudonym under which Blatchford wrote for Clarion, did not
necessarily approve of the empire; indeed, before 1898 he in fact seems to have been a keenly
anti-imperialist Little Englander.32 What prompted Blatchford’s somewhat head-scratching
volte-face was the outbreak of the South African War, which evidently provoked in him an
acknowledgement of the reality of the British Empire: it was there, and regardless of anything
else, whatever formless, unknown and unknowable ocean of chaos its seawalls were holding
back, whatever inundation it kept at bay, was reason enough to justify not only its maintenance,
but also its extension. Thus, for Blatchford, this unquantifiable variable made the abrogation of
the empire far too “dangerous.”33 Britain and the British were encumbered with Leviathan and
the only rational choice was to perpetuate it; for in its absence, le deluge.

The Fabians and Labor: Beginnings and Distractions
For all the vitriol and bitterness that stalked the debate surrounding the South African
War like some loquacious predator alert to the faintest shift in allegiance, the war was
nonetheless a boon to the British socialists, whose visibility in affairs international unexpectedly
surged. This was especially the case for the Fabians, whose “new birth pang with a foreign
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policy” roused in the breasts of its membership an intense interest in foreign affairs hitherto
largely absent.34 Soon, along with Fabianism, the Fabians brought this heightened awareness
with them to London’s Memorial Hall where, in conjunction with the ILP and the SDF, and
against the backdrop of a deepening sense of economic depression,35 they were invited to discuss
the formation of a working-class political party alongside the TUC.36 Yet the Fabians’ card for
this particular dance had been punched once before—when the ILP proposed electoral
cooperation between themselves, the TUC, and the Fabians back in 1896—and it was a sloppy,
acrimonious affair that ended with feet aching on both sides.37 Exigency, however, tends to alter
circumstances, and for the majority of the trade union leaders, who to a man were Gladstonian
Liberals (i.e. Little Englanders), the outbreak of the South African War did precisely that.
Staggered by the sudden collapse of Liberal opposition to the war and the subsequent rise of the
Liberal Imperialists in Parliament—with whom the trades unionists could not agree—the TUC
unexpectedly found itself being drawn to the same conclusion as most of the socialists: that the
“war had been brought about by unscrupulous financial interests.”38
Thus it was that on February 27, 1900, 129 delegates representing over half a million
trade unionists along with a disparate assemblage of British socialists of varying shades of
radicalism converged on Memorial Hall in Farringdon Street, “that cathedral of
34
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Nonconformity.”39 There, in an atmosphere of “mutual reconciliation” and guided by an agreedupon schema40 for their deliberations, it was decided to form the Labor Representation
Committee (LRC), the purpose of which was to establish, “a distinct Labour group in Parliament,
who shall have their own whips, and agree upon their policy, which must embrace a readiness to
cooperate with any party which for the time being may be engaged in promoting legislation in
the direct interests of labour, and be equally ready to associate themselves with any party
opposing measures having an opposite tendency.”41
Pelling understandably considers this the most important resolution promulgated during
the two-day conference.42 Yet for all its significance as a foundational tenet of the soon-to-be
Labor Party, the statement was anything but new, particularly to the Fabians, who had proposed
almost precisely the same programmatic collaborative design in A Plan of Campaign for Labor.
Published in 1896, the Bernard Shaw-Webb-penned tract outlined an electoral strategy that
called for the formation of an “independent Labor…party in Parliament,” a plan the Fabians
framed in terms virtually identical to those proposed at the foundational meeting of the LRC.
For example, it was argued in A Plan of Campaign for Labor that relations between labor, the
“Social-Democratic party,” and the “Trade Unions need not be otherwise than entirely friendly,
provided only all the political societies work loyally for increasing the representation of Labor in
39
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Parliament.” Furthermore, among the trio of resolutions that guided the conference’s
deliberations was the guarantee of candidates’ “financial autonomy”—or, as the Fabians had
proposed, “A thorough Labor candidature ought not to cost the candidate a single farthing.”43
It could be argued, of course, that the cooperative nature of these resolutions is, in fact,
commonsensical, especially in light of the hoped-for outcome of the London conference; so
considered, any similarity between the LRC’s foundational tenets and the Fabians’ treatise is
rendered a mere product of circumstance. Such sentiment is, however, problematic; for it
presupposes collaborative inevitability amongst and between these groups—particularly the trade
unions and independent labor—in the face of a historical landscape littered with failed attempts
at association.44 Moreover, it ignores collaboration between the former Fabian J. Ramsay
MacDonald45—who, along with J. Keir Hardie, was responsible for devising the ILP’s
contribution to the conference—and Pease, the secretary of the Fabian Society, in the months
leading up to the conference. In that correspondence, dating from November 1899, MacDonald
outlined some of the principles the ILP proposed to advance at the London meeting and solicited
Pease’s feedback.46 Thereafter, both men kept in constant contact regarding the committee’s
work, with MacDonald, then Secretary of the LRC, occasionally consulting Pease on special

43

ILP News, February 1900, 6; A Campaign for Labor (London: The Fabian Society, 1894), 2324 and 29.
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points, such as the creation of a Labor Members’ Maintenance Fund—a fund originally proposed
in 1894 in the Fabian tract “To Your Tents, O Israel!,” itself the basis of A Plan of Campaign for
Labor.47 Thus, of all the groups interested in electoral collaboration and the formation of a truly
working-class political party who contributed to the foundation of the LRC, the significance of
the Fabian role is irrefutable—albeit one which manifested itself in a characteristically rhetorical
fashion.
For all this, the Fabians, who as founding members of the LRC and, subsequently, the
British Labor Party, enjoyed a seat on the Executive Committee48 (eventually Labor’s National
Executive Committee, or NEC), were utterly non-nonplussed by these developments. After all,
as McBriar points out, four years had lapsed since the publication of A Plan of Campaign for
Labor and, in the intervening period, the society’s executive had justifiably lost much of its
enthusiasm for the endeavor.49 Pease himself, who for years served conscientiously—if
unimaginatively—as the society’s member on the LRC executive as well as the Fabian delegate
to the annual conference, characterized the Fabians’ attitude toward the new body as one of

Originally proposed in “To Your Tents, O Israel!” as “A subscription of a penny a week for a
year from every member of a trade union in the country….” On January 11, 1901, the Fabian executive
minuted the following resolution to be proposed by S. G. Hobson at the LRC: “That this Conference
expresses general approval of the scheme for a Labour Members’ Maintenance Guarantee Fund, as
framed by the Fabian Society, and instructs the Executive Committee officially to assist in its formation
by all suitable means.” Ultimately, the Fabian proposal was modified to an annual subscription of a
penny and finally passed at the 1903 Annual Meeting of the LRC. See: A Plan of Campaign for Labour,
21; Minutes, FS, November 17, 1899-June 26, 1903, January 11, 1901, LSE FSA C/8.
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Society, having learnt from experience that Socialists cannot have their own way in everything any more
than other people, recognizes that in a Democratic community compromise is a necessary condition of
political progress,” seems to argue against MacKenzie. See: MacKenzie, The Fabians, 231-232.
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“benevolent passivity.”50 Testifying to this general sense of indifference is the fact that the
Fabians did not put forward any new resolutions until Labor’s Newport Conference—which was
convened a full decade later, in 1910.51
In the meantime, the Fabians’ chrysalis of ambivalence in relation to the nascent Labor
movement, some of whose upstarts almost immediately turned colicky and recalcitrant, 52 did
nothing to insulate them from the political fortunes of the Liberal Party, which had been riven
following the khaki election of 1900. Defeated and shunted into opposition by the coalition of
Lord Salisbury’s Conservatives and Chamberlain’s Liberal-Unionists, the now-fractured Liberal
Party responded by swiftly cannibalizing itself.53 Mistaking this as the ideal opportunity to
permeate the Liberal Party and thus massage the government’s domestic reform program, the
Fabians tacked into the strong headwinds blowing from the direction of Westminster only to find
themselves wrecked once again on the shoals of Lord Rosebery’s political indeterminacy.54 In
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March 1902, Beatrice Webb vented her spleen at Rosebery and his cliquish acolytes, in whom
the Fabians had vested and lost so much of their political capital: “Asquith is deplorably
‘slack,’” she wrote, adding that “Grey is a mere dilettante, Haldane plays at political intrigue,”
while the frustratingly evanescent Rosebery,55 who had “no care for or knowledge of economic
and social evils, lives and moves…in the plutocratic atmosphere, shares to the full the fears and
prejudices of his class.” Irritated, she concluded somewhat redundantly that Rosebery was “a
bad colleague.”56
The political outlook did indeed look bleak for the Fabians, particularly considering two
developments: first, labor had run two successful candidatures in the 1900 election.57 This was
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Herbert Henry (H. H.) Asquith, attorney, Liberal parliamentarian, imperialist, and long-time
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Government (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2006), 41-67.
Archibald Primrose, whose political oscillations were the source of so much Fabian grief. The
Lord Rosebery was a Liberal statesman who served as Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from 1894
to 1895. From 1896, he served as the effective head of the Liberal Imperialist (“Limp”) faction of the
Liberal Party, marshalling the talents of men like Asquith, Haldane, and Grey. Unlike those figures,
however, he did not enjoy a return to power in 1905/6. In fact, he was a wholly negative critic of both the
Campbell-Bannerman and Asquith regimes. See: Elie Halevy, Imperialism and the Rise of Labour,
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a disquieting indicator, for labor—from whom the Fabians seemed to be abstaining—were
gaining ground politically while at the same time the society’s favored Liberals were losing it.
And while the passage of the Fabian-influenced Education Acts of 1902-3 marked a proper
legislative boon for the society generally and Sidney Webb’s policy of permeation specifically,58
it was soon overshadowed by Chamberlain, who resigned from the government in 1903 and
launched his crusade for tariff reform with “savage persistence.” 59
Chamberlain’s enormously popular campaign framed a worrisome discourse for the
Fabians, as Sidney Webb recognized. “The irruption of this new steamboat into political
waters,” Webb noted, “will make a swell that is calculated to affect the smallest cockboat, and
we must be careful.”60 Indeed, for the Fabian Society, the tariff reform movement dredged up all
the old questions concerning their position relative to the antipodean poles of free trade and
protectionism—and, by extension, the empire—recalling the circumstances that irrevocably split
the society in 1900. Having survived the ideological quagmire engendered by the South African
War, Chamberlain’s tariff reform movement scraped open all the old wounds—and the society
unhappily found itself in the same querulous position for the second time in its near-twenty-year
history.
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As divided over free trade and protectionism as it had been over empire, the Fabians
again responded ambiguously, this time fully cognizant of the potential for internal strife, with
the Bernard Shaw-penned tract Fabianism and the Fiscal Question. As with Fabianism and the
Empire, Bernard Shaw invoked the vague notion of an “alternative policy”—a third way, which,
in this case, was the centuries-old-but-still-controversial bounty system, “which does not raise
prices, and might be used to hasten the development, within the Empire, of supplies of food and
raw material to replace those which our present alien purveyors will soon want for their home
market”—while harshly criticizing the “nincompoop” Chamberlainites and the “obstinate” free
traders and—for good measure—upbraiding the working-class for “failing to strike out for
itself.”61 In the end, Fabianism and the Fiscal Question represents a sort of negative ideological
response to the controversy, heavily critiquing the positions of all the other parties involved in
the tariff reform debate and hewing closely to the tenets of Fabianism—especially collectivism
and state interference as a means of “subordinating” commercial enterprise to “national
interests,” thus ensuring the “intelligent direction of the imperial economy”62—while not actually
promulgating an official Fabian policy. Perhaps this was the very point of Bernard Shaw’s
rhetorical legerdemain, since it saved the society from cleaving itself in two for the second time
in three years.
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Able to find and then navigate a middle ground between the internal contradictions
provoked by a second, rather public and increasingly politicized debate surrounding the nature of
the British Empire, the Fabian Society turned once more to what the executive considered their
“proper business”: domestic reform.63 Thus, until 1918, the Fabians were largely, although not
exclusively, preoccupied with parochial affairs, working on the one hand to iron-out the
practicalities of English Socialism while, on the other, working in partnership with the ILP to
crystallize the ideological framework of the embryonic Labor Party (formerly the LRC).64

The Fabians “On the Threshold”
By the time the Labor Party published its new constitution and its accompanying
manifesto, Labor and the New Social Order, in 1918, the Fabians had effectively displaced the
ILP, the hitherto senior intellectual partner in the association, and cemented the society’s
position as the Cronus of Labor ideology.65 The genesis of this conversion lay in events
surrounding the First World War, which in 1914 not only opened a deep ideological chasm
between independent labor and the Labor Party, but also fractured Labor’s erstwhile solidarity.
Renowned for its pugnacious antiwar rhetoric, the ILP’s “extreme Pacifist Executive”66
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Over the course of the ensuing decade, the society published work on everything from the ills
of the sweating system (Home Work and Sweating: Causes and Remedies), the fate of electoral reform
(The Twentieth Century Reform Bill), and a biography of Robert Owen to the motives underlying the
women’s movement (The Economic Foundations of the Women’s Movement) and the future of the arts
under a socialist regime (Socialism and the Arts of Use).
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denounced in no uncertain terms the Labor executive’s pro-war stance67—a disagreement shared
by the party’s own pacifist wing, prompting the resignation of the likeminded Ramsay
MacDonald, then secretary of Labor’s Parliamentary Labor Party (PLP). Meanwhile, the
majority of the Fabians68 sympathized with the party executive and thus assiduously supported
its wartime efforts.69 Naturally, the Labor Party gravitated toward the similarly-disposed
Fabians, who themselves had been orbiting Labor with increasing affinity since the election of
1906, which returned five Labor candidates who were also members of the Fabian Society. The
outcome of the election marked the beginning of a years-long Fabian presence in Labor’s PLP.70
The figure primarily responsible for the wartime alteration in Fabian fortunes was Arthur
Henderson, who replaced Ramsay MacDonald as Secretary of the PLP. A Fabian himself,71
Henderson recognized Sidney Webb’s ability to formulate policy, draft reports, and to manage
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committees—all of which were on display during Webb’s tenure on the War Emergency
Committee (WEC).72 The WEC was an umbrella organization that brought together the various
arms of the Labor Movement.73 As a member of its executive, Webb was propelled into the very
heart of the Labor Party’s wartime affairs. Early on, he was encouraged by J. S. Middleton,
secretary of the WEC and assistant secretary of the Labor Party, to “formulate policies first on
the impact of the war on the workers and then later on post-war reconstruction.”74 This Sidney
Webb did, and with electrifying effect became the chief architect behind the committee’s
proposals.75 Indeed, within a week he had prepared The War and the Workers, a guidebook
intended for use throughout the country by local organizations like trades councils, trade union
branches, and branches of socialist societies and designed to prevent war-related dislocation and
distress.76 Not coincidentally, the Fabian Society issued the pamphlet on behalf of the
committee. Soon, Webb was inspiring the committee to act as a labor movement pressure group
on everything from food prices to old age pensions and the supply and cost of coal.77 As
Beatrice Webb noted in a diary entry from September 1915, the work of the WEC “has laid
down the policy for Labour and Socialist Movement during the war. Sidney, representing the
Fabian Society, has been able to make himself useful by drafting the resolutions, pamphlets and
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leaflets that the Committee has issued. … One result of [the Committee’s] existence is that we
personally have never been more intimate with all sections of the Labour Movement. ... It is
interesting that in the new Labour and Socialist Yearbook, though Sidney has written more than
anyone else, his name is nowhere mentioned. … We can still be useful as the ‘clerks’ of the
Labour Movement if we are content to take a back seat.”78
Sidney Webb had by this time taken the Fabian position on Labor’s NEC which, as
Middleton later pointed out, was “a position of immense advantage to Webb.”79 Indeed, it
brought him into contact with Henderson who, by 1916, was not only the secretary of the PLP,
but also its chairman and a member of Lloyd George’s coalition wartime Cabinet.80 Henderson
himself possessed some “sterling qualities,” Beatrice Webb noted. But although he was “a
veritable rock of bourgeois respectability and control,” she sneered that “he is personally most
unattractive. I have never known a man of undoubted power with so little personal charm or
magnetism.”81
Notwithstanding Beatrice Webb’s uncouth assessment, which seems not to have
prevented her from inviting Henderson to dinner,82 it was under Henderson’s guidance that a
new Joint Committee on Post-War Reconstruction headed by the NEC was formed.83 The WEC,
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with Sidney Webb as its representative, was a member of the committee, which soon established
a number of dedicated sub-committees to deal with areas of special concern related to Britain’s
post-war recovery, from unemployment and taxation to education, trades unions, and
demobilization. In a collaborative masterstroke, the Webbs “arranged to have the research for
the sub-committees carried out by the Fabian Research Department,” which presaged a
deepening ideological affinity between the Fabians and the Labor Party.84 This was confirmed
when, on July 1, 1918, the Fabian Research Department (FRD) moved into Labor headquarters
and converted into the Labor Research Department (LRD), there to provide research and
information under the heads of trade unions, cooperatives, trades councils, and labor parties.85
The fact that Fabians acted either in the capacity of chairmen or secretaries to almost all the
party’s subsequently-created advisory committees further testifies to the breadth and depth of the
Fabian-Labor entrenchment.86
This chain of Fabian influence on the Labor Party culminated with the promulgation of
Labor’s new constitution and the accompanying policy statement, Labour and the New Social
Order, drafted by Sidney Webb. Both documents bear the socialist commitment that was a
hallmark of Webb’s research87 and, indeed, Fabianism, particularly as expressed in his
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“Conscription of Wealth” campaign and “Labour After the War” program, and pledged Labor to
the “universal” enforcement of a “national minimum,”88 secured through “full employment at
decent wages;” the “democratic control of industry” and the immediate nationalization of such
industries as railways, roads, electricity, and mines; taxation based on the ability to pay, plus a
capital levy or wealth tax to pay off the huge national debt that had accumulated during the war.
89

Revolutionary as it may appear, it is somewhat ironic that a program designed to preserve the

wartime state and the increased prominence of working-class demands—by definition,
conservative goals since it would maintain the wartime status quo—should signal the acme of
Fabian influence on the development of Labor Party policy for the next thirty years.
Yet, like the Labor Party itself, which following the war seemed poised to be considered
a player in government for the first time, the Fabians too were tantalizingly close to the
threshold. While it is true that in the period of reconstruction immediately following the war the
amalgamated Fabian and Labor research departments produced little of note, an exception being
Leonard Woolf’s study of imperialism, Empire and Commerce in Africa (1919), politically the
Fabians were buoyed by the sensational performance of Labor in the elections of 1922 and 1923.
In 1922, Labor claimed slightly more than 29 per cent of the votes, an outcome which brought 10
Fabian-affiliated Labor parliamentarians to Westminster.90 While a year later the confused
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results of the election witnessed only a slight uptick in Labor representation,91 the number of
Fabian-affiliated MPs—five of whom eventually became Cabinet members92—doubled. Webb,
who won a constituency seat (Seaham) for the first time, took “almost boyish pleasure in the
adventure.”93 Of his experience on the PLP that year, Beatrice Webb observed, “And yet
Sidney’s life in the Parliamentary Labour Party is full of interest. The Parliamentary Labour
Party is unlike either of the other political parties as I knew them through my brothers-in-law and
friendly MPs. It is a closely-knit organization with a vivid internal life of its own. The leaders
do not dominate, and in so far as they lead, they lead by perpetual consultation with the rankand-file members.”94
The bloom was still on the rose when, in January 1924, Conservative efforts to forge a
coalition government collapsed and Labor was invited to form its first minority government.95
The sudden arrival of Labor made very urgent Sidney Webb’s remarks in The Labour Party on
the Threshold, his chairman’s address at the party’s annual conference in 1923. He stressed that
Labor had to do more than convince the electorate that the Conservatives had failed to deal with
major problems; instead, Labor had to prove that it could solve them by using the “principles that
we preached.”96 Those principles comprised an alternative program, encouraged by the difficultto-quantify notion of “inevitable gradualness,” based fundamentally on the platform outlined in
Labour and the New Social Order, Webb’s heavily-Fabianized 1918 policy document.97 But this
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first Labor government did not get far with its program, for the impressive rhetoric of Labour
and the New Social Order proved woefully inadequate in the face of ongoing, postwar domestic
problems—such as exorbitant inflation, high levels of unemployment, and disappointing
industrial performance—and a largely stagnant international context.98 Together, these
conditions made even socialism by gradualness impossible.99 By the beginning of October 1924,
it was clear that the government could not survive much longer: a combination of internal
stresses, incapacity, frustration of its policies, and the growing opposition of both Conservatives
and Liberals brought it down in November.100
Scholars note that at this point, or perhaps a little before, the Fabian Society entered a
period of “inertia” and “lethargy.”101 While this assessment is somewhat overdrawn—for the
frequency and breadth of the society’s lectures (a particularly memorable series was “Untrodden
Paths in Politics”), the putting forward of possible Labor candidates to run in local elections, the
work of the New Fabian Group, and the publishing of tracts and treatises (mostly revisions, but
some were new) proceeded at a respectable pace—there is nevertheless profound evidence that
an ideological malaise had in fact settled amongst the “old-guard” Fabians by the 1920s. The
most damning indication can be found in Labour and the Nation, the party’s new program, the
drafting of which was “mainly” the work of the Fabian, R. H. Tawney.102 Put forward and
agreed at the 1928 annual conference, the manifesto drew heavily on Webb’s Labour and the
New Social Order. But unlike that treatise, which had the benefit of framing a legislative
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program, Labour and the Nation was little more than a set of principles wrapped in outdated
socialist platitudes.103 It was, as Tawney later wrote, “a glittering forest of Christmas trees, with
presents for everyone.”104 Indeed, having read confidential drafts in advance, Sidney Webb
stressed to Beatrice Webb in a letter dated February 24, 1928 that “I don’t think it will be any
improvement on Labour and the New Social Order!”105 Of course, he was right; and soon, the
more radical elements to the party’s left attacked Labour and the Nation for its imprecision and
lack of commitment. Troublingly, it seemed that the Fabian Society was not only stuck, but had
regressed; arguing for the same unworkable solutions in increasingly rhetorical terms.106 Very
soon, much sooner than perhaps anyone could have imagined, the flaws of the Fabian design
were realized, with disastrous consequences for the Labor Party.

The New Fabian Research Bureau107 and the Next Generation of Fabians

For example, the Labor Party was “the political organ created to express the needs and voice
the aspirations of all who share in the labour which is the lot of mankind…the force which sustains
society is not passive property but creative effort…[and] the Labour Party since it holds that creed is a
Socialist Party…[it aims] without violence…[by] scientific knowledge…[at the] deliberate
establishment…of a social order…to secure…the largest possible measure of economic welfare and
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Labor had wed itself to Labour and the Nation by the time it unexpectedly lurched into
government in 1929. Given the rhetorical DNA of Labor’s plan, most of the cabinet were
befittingly Fabians (or at the very least associates of Fabians), as were 21 out of the 54 members
of the PLP.108 The density of Fabian permeation is further evidenced by the 1931 Labour
Yearbook, which reveals Fabians in both upper groups of the party as well as serving in advisory
capacities, including: Basil Hall, Defense; A. E. Davies and J. M. Kenworthy, Finance; R. H.
Tawney and Barbara Drake, Education; Barbara Ayrton Gould, Home; C. R. Buxton and
Leonard Woolf, International; Josiah Wedgwood, Land; Arthur Henderson, Jr., Legal; Herbert
Morrison, Local Government; Somerville Hastings and G. P. Blizard, Health; G. W. Thomson,
Science; and C. T. Cramp, Transport.109
Yet, the second Labor government could have been packed stem to stern with Fabians for
all the difference it would have made, for the government was quickly overtaken by a worldwide
economic crisis for which it was clearly unprepared.110 Indeed, the economic upheaval prompted
by the Wall Street crash in October 1929 plunged Britain into a severe economic crisis. Since at
least 1928, British export orders had been falling, a trend accelerated by the problems which
beset the US economy the following year. The deterioration of the old staple industries111
intensified, unemployment continued to rise, and the balance of trade worsened. Across Britain,
the number of registered unemployed workers rose from 1,534,000 in January 1930 to 2,783,000
in July 1931.112 These troubling circumstances converged on the minority Labour government,
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which during the 1929 election ran a campaign that concentrated heavily on the plight of the
unemployed (one of the party’s more popular slogans was “The Works Are Closed! But the
Ballot Box Is Open!”), and stripped the government of its vague rhetorical veneer, laying bare
the deep chasm between the party’s nationalistic grandiloquence (grounded as it was in “old
guard” Fabianism) and the reality of Britain’s political and economic decay.113
The nuance of the government’s spectacular collapse in 1931 has been debated copiously
elsewhere and therefore need not detain us here. Indeed, for our purposes the critical aspect of
the government’s downfall is not to be found in the event itself, but rather in its aftermath, which
witnessed Labor’s electoral decimation.114 The upshot of this defeat was a series of parallel, yet
complementary, developments that turned out to be crucial to the future of the Labor Party.
First, the party, which had been stunned by the “betrayal” of its prime minister, Ramsay
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MacDonald,115 pivoted left to reinvent itself ideologically.116 As part of its rehabilitation,
judicious watchwords and catchphrases like “socialism by gradualism,” which had populated the
elaborate programs of the earlier Labor regimes, were jettisoned in favor of more concrete
agenda. Here, again, the Fabians played a decisive role. For the NEC, under the guiding hand of
George Lansbury, himself a Fabian, established an eight-man policy committee effectively
dominated by the moderate, Cambridge-educated Fabian Hugh Dalton.117 Equipped with a remit
to “put the flesh on the bones of the party’s future vision,” the policy committee created a quartet
of subcommittees responsible for the development of Labor policy on everything from finance
and trade (chaired by Dalton himself) to the reorganization of industry. These groups included a
mixture of trade unionists and various coopted experts and party intellectuals, such as the noted
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Fabians Harold Laski and F. W. Pethick-Lawrence. 118 The subsequent investigations of the
policy committee, its multifarious subcommittees, and even the PLP depended not only on the
research and reports of Labor’s own research department, under the headship of the Fabian
Arthur Greenwood at the time,119 but also on the work of an extra-parliamentary section, the
New Fabian Research Bureau (NFRB), which was founded by G. D. H. Cole in 1931.120
Created with the “enthusiastic endorsement”121 of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, the NFRB
was the implicit acknowledgement of the ideological complacency into which the Fabian Society
had sunk, resulting in such wordy and unworkable policies as those found in Labour and the
Nation.122 The NFRB123 was the product of a new generation of intellectuals who not only
eschewed the kind of direct political involvement to which the Fabian Society had become
prone, but also considered the old Fabian Basis “obsolete” and “unintelligible.”124 Indeed, where

118

Worley, Labour Inside the Gate, 121-122.
Ibid., 151.
120
G. D. H. Cole, who eventually became the chairman of the Fabian Society when the NFRB
amalgamated with it, served alongside R. H. Tawney on the party’s Economic Advisory Committee
(EAC) from 1929. See: Pugh, Educate, Agitate, Organize, 158.
121
Neil Riddell, “‘The Age of Cole’? G. D. H. Cole and the British Labour Movement, 19291933,” The Historical Journal 38, no. 4 (December 1995): 948.
122
“Complacency” is perhaps too genteel a term, for it seemed even to Beatrice Webb that the
society had done worse than outlive its usefulness; it verged on “senility.” In a gloomy state of mind, she
remarked that the jubilee year of 1934 seemed like a good time for “winding up the Society.” “The Fabian
Society,” Webb noted in her diary, “becomes every year more respectable and seedy; made up of ageing
females, or stray foreigners and a few younger folk who come for the bank holiday. … There are of
course a large per cent of important persons still members; not only the survivors of the historic group
(G[eorge] B[ernard] S[haw], [Sydney] Olivier and ourselves) but also younger men like Laski, Cole,
Stafford Cripps, etc. But the society itself does little or nothing else but run the autumn course (which is
getting stale), the summer school and a few book boxes.” BWTD, January 4, 1932-December 29, 1934,
August 24, 1933, LSE FSA PASS/1.
123
It must be kept in mind that the NFRB and the Fabian Society were not mutually exclusive
bodies. In fact, many members of the Fabian Society proper were New Fabians as well, an overlap that
caused no small amount of confusion (then as now). What primarily differentiated the two groups was
the NFRB’s rigid apolitical stance. The Bureau’s research and reports could be used by a political party
toward whatever ends desired, but the Bureau—unlike the Fabian Society—did not itself endorse
candidates, put its own members forward for office, or propose resolutions at party conferences.
124
Cole, The Story of Fabian Socialism, 246. The Fabian Basis was first promulgated in 1886. It
was subsequently amended in 1887, 1919, 1939, and 1959. One of the more objectionably vague sections
of the earlier Basis was the third paragraph of the 1919 revision, which reads: “The Society accordingly
119

117

its predecessor had been disposed to increasingly nebulous policy formulations, the NFRB
offered detailed policy blueprints and “ways forward” to Labor. Tellingly, in the mere seven
years of its existence, the Bureau managed to produce some 42 research pamphlets, seven books,
and volumes of memoranda—an output that shamed the traditionalists of the Fabian Society.125
In its Aims and Methods, the NFRB positioned itself thusly: ”The Bureau does not promise
immediate results. It is setting out on a programme of research meant to be spread over a
considerable period of time, and it is setting out to do its work patiently … conscious that what
the Labour movement needs above all is the constant expansion and adaption of policy in the
light of changing conditions, on a basis of accurate research and collection of available
experience.”126
Almost immediately after its founding, the Bureau became affiliated with the Labor
Party—a process initiated in part by Arthur Henderson who, while still leader of the party in
1931, wrote to Cole encouraging cooperation between the New Fabians and Labor.127 The
election of Clement Attlee as the Bureau’s first chairman in June 1931 signaled the potential for
a deepening of this affinity, for Attlee soon became the party’s deputy leader—a development
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anyone’s guess—hence the New Fabians’ criticism.
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which effectively guaranteed the NFRB considerable publicity within the PLP.128 Furthering this
process of entrenchment was Cole himself, who, along with other like-minded literati, formed
the House of Commons Group, which acted as a sort of connective tissue between the NFRB,
parliamentary leaders, and individual members of Labor’s National Executive.129
Thus, when the NFRB sent a delegation to study socialism in Russia in 1932, the
machinery of a reinvigorated Fabianism was well-positioned to influence anew the Labor
Party.130 Before long the relationship bore fruit, for among the membership of the Bureau’s
mission was Hugh Dalton, arguably the dominant figure on the party’s policy committee. As
part of the wider delegation, the trip provided Dalton with the opportunity to gather information
on the nature of “planning” in the Soviet Union which, unlike Britain, had escaped the ravages of
depression-era unemployment.131 Upon his return from Russia, Dalton immediately began using
the lessons he learned to influence Labor’s thought on economic policy. In point of fact, it is
from this point forward that the word “planning” took a central place in Dalton’s vocabulary—as
indeed it did in the Fabian lexicon.132 Indeed, so convinced had he become as to the efficacy of
“the principle of economic planning along socialist lines” that when Dalton drafted For
Socialism and Peace,133 the program adopted by the party at its annual conference in 1934, it
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emphasized the creation of a planned national economy as a necessary precursor in the move
away from capitalist enterprise, called for policies of social provision (in education, health, and
housing, among others), and the use of surpluses created by “social effort…for the good of
all”—the very same basic framework which lay at the heart of Fabianism.134 This triumph of
Dalton’s vision of technocratic socialism was fueled by the NEC, which earlier took the decisive
step of inviting the New Fabians into direct cooperation with its Policy Committee.135
So it was that from 1934 onwards, notions of economic planning and assertive references
to socialism began more readily to characterize party—and Fabian—policy; the vagaries which
had been symptomatic of MacDonaldism were replaced by the “practical socialism” of a new
generation of Fabians—men like Dalton, Herbert Morrison (whom Beatrice Webb glowingly
referred to as “a Fabian of Fabians—a direct disciple of Sidney Webb’s”136), and Clement Attlee
(whose election as leader of the PLP in 1935 prompted Beatrice Webb to unflatteringly describe
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as a “somewhat diminutive and meaningless figure to represent the British Labor Movement in
the House of Commons!”137). Yet the small PLP—which had been catastrophically reduced
following the election of 1931—was largely ineffective until 1935, when the outcome of the
general election brought about a moderate recovery by Labor.138 Indeed, the return of “known”
Labor politicians139 as well as many experienced PLP and NEC members brought much-needed
stability and competence to the parliamentary party, with New Fabians being well-represented in
both. The PLP, for example, now counted among its ranks Dalton, Morrison, Pethick-Lawrence,
and Attlee, who replaced Lansbury as the leader of the parliamentary party. Meanwhile, Dalton
and Morrison were elected to the party’s executive.140
As this cadre of like-minded New Fabian intellectuals gradually penetrated the upper
echelons of Labor, Dalton published in 1935 Practical Socialism for Britain. Although not an
official party program, Practical Socialism brought together the work Labor and the New
Fabians had been engaged in since 1932 and pointed the way forward by providing Labor with
the soon-to-be-realized long-term framework of its social reform agenda, the ideological basis of
which was undeniably New Fabian.141 Yet, with its defiant “pragmatism,” Practical Socialism
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also managed to accomplish something else, as Pimlott has observed; for it “revived” “nuts-andbolts Fabianism” by divesting it of the sentimental rhetoric to which it had been inclined since
the 1920s and, through ideas such as national planning, restored to it a broad-based appeal in an
age of hardship.142 Meanwhile, changes were afoot within the NFRB itself. Originally
dominated by G. D. H. Cole, its provocative founder, initiative within the Bureau soon passed to
the less-controversial intellectual triumvirate of Hugh Gaitskell, Evan Durbin, and Douglas
Jay.143 In 1936, this younger generation of New Fabians was coopted by Dalton to serve on the
NEC’s Finance and Trade Policy Subcommittee and create a “center-left version of technocratic
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socialism which regarded public ownership and planning as essential preconditions for social
reform.”144
Hence, by the time Dalton assumed the chairmanship of the party’s annual conference in
October 1936, the struts and armatures necessary to support Labor’s ideological evolution were
in place and the machinery to launch it well and truly primed. Effectively unencumbered, Dalton
presided over the formulation and preparation of Labor’s new policy statement, which it
promulgated in Labour’s Immediate Programme (alt. Labor’s Short Programme).145 Rooted
firmly in the social reform agenda developed by Dalton in Practical Socialism and, by extension,
the work of the New Fabians, Labor’s new manifesto committed the party to a program of
“measures of Socialism and Social Amelioration,” a rubric which rolled up under its expansive
umbrella a quartet of measures aimed at reconstruction, including finance, land, transport, and
energy; and a corresponding set of “great benefits,” including “abundant food, good wages,
leisure, and security.”146 For all this, however, it was a remarkably moderate manifesto, a quality
which clearly reflects Dalton’s judiciousness. Indeed, while Labour’s Immediate Programme
presented the party’s “plans to bring real prosperity and peace to all,” it stopped far short of
articulating anything like a too-radical agenda. For example, the earlier rhetoric surrounding
nationalization which virtually suffused For Socialism and Peace was softened in favor of a
vague policy designed to direct the “commanding heights” of the economy.147 Moreover, very
little was said about constitutional reform, deficit financing (Keynesianism remained a
contentious issue within the party), or even planning. Nevertheless, the specificity and
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practicality of Labour’s Immediate Programme constituted a major advance for Labor as a party
of reform and would, in time, form the “bedrock” of the work of Attlee’s postwar Labor
regime.148

“A Marriage Arranged”: Amalgamation and the Revival of the Fabian Society
The following resolution was agreed at an extraordinary meeting of the Fabian Society
executive on June 18, 1934: “The Fabian Society does not undertake the publication of
pamphlets upon specific issues of policy, since this function is already performed in the research
stage by the New Fabian Research Bureau and in the definitive stage by the Labour Party.”149
With one sentence, the society effectively gutted itself, resigning into the hands of the
NFRB the prestigious, clout-generating function which had propelled the Fabians into the inner
circles of Britain’s political elite. Now “elderly” and “comatose,”150 the Fabian Society was
content to act as little more than a purveyor of “socialist books and pamphlets” and an arranger
of lecture series and summer schools designed to “re-state…the fundamental principles” upon
which the “British Socialist Commonwealth” must be built. It was noted, however, that should a
“specifically Fabian approach to particular problems emerge” in the course of said restatement,
“it may be advisable to consider its development and arrange for subsequent publication.”151
Thus, the society’s new raison d’etre, as approved by the executive, confirmed its own
intellectual feebleness.
Yet beneath the banality of the society’s subsequent proceedings and the perfunctory
revision of tracts and pamphlets increasingly at risk of becoming outdated, there stirred a
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movement to stave off this officially-sanctioned decline into obsolescence. Indeed, barely seven
months after the extraordinary meeting, the journalist, Fabian, and New Fabian Ivor Thomas152
motioned that the society’s executive appoint a small subcommittee to “consider relations
between the Society and the New Fabian Research Bureau and to make recommendations for
closer working arrangements.”153 Later that same year, G. D. H. Cole was invited to speak on
“What socialist planning means” at the Fabian-sponsored autumn lectures, New Fabians were
appointed to society subcommittees (Barbara Drake and Harold Laski, for example, sat on the
Publications Subcommittee), and the society and the NFRB published tracts jointly (for example,
Colin Clarke’s A Socialist Budget).154 Yet when amalgamation was initially broached by the
society in 1935, the Bureau declined; for at the time it was trying to organize an investigation of
Nazi Germany similar to that which had produced Twelve Studies in Socialist Russia (a project
that included a parallel volume of essays)155 and merger would have complicated the scheme.156
A year later, the Webbs’ exploration of union was rebuffed by the society’s long-serving general
secretary, F. W. Galton, who objected for fear of losing his job.157
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The way was finally cleared of encumbrances in 1938 when, on January 10, the officers
of the NFRB “plumped” for amalgamation.158 Indeed, contending that union brought with it not
only greater prestige but also more income, even Cole reasoned in favor of a merger. But as
founder of the extra-parliamentary organ which had assumed the Fabian Society’s high-profile
research mantle, Cole had to be persuaded that the new body should assume the Fabian name.
After all, would not such a move give the impression that the Bureau had been taken over by the
society?159 In the end, two conditions convinced Cole that adopting the “Fabian Society” was
indeed the best way forward: firstly, name recognition. Seedy and aged though it may have
become, it was undeniable that the Fabian Society’s reputation brought with it a certain cachet
which the NFRB totally lacked. Secondly, and rather more pragmatically, Cole was aware that
there were large and non-transferable legacies tied to the Fabian Society. Changing the name of
the society meant sacrificing future solvency, a decision no one was willing to make.
When the merger was finally approved—having been agreed by a vote of 78 to 0 (with
four abstentions) by the Fabian Society in December of 1938—the revitalized society not only
retained its name, but its long-standing and highly-fruitful affiliation with the Labor Party.160
Yet to accomplish all this, significant concessions had to be made to Cole and the NFRB,
including the laying out and adoption of a new set of rules that jettisoned the old Fabian Basis161
158
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and contained, controversially, a “Self-Denying Ordinance” or “Rule 3.”162 The ordinance read
as follows: “No resolution of a political character expressing an opinion or calling for action,
other than in relation to the running of the Society itself, shall be put forward in the name of the
Society. Delegates to conferences of the Labour Party, or any other conference, shall be
appointed by the Executive Committee without any mandatory instructions.”163
In effect, Cole and the NFRB made amalgamation contingent upon reasserting the
primacy of the Fabian Society’s research function. Given her history as the founder of the
Fabian Research Department (FRD) and her own fraught relationship with Labor politics as
ciphered through Sidney, Beatrice Webb understandably defended the New Fabians’ position,
even going so far as to argue in her welcoming message, which appeared in the February 1939
issue of Fabian News, that “The plain truth is that research and active propaganda of immediate
proposals are uncongenial companions: the one insists on an open mind, the other prefers a
closed one. If Fabians want to influence the immediate policy of the Parliamentary Labour
Party, they can fall back on their local Labour Party or their trade union.”164
With that, the “contract of marriage” between the Fabians and the Bureau was sealed.
The immediate outcome of this conjugation was a revitalized and progressive Fabian Society
chaired by Cole and presided over by Beatrice Webb in the newly-created post of honorary
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president.165 By then entering her eighty-second year, Webb held the position just long enough
to safeguard the continuation of the Fabian Society in its reconstituted form and then, in June
1941, withdrew. Thus, one era ended and another began.

Conclusion
When the constitution of the revitalized Fabian Society was approved in June 1939,
nearly four decades had passed since the meeting of the LRC at Memorial Hall in London. Since
that time, the fortunes of the Fabian Society had oscillated in accordance with the vagaries of the
Labor Party and the vertiginous character of contemporary British politics. That the society
managed not only to survive these tumultuous circumstances, but also to outlive so many
members of its Victorian cohort is testament to its ability to stay relevant—sometimes at great
cost to itself.
For all this, however, the Fabian Society was not permitted to wallow overlong in
connubial bliss. Indeed, the honeymoon did not outlast the summer of 1939; for on September 4,
1939, less than four months after the promulgation of the society’s new constitution and a day
after Britain declared war on Germany, the Fabian Finance and General Purposes Committee
convened an emergency meeting.166 At the meeting, it was agreed that, with the onset of the
Second World War, “the Society should draw up a new programme beginning with work on war
aims etc, watching and criticising war legislation, orders in council, etc. It was recommended
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that the Executive Committee should suspend all committees and sections and should delegate
powers of action between meetings to the officers, who should organize research and other
activities. … It was recommended that cooperation on suitable work take place with the Labour
Party, the Haldane Society, PEP, UDC, and LRD. It was decided to offer the Society’s services
to the Labour Party for research work during the war.”167
In truth, the onset of war was a boon to the Fabian Society for, as we have seen, the
society always functioned best when it had a clear purpose. Absent an overarching context
heavily informed by some sort of exigency—be it the South African War or the First World
War—precision of purpose proved to be frustratingly elusive, circumstances which, in retrospect,
activated the Fabians’ less successful rhetorical proclivities. Thus, as it had in 1923/4, the
Fabian Society found itself on a threshold—poised somewhere between realizing fully its
potential or fading into obscurity. But unlike the last time, when the Fabians slipped from the
precipice and descended into a period of “seedy” indolence, 1939 was different. This time, the
Fabian Society crossed the threshold and did so with remarkable effect.
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CHAPTER 3: 1929-1944
From Imperial Trusteeship to Mass Education in African Society: A Study of Fabian
Perspectives and Influence on Colonial Development Policy through the
Second World War

This country is under a Conservative Government, pledged up to the hilt to the
defence of capitalist interests. … While men’s minds are keyed up by suspense,
the chance is ours to organize and redirect the democratic forces.1
– G. D. H. Cole

Introduction
In putting its research functions at the disposal of the Labor Party during the Second
World War, the reconstituted Fabian Society skirted the jagged edge of its self-denying
ordinance. A threshold mandated as part of G. D. H. Cole’s amalgamation concessions, it is hard
to imagine an arrangement less propitious to ensuring Fabian neutrality. While it is certainly true
that in principle the society remained impartial, refraining from making policy proposals or
pronouncements in the name of the society itself, in practice certain of its bureau effectively
ignored the ordinance. This was especially true of the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB), which
was established in late-1940 and chaired by the Fabian and Labor MP Arthur Creech Jones. The
ostensible remit of the FCB was to act as an objective research clearinghouse for colonial
information and research, a framework which necessarily obliged the creation of a network that
connected the Bureau both to governmental and non-governmental bodies. Over time, the
processes inherent in collecting, analyzing, and sharing information managed to deepen the
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nascent Bureau’s relationship with Labor, an almost organic development naturally encouraged
by the Fabian Society’s long-standing relationship with the party.
Having been dazed by the one-two punch of the collapse of its second ministry and
subsequent defection of Prime Minister J. Ramsay MacDonald, the Labor Party was sent reeling
to the ropes of government as His Majesty’s Opposition in 1931. There, mired in the economic
crises stimulated by the Great Depression and buffeted by the concomitant economic blowback
suffered by its working-class constituency, the party licked its wounds, choosing to focus on its
favored domestic-policy agenda while adopting a default, paternalistic approach toward the
colonial empire. This largely benign position prevented Labor from developing anything like a
long-term imperial vision. Yet, this is not to say that the party was explicitly neglectful, at least
at the level of policy formulation; indeed, rather the opposite is true, for the Advisory Committee
on Imperial Questions (ACIQ) produced two notable treatises on the subject, one in 1933 (The
Colonial Empire2) and another in 1936 (The Demand for Colonial Equality of Economic
Opportunity3). That these were largely ignored by the annual party conferences, however, has
led some scholars, including Barbara Bush and Stephen Howe,4 to bemoan the party’s thorough,
near decade-long muteness on matters imperial.
This torpor was interrupted with the establishment of the FCB, which remained wedded
to the society’s self-denying ordinance only until Labor issued The Old World and the New
Society: An Interim Report of the National Executive of the British Labour Party on the
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Problems of Reconstruction in 1941.5 Meant to guide deliberations at the party’s 1942 annual
conference, The Old World and the New Society included eight sections detailing everything
from the party’s position on appeasement to its policies on social security. Of special interest to
the Bureau was the section on “Imperial Questions,” the basis of which was the work of the
Fabian Leonard Woolf, who had spent the previous two years devising and adapting policies as a
member of the ACIQ. But by the time The Old World and the New Society was published,
“Imperial Questions” had been defanged by the Labor Party executive. Gone now were the
Fabians’ more ardent initiatives and pointedly anti-white settler language, prompting the FCB to
issue a long and painstaking rebuke to the National Executive Committee (NEC). This
admonishment, Patricia Pugh concludes justifiably, signaled the Bureau’s abrogation of the
society’s self-denying ordinance in regard to party policy statements.6 Henceforth, the FCB was
an active and unambiguous partner in Labor’s colonial policy formulations.7
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Yet, throughout the early twentieth century, the Fabians were no less subject to the
vicissitudes of Britain’s colonial enterprise than the Labor Party—or, indeed, Whitehall—was
itself. From the debate surrounding imperial trusteeship and paternalism to the practical
translation of the empire’s fraught colonial development regime, the society strove to reconcile
the reality of colonialism with indigenous interests, in the end formulating a positivist vision of
colonial policy that framed trusteeship as the vehicle for the political, economic, and social
progress of colonial peoples. As we shall see, along the way, the Fabians worked in tandem
with, and independently of, colonial officials to forge certain policy initiatives, notably Mass
Education in African Society (1944) and the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance (1946).
Encumbered with such ideas as the gradual extension of democracy and the improvement of the
machinery of democratic government through such elements as education, as well as the
expansion of government powers in a way that yielded “positive government action” as a means
of promoting social and economic equality8 through the establishment and regulation of local
cooperatives, both initiatives harkened back to Fabianism’s vision of development-based
progress. In the final analysis, the success of these initiatives reflects not only the ability of the
Fabians to extend their influence beyond the confines of the Labor Party, but also hints at the
complex of idealism and pragmatism which underlay the society’s evolving socialist ethos.
This chapter examines the evolution of Fabian thought regarding colonial development
policy in the period between the onset of the Great Depression and the end of the Second World
War. During this time, the Fabians jettisoned Chamberlainite trusteeship as a cog in their
ideological wheelhouse in favor of an alternative vision of trusteeship primed by Sydney Olivier.
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With its emphasis on indigenous African interests, Olivier’s work framed key discursive
elements of subsequent Fabian colonial development theory for the next 25 years. This
evolution of Fabian thought coincided with a revolution in official development policy, for 1929
marks the passage of Britain’s Colonial Development Act (CDA). Although economic exigency
prompted a retrofit of the CDA, ultimately bending the machinery of colonial development
toward the fulfillment of metropolitan needs, it nonetheless signaled an important change in the
“official mind” at Westminster. Indeed, a precedent had been set, and it was the CDA’s
legislative successor, the Colonial Development and Welfare Act (CDWA), which, a decade
later, provided vital political impetus for Fabian colonial development designs. As such,
included herein is an examination of the degree to which Fabian thought manifested official
policy under the Conservative-dominated wartime Coalition Government. This chapter
concludes with a discussion of the sterling crisis of 1947 and its impact on the postwar colonial
development drive. Necessarily, this chapter introduces and explores the work of the FCB, the
organ of the Fabian Society which, under the chairmanship of Creech Jones, was responsible for
researching, devising, and pursuing departures in official colonial development policy.

The Fabians and “Trusteeship”: Evolving Perspectives on Empire
At the turn of the twentieth century, the cardinal principle of the British Empire’s
colonial development regime was “trusteeship,”9 the developmental parameters of which were

The eventual framework of “development-through-trusteeship” was derived in part from the
work of late-eighteenth/early-nineteenth-century French social theorist and “founding socialist” ClaudeHenri de Saint-Simon. Informed by the destabilizing effects of the Industrial Revolution, Saint-Simonian
development philosophy argued for development as the means by which stability could be achieved
amidst the destructive effects of “progress.” As the Saint-Simonians saw it, the necessary vehicle for this
restoration of order was “an organization of material work”—that is, “trusteeship,” whereby those
individuals with the capacity to utilize land, labor, and capital in the interests of society were “entrusted”
with the responsibility to do so. As imagined by the Saint-Simonians, the system worked something like
9
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sketched by Chamberlain during his time as the Secretary of State for the Colonies.10 An “ardent
imperial spokesman,” Chamberlain saw the “colonies as being in the condition of
underdeveloped estates, and estates which never [could] be developed without imperial
assistance.”11 For Chamberlain, Britain was not some absentee landlord neglectful of the
maintenance and improvement of his manor. Rather, Britain was an imperial trustee, an active
partner possessed of a sacred duty to develop the massive agricultural estate which had been
“entrusted” to it. Thus, if the endgame of colonial development was to make the colonies more
productive and self-sufficient in order to promote the economic well-being of the metropole, as
Chamberlain’s vision of social-imperial trusteeship held,12 they could no longer be subject to the
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laissez-faire vagaries of nineteenth-century imperialism.13 Rather, dependencies like Africa and
the West Indies required a more “constructive imperialism,” obliging a minimum of statedirected improvements in things like infrastructure, agriculture, veterinary services, and
education to “unlock” their untapped wealth and resources.14 To this end, the CO retrofitted the
struts and armatures of Britain’s colonial development regime to support Chamberlain’s new
“imperial estates doctrine” and its associated scheme of “imperial preference.”
For a time, at least, the Fabian Society shared this view; in fact, in Fabianism and the
Empire, the society had expressed views that were “practically identical to that upheld by Mr.
Chamberlain.”15 This position remained static even in the years immediately following the
debate over free trade and protectionism, which briefly imperiled the society’s fragile postwar
recrudescence. Yet cosseted as they were in a swathe of post-tariff reform insularity, one thing
about Chamberlain’s system was impossible for the Fabians to ignore: the operation of
trusteeship within the rubric of the imperial estates doctrine rendered the interests of the
indigenous peoples of the colonies “wholly subservient” to those of British capitalism.16 One
need look no further than Kenya, where the impoverishment of Africans at the hands of
speculative European landlords and the large numbers of “native” producers forced into wage

centers. Thus, a self-perpetuating system was formed, one that kept the prices of foreign goods
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For fuller discussions on social-imperialism and its variants, see: Peter J. Cain and Anthony G.
Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 1688-1914 (New York: Longman Group,
1993), 204-213; Semmel, Imperialism and Social Reform, 1-17 and 89-118.
13
Constantine, The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 23.
14
Joseph M. Hodge and Gerald Hodl, “Introduction,” in Developing Africa: Concepts and
Practices in Twentieth Century Colonialism, eds. Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl, and Martina Kopf
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014), 6.
15
Sydney Olivier, “Liberalism and the Fabians,” The Daily News, December 17, 1901, 4. As
quoted in Francis Lee, Fabianism and Colonialism: The Life and Political Thought of Lord Sydney
Olivier (London: Defiant Books, 1988), 105.
16
Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 152 and 156.

136

labor to achieve minimal subsistence attested to the corrosive advance of capitalism, to witness
how colonial policy had “diseased and disordered” African communities.17 Indeed, soon after
Chamberlain left office, Lord Elgin, the Liberal Secretary of State, found himself in the position
of trying to constrain “the evils of unrestricted speculation in land” in Kenya, with decidedly
mixed results.18
Indeed, by the 1920s, this system of exploitative paternalism had become entrenched,
frustrating even the efforts of the CO to assert the “unassailable” paramountcy of African
interests as part of the principle of trusteeship.19 So it was that, throughout the decade, the
fortunes of trusteeship waxed and waned according to the caprice of the administration. In 1923,
for example, the Devonshire Declaration not only upheld the paramount importance of African
interests in the face of immigrant settlement, but also rejected outright “the grant of responsible
self-government” to Britain’s African dependencies.20 Some four years later, however, the white
paper on “Future policy in regard to Eastern Africa,” written by then Colonial Secretary L. S.
Amery, argued in favor of extending the responsibility for native trusteeship to immigrant
settlers, a step expressly forbidden by Devonshire,21 while at the same time suggesting the
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possibility of a “Closer Union”22 of Britain’s East African colonies and the creation of what
Priscilla Shilaro describes as a “grand Dominion of East Africa, comprising Kenya, Uganda and
Tanganyika, and possibly Rhodesia and Nyasaland.”23 These suppositions, reflective of Amery’s
belief that European migration and settlement in the colonies was the motive-force for colonial
development and, thus, a precondition for indigenous advance,24 framed the remit of the Hilton
Young Commission, which was launched in 1927 to investigate and make recommendations on
associating immigrant communities “more closely in the responsibilities and trusteeship of
Government” so that they might help determine how the development of “native” communities
could “best be progressively applied in the political as well as the economic sphere.”25 In 1929,
the commission’s findings were published in its Report on Closer Union of the Dependencies in
British East and Central Africa, which essentially rejected Amery’s proposals by reverting
colonial policy back to the declaration of 1923.26
As the CO struggled to arrive at a consistent development policy, the Fabians’ own
paradigm of trusteeship underwent an overhaul. The change was largely the result of the
influence of leading Fabian Sydney Olivier, who, during his tenure as a colonial official in
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Jamaica between 1900 and 1913, set the tone for a particular “Fabian conception” of
colonialism.27 A long-time student of Comtean social theory,28 Olivier saw in Auguste Comte’s

27

Olivier served as a colonial official in Jamaica between 1901 and 1913, including governor
from 1907-1913. During his tenure, Olivier worked to “extend peasant proprietorship” by “denationalising Crown land” for alienation to small-holders—a peasantization scheme whose spirit lay in
the Fabian tract Capital and Land, which Olivier penned in 1888. As Cowen and Shenton have observed,
a “favourite theme of Olivier’s and, not coincidentally of the emerging Fabian critique of British colonial
rule in Africa, was to contrast the beneficent colonialism of the West Indies and West Africa with the
maleficent implantation of settler and large-scale production in Kenya and Southern Africa.” Later,
Olivier became Lord Olivier and Secretary of State for India. Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 153.
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As a theory of human development, “positivism” originated with the work of Auguste Comte
(1798-1857), Henri-Claude de Saint Simon’s secretary and principal ideological successor. Comte argued
that the Saint-Simonian paradigm of development (the model which eventually lay at the back of
Chamberlainite trusteeship) had, in fact, failed to reconcile progress with order; for progress remained
imperfect—relentless, inconstant, and chaotic and had not, therefore, brought about the “constructive
order” promised by the Saint-Simonian model. Thus, development-based “improvement” had reached an
impasse. The solution, Comte believed, was philosophical; hence, positivism, the character of which is
generally defined as being altruistic, or the putting of “the social above the personal.”
As outlined in Comte’s “Law of Three Stages,” positivism was the third and final stage of human
development. Briefly, Comte reasoned that human society developed through a trio of “mentally
conceived” stages, each of which was defined by the means and methods humans used to understand and
rationalize the world around them: the Theological Stage, the Metaphysical Stage, and the Positive Stage.
In the Theological Stage, human development is subject to and entirely dependent upon the caprice of
personified deities—as expressed, for instance, in animistic, polytheistic, and monotheistic belief systems.
The Metaphysical Stage is a sort of “abstractified” extension of this first stage. Lastly, the Positive Stage
(alt. the Scientific Stage), in which human development is understood/explained by way of observation,
experiment, and comparison. Unlike the earlier, supernatural stages, the Positive Stage relies on the
scientific method and objective thought to explain the natural world and correct for its imperfections.
Considered within the context of development, it is in the Positive Stage that humanity acquires
the intellectual capacity necessary to “tame progress” through order so that it might achieve the kind of
altruistic, mature, morality-based “progressive development” required for “improvement.” In the end,
what this Comtean model of development effectively did was bring together the Saint-Simonian bankertrustees with Comte’s “high priests of positivism”—scientists and sociologists—as the new agents of
“collective development.”
The Comtean model of social theory was pivotal in the formation of the Fabians’ own vision of
social trusteeship. However, the Fabians’ version differed from that of Comte in that it “rejected the role
of the banker as a social trustee.” Indeed, in keeping with their own theory of rent, the Fabians saw
bankers as just another active and “knowingly self-interested” (rather than altruistic) party that received
“rents”—in the form of things like interest—in much the same way landlords received rents from land.
Inasmuch as landlords could “not be depended upon to fulfill their social obligation to make land
productive and at the same time keep labor employed without destitution,” bankers could likewise not be
trusted to act impartially. The Fabians therefore fell back upon state officials who did have the “potential
to be positively enlightened” or “permeated” by Fabian thought. Thus, in the Fabian vision of social
trusteeship, bankers were replaced state officials as the new priests of positivism imagined by Comte.
For the best source on Comtean Positivism, see: A Comte (trans.), A General View of Positivism
(Aberdeen: A. King & Co, 1865). For notable—if esoteric—renderings on the connections between
Saint-Simonian trusteeship and Comtean Positivism and British and Fabian colonial development
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doctrine of positivism the means by which development could not only correct the depredations
of Chamberlainite trusteeship—which critics held promoted capitalist interests as the “chief
function of the State”29—but also lead to social, political, and economic improvement in the
colonies. This positivist assessment of development’s potential formed the basis of “Fabian
Trusteeship,” which in effect redefined Bernard Shaw’s “privilege” of inclusion in the empire by
converting social obligation—such as the protection of colonial subjects from the ravages of the
market—into a regime of progressive development arranged and ordered by altruistic state
officials (or “trustees”).30 Thus, for Olivier, and a growing body of Fabians, including Leonard
Woolf, Graham Wallas, and, eventually, Sidney Webb, the question confronting imperial Britain
was no longer if it would remain the “centre and nucleus” of a global empire characterized by
“Responsible Government,” as Bernard Shaw had postulated in Fabianism and the Empire, but
whether or not the “State can be changed from an instrument of economic exploitation into an
instrument of good government and progress.”31
Leonard Woolf—publisher and close friend of Olivier and, arguably, the Fabian nearest
to him ideologically32—developed this theme in Empire and Commerce in Africa. Published by
the Labor Research Department in 1919, which had recently been amalgamated with the research
arm of the Fabian Society, Woolf argued that Britain’s position in Africa was “merely that of
trustee for the native population and that its only duty was to promote the interests…of the
Africans.”33 This benign sense of trusteeship was to be guided by a bundle of principles that

policies, see Cowen and Shenton, “The Invention of Development” in Power of Development, 27-43;
Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines of Development.
29
Leonard Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism (London:
George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920), 9 and 352-353.
30
Cowen and Shenton, “Origin,” 156-157.
31
Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, 358.
32
This ideological affinity is explored in Lee’s Fabianism and Colonialism, 170-197.
33
Woolf, Empire and Commerce in Africa, 362.

140

included the protection of native land rights and the use of revenue derived from the land to
support native development, measures that constituted an early roadmap toward eventual selfgovernment. Later, Woolf extended versions of these principles to Labor’s colonial policy
formulations when, as secretary of the Imperial Affairs Sub-Committee34 (later renamed the
Advisory Committee on Imperial Questions), he drafted, along with its chairman, the Fabian C.
R. Buxton, The Empire in Africa: Labour’s Policy (1926), the party’s first comprehensive
colonial policy statement.35
As Labor’s policy crystallized around a nucleus of Fabian-approved doctrine, Sydney
(now Lord) Olivier launched a broadside against Amery’s White Paper in the House of Lords.
The principle of trusteeship as expressed in the Devonshire Declaration, he observed, represented
a “distinct and acceptable departure” from the earlier Chamberlainite policy which regarded
“Imperial Dominions as undeveloped estates of the sovereign nation.”36 Amery’s white paper,
with its controversial reliance and the “fallacy”37 of benevolent immigrant trusteeship vis-à-vis
native affairs, threatened to wreck this and, in the process, destroy “the confidence of African
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natives in the British government.”38 When in early 1929 the Hilton Young Commission
delivered to Parliament its findings affirming39 but vaguely the imperial government’s principles
of trusteeship as outlined in 1923, its imprecision only fueled Olivier’s frustration, who
complained that it was “not enough” to simply adopt the principles of trusteeship and to reiterate
their adoption in white papers. 40
For Olivier, this war of words over trusteeship climaxed in the tract Imperial Trusteeship,
which the Fabian Society published in 1929. Hewing closely to Labor’s colonial policy as
formulated in Woolf and Buxton’s Empire in Africa and partially informed by the Hilton Young
Commission’s report, the Olivier-penned treatise proposed a framework of state-run social
trusteeship that scuttled Chamberlainite policy. Based on Devonshire’s ostensible “dictum that
native interests are to be paramount,”41 Olivier’s model delinked European landlordism and its
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Devonshire Declaration was promulgated, African paramountcy was little more than a political expedient,
the means by which the simmering tensions which had characterized relations between the Indian
immigrant population in Kenya and the colony’s white settler population since 1919 could be defused.
Kenya’s “Indian question” had, since the First World War, pivoted on four issues: Indians
demanded 1) the right to obtain land in the European “white highlands;” 2) the “same political rights as
those granted to the settlers after the war;” 3) an end to both commercial and residential segregation in the
colony’s urban areas; and 4) the right of Indians to “immigrate freely” to Kenya. After three years of
haggling, the India Office and the CO put forward in 1922 the Wood-Winterton plan (so named after the
plan’s leading architects, Stuart Edward Wood, under-secretary of state at the CO, and his opposite at the
India Office, Lord Winterton), which sought to strike a balance between the two parties. On one hand,
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concomitant scourges from the health and longevity of the empire by ensuring adherence to the
“just and equal principles of British Imperial rule which prior to the Imperial development period
were assumed [to be] axiomatic.”42 In effect, Olivier—and, by extension, the Fabian Society
itself—argued that a return to the humanitarian precepts of “justice, liberty and equality of civic
privilege”43 that characterized Britain’s “Old Empire”44 was the necessary bridge between the
contemporary rhetoric of trusteeship and its reality.

term, however, such ameliorative efforts amounted to naught, for changing political fortunes in London
coupled with European intransigence in Kenya to forestall resolution. Until, that is, early the following
year, when considerations over African rights interposed and presented officials with “a clever and
convenient way out of a serious imperial problem.”
On the surface, at least, the two sets of issues seem poles apart—and yet, a swathe of fiscal
common ground existed between them. For the very same year that the Wood-Winterton plan was being
formulated, it dawned on the CO that the economic policy of Governor Sir Edward Northey (in office,
1919-1922), based entirely on European production for export, posed two very real dangers: first, the
bankruptcy of the colony; second, rising levels of African dissent. The ramifications of these
developments were all-too-vividly realized in the form of intensifying African nationalism and its
concomitant scourge, rebelliousness, as embodied by the work of Harry Thuku and the East African
Association; “by the complaints of British capitalists;” and by the protestations of British humanitarians.
Pressurized seemingly from every angle, the CO did the only realistic thing it could to help ventilate these
frustrations: in 1922, it committed itself to measures “for encouraging native agriculture and industry.”
The decision to do so had a ripple effect on the controversy surrounding the Indian question. For
the revivification of African production for export required not only greater assistance to African
agriculture and increased provision of services to the reserves (thereby defusing an increasingly volatile
political situation between the colony and its African subjects), but also the presence of Indian traders
who would “provide the means for getting African product to the world market.” Hence, there could be,
as Maxon observes, “no question of a complete stoppage of Indian immigration, nor could there be a
complete denial of Indian claims for equal rights.” As a result, driven by economic necessity, the
Devonshire Declaration included language that guaranteed the paramountcy of African interests. Despite
this, however, the officials at Whitehall went to some lengths to assure the white settler population that
African production for export was meant to complement, not supplant, European production. Framed
accordingly, Olivier’s allusion back to Devonshire’s dictum is, at best, the sincerest form of rhetorical
flummery. See: Robert M. Maxon, “The Devonshire Declaration: The Myth of Missionary
Intervention,” History of Africa 18 (1991), 259-270.
42
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43
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consistent with the principles and practices of the evolving old empires, which had incorporated
humanitarian precepts into the imperial transition from mercantilism to self-government. But the

143

By this time, the Fabians had never been closer to realizing their vision of social
trusteeship. For in the summer of 1929, the newly-installed Labor government, equipped with
Empire in Africa, initiated a series of policy changes seemingly calculated to consummate the
Fabian design: first, the founder Fabian Sidney Webb, who chaired Labor’s Imperial Affairs
Sub-Committee from 1918-1921,45 was elevated to a peerage (the Lord Passfield), an
appointment accompanied by his installation as Secretary of State for the Colonies;46 a month
later, Parliament passed the long-gestating CDA, which set aside funds for “aiding and
developing agriculture and industry” in the colonies.47 Taken together, this cascade of good
fortune suggested that the stars in the constellation of Fabian Trusteeship had well and truly—if
unexpectedly—aligned. “Fabians to the Rescue!” The Clarion boldly proclaimed.48
Events, however, soon conspired to disillusion the Fabians—and the first sign of
difficulty came from an unexpected source: Sidney Webb himself. In June 1930,49 Webb issued
his Memorandum on Native Policy in East Africa which, although it upheld the paramountcy of
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native interests as embedded in the Devonshire Declaration,50 in abeyance since 1924,51 also
sought to reconcile native paramountcy with Amery’s proposal to extend trusteeship to
immigrant settlers by promoting the “fiction” that being mindful of settler interests was “in no
way inconsistent” with the ideal—a notion which was conceptually anathema to the bulk of the
Fabians.52 Insult was added to injury when, in April 1931, Webb, literally cornered53 by the anticolonialists Woolf and Buxton who pressed him to implement the policies as outlined in Empire
in Africa, balked after more than an hour of inflamed argument.54 Decades later, Woolf
characterized Webb’s behavior at the meeting as the “pig-headed”55 conduct of “a common or
garden imperialist Conservative”56 and admitted that at the time he feared—rather
outlandishly—that Webb had succumbed to the blandishments and prevarications of Sir Edward
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Grigg, the pro-settler governor of Kenya. Woolf’s harsh critique seems to have failed to take
into consideration two things: first, Webb was no Grigg acolyte. In fact, Webb was eager and
committed to ensuring the security of African land rights in Kenya. Indeed, as Secretary of State
for the Colonies, Webb made revisions to the draft bill of the long-gestating Native Lands Trust
Ordinance that were designed not only to fairly compensate Africans whose land was alienated,
but, in the event of alienation for public purposes, to ensure that suitable contiguous land be
appended to the reserves from whence the land came. Second, unlike his predecessor at
Whitehall, Webb was fully prepared to bypass the legislative morass fostered by Nairobi’s
intransigent administration and the settler-dominated LegCo by issuing an Order in Council,
which would legislate in accordance with the Secretary of State’s revisions and, in bearing the
weight of the King of England, suffer none of the vicissitudes of colonial obduracy.57 Doubtless,
the basis of Woolf’s critique lay in fundamental differences at the back of the two men’s
ideological predispositions: whereas Woolf’s Fabianism was of the militant variety—a
temperament he shared with the likes of Buxton and, to some extent, Olivier—Webb’s was and
always had been of the gradualist bent, one which made him loath to pursue anything like an
immediate (what Webb saw as “radical”) departure in colonial policy such as that being
suggested by Woolf and Buxton.58
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Yet, even had Webb been receptive to Woolf’s and Buxton’s appeals, the economic
slump that gripped Britain in the wake of the First World War59 all but ensured that government
efforts to develop the colonies along the lines favored by the society’s more radical elements
would be shaped by depression and spiraling unemployment at home, rather than concern over
the inequalities of capitalism abroad.60 Thus, when it was passed in 1929 amid growing anxiety
about the upcoming election becoming a referendum on the government’s handling of the
economy, the CDA targeted the improvement of colonial agriculture and industry to promote
“commerce with or industry in the United Kingdom” as part of a “scheme to solve our own
unemployment problem.”61 In the end, the reality of contemporary global financial trends
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intersected with the symbiosis of the colonial-metropolitan economy not only to doom Labor’s
second minority government, but to trump the idyll of Fabian Trusteeship. The Fabians would
have to wait some 15 years to once again be so positioned.

The Colonial Development Crucible: The Crisis of the West Indies, Hailey’s African
Survey, and the CDWA, 1934-1941
In the decade before Parliament marked the passage the CDWA of 1940, the operation of
Britain’s colonial development machinery was increasingly subject to Parliamentary and extraParliamentary criticism—a trend that prompted Sir Edward Grigg to complain in the Commons,
“The attack on our position in Africa is not, in my opinion, coming from Africans or from
anybody outside ourselves. It is coming from within our own ranks. … If that kind of
propaganda goes on it will undermine the peace of the Colonial Empire, not because of its effects
on Africa, but because of its great effect upon ourselves.”62
Indeed, as R. D. Pearce has observed, parliamentary debates at the end of the 1930s
reveal not only an atmosphere of widespread discontent with the colonial policy status quo, but
also a readiness to “censure past mistakes in moral terms.” 63 Figures such as the Fabian PJ
Noel-Baker, Sir Richard Acland, and Captain Peter MacDonald argued, respectively, for a
reorganization of colonial policy, called for “violent” changes in policy, and expressed confusion
over the CO’s long-term policy.
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Dissatisfaction manifested itself much more ominously beyond the British archipelago,
however, as events in the West Indies proved. When the Great Depression spread across the
empire in the 1930s, economic suffering in the Caribbean sugar island chain was amongst the
most severe. Indeed, following the effective collapse of the global sugar market, conditions were
so abysmal that Jamaica, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, British Guiana, and Trinidad and Tobago were
the scene of a series of violent disturbances and labor riots,64 events which scandalized those in
Britain who took an interest in colonial affairs. As the Times reported, “Recent events in the
West Indies have shaken the complacency with which most people in this country have been
accustomed to regard the Colonial Empire…they have created an uneasy suspicion that
economic and social improvements may be just as badly needed in other parts as well.”65
Amidst reports of growing casualties in Barbados and Trinidad and Tobago, where
policemen were being burned to death by rioters,66 the CO dispatched the Moyne Commission67
to investigate the social and economic conditions of the island chain and make recommendations.
Meanwhile, in the Commons, parliamentarians heaped scorn on Britain’s “deplorable”68 record
in the West Indies: David Lloyd George was “perfectly appalled at the conditions” and felt
ashamed that this “slummy empire” had been so long tolerated; Creech Jones argued that the
riots had “rudely shocked our own complacency in Colonial administration;” and Aneurin Bevan
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asserted that the boast about Britain being a good colonizer was baseless: “We are obviously
incompetent,” he remarked. “This House of Commons…is entirely not to be trusted with the
stewardship of these areas.”69
When the findings of the Moyne Commission were delivered in December 1939, a dire
inventory that revealed disease, malnutrition, and illegitimacy on an unprecedented scale, they
confirmed Bevan in his stark assessment.70 In fact, so horrendous were the commission’s
conclusions that it was agreed not to release them for public consumption for fear that they
would be used by Joseph Goebbels and his cadre of Nazi propagandists to undermine Britain’s
position in the colonies during the Second World War.71 And yet in terms of colonial
development policy, the events in the West Indies were, as Parker has observed, a “watershed,” a
veritable “canary in the imperial coal mine” that triggered colonial reforms financed by the
metropole on a scale that dwarfed the 1929 CDA.72 As Lord Moyne confirmed in a speech
broadcast from London and received in Jamaica on February 20, 1940: “To-day there have been
two events of far-reaching importance not only to the West Indies but to the Colonial Empire as
a whole. One is the publication of the recommendations of the West India Royal
Commission…and the other is the announcement by the Government of a new development
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policy for the Colonies...That policy is based on the same principles which led the West India
Royal Commission quite independently to their most important recommendations.”73
As Moyne delivered his address, the findings of Lord Hailey’s African Survey (1938)
were being digested at Whitehall.74 A monumental research project running to some eighteenhundred pages in length, the Survey provided a compendium of British knowledge about the
entire continent of Africa, with emphasis on agricultural, environmental, and social issues. The
Survey’s findings, which gave officials an “expert’s view” of local conditions, were dismal and
doubtless uncomfortably familiar in the wake of the Moyne Commission’s revelations.75 Yet, it
was more than a canvass of the bleak contemporary context in Britain’s African colonies; rather,
Hailey’s study was a progressive treatise that offered a framework for an improved colonial
future—one that called for a Colonial Research Fund (CRF) to support development schemes.76
“Lord Moyne Tells of Findings of Royal Commission,” The Daily Gleaner, February 21, 1940.
There is some debate surrounding the impetus which underlay Hailey’s Survey. Some scholars,
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Coupled with the overt fear in the metropole that if left unaltered conditions in Africa would
prompt violence to match or even exceed that witnessed in the West Indies, the way ahead at the
CO was now clear; it therefore put in the hands of Secretary of State Malcolm MacDonald a
memorandum to take to the cabinet.
Presented to the cabinet by MacDonald, the memorandum put forward three reasons why
a more progressive colonial policy was essential:
1. A series of strikes and disturbances in the West Indies, Mauritius and elsewhere had
brought home to people that all was not well in the economic or social field of these
Colonies. This impression was confirmed by such reports as Major Orde Browne, my
Labour Adviser, on his visit to the West Indies. Also, the Report of the Committee on
Nutrition in the Colonial Empire brought home to people how low is the standard of
living in almost every part of the Colonial Empire and how great the volume of
preventable ill health and inefficiency.
2. Lord Hailey in his great ‘Survey of Africa’ published at the beginning of this year
emphasized that ‘the present is possibly the most formative and therefore the most critical
period of African history’. He brought home to the public the fact that the lines our
policy took now might mold the future of the whole continent.
3. The ‘Colonial question’ as an international problem focused attention on Colonial
matters. Foreign Governments have been quick to take note of talk about our ‘slum
Empire’. They have alleged that we are neglecting our vast possessions, that they impose
a strain on our resources that we are unable to stand and that there should be some
redistribution of Colonial territories. These arguments, it may be noted, are not confined
to our present enemy but were heard from Italy and from Poland. In the face of the
evidence which I have mentioned above, public opinion here and in the world generally,
particularly perhaps America, has felt that there was at least some justification for these
suggestions.77
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Committee (CRAC),78 itself an adjunct to the CO, but legislated social welfare and economic
development as essential tenets of British trusteeship—a wide-ranging framework that
compassed everything from agriculture and housing to health and education. In the Commons
that day, Creech Jones, no doubt alive to the parallels it shared with the Fabian vision of social
trusteeship, noted with satisfaction that the philosophy which motivated the CDWA departed
significantly from that which underlay the 1929 CDA, which was “more concerned with finding
employment in this country than with Colonial development and the well-being of the Colonial
peoples….”79
In the immediate term, however, the CDWA amounted to little more than ink on paper.
Shepherded through Parliament under Neville Chamberlain’s National Government in the
months before his ministry collapsed and in the wake of the outbreak of the Second World War,
it fell to Winston Churchill’s Conservative-dominated Coalition Government to instigate the
CDWA. The war, however, suppressed all but the most urgent of colonial development needs,
as the Fabian and Labor MP R. W. Sorensen discovered when he inquired if the CO would
consider expanding existing development plans to include a ten-year program of social, political,
and economic development. In his response, George Hall, the Colonial Under-Secretary of
State, demurred; explaining that “wartime conditions” made it infeasible to embark on many of
the types of development which the CDWA was designed to promote. Although Hall blunted
this assessment by adding that the CO would in time coordinate the formulation of a
comprehensive development program with the colonial governments as soon as it was
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“practicable” to do so,80 his remarks were consistent with restrictions emplaced in September
1940, when the colonial governments were told that Britain “could not afford development
schemes which did not bear a direct relation to the war effort unless ‘the scheme was of such
urgency and importance as to justify the expenditure…in present circumstances’.”81 While a
number of development projects were authorized in the period between 1940 and 1943, the
expenditure, which amounted to £3.6 million, was a fraction of the total amount authorized for
the period (£13,750,000).82 This, however, was the extent to which the CO was willing to
commit itself in the period immediately following the passage of the CDWA and in some ways it
reflected a more generalized sense of ambiguity which emanated both from Westminster and
Whitehall during the early war years.
Indeed, despite its wartime rhetoric of unity—which included the suspension of “normal
politics,” such as elections, for the duration of the war—the Coalition government was, in fact,
riven along ideological fault lines. The breach was evident as early as 1941-42, when debate
erupted over the Beveridge Report.83 While Labor came out quickly in favor of the report’s
recommendations, even pressing for its implementation, the plan provoked considerable
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resistance from Conservatives both in and out of government. Endorsement soon turned into a
highly partisan issue, with Conservatives seemingly unwilling to embrace the report while Labor
was perceived as being strongly in support of it. The rift that opened between them became a
breeding ground for partisan restiveness, as Conservative backbenchers resentful of Labor’s
influence in the Coalition denounced everything from coal rationing to perceived left-wing
efforts at perpetuating “unnecessary official control” over things like trade and industry,
employment, and even the private lives of Britons after the war.84 This steady erosion of
political comity was not limited to the Conservatives; indeed, at Labor’s annual conference of
1942, the ever-controversial Aneurin Bevan tabled a resolution to terminate the truce with the
Conservatives altogether. It was only narrowly defeated.85 This growing tendency toward interparty dissonance was intensified by a profound change in the military fortunes of the Allies. For
the same year that Bevan introduced his motion, advance of German forces was checked in both
Stalingrad and North Africa, a turning of the tide on the battlefield that fundamentally altered the
working relationship of the Coalition partners at Westminster, and not for the better. No longer
hamstrung by an intense fear that disagreement would unsettle the Coalition and, by extension,
dampen the war effort, the parties were unshackled from their restraints, prompting the
introduction of a tranche of controversial resolutions that, unsurprisingly, nurtured the growing
sense of political alienation.86
To be sure, these were worrisome fissures, but they remained bridgeable—at least until
the Conservatives realized that they, as the majority stakeholders in the coalition, would be
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identified with its policies, including those of the left-wing “progressives” and postwar
“planners.” In circumstances where over-identification with such antithetical policies as family
allowances and universal health risked alienating its base, an estrangement that effectively
torched Conservative hopes of governing postwar Britain, the political calculus presented a stark
solution, one made all the bleaker as the war dragged on and the Coalition partners gradually
salted the swathe of common ground that lay between them.87 Left only with those subjects on
which they disagreed, Churchill was prompted to “Warn Against Premature Pledges” in a BBC
broadcast on March 21, 1943. “First of all,” the prime minister began, “we must beware of
attempts to over-persuade or even coerce His Majesty’s Government to bind themselves or their
unknown successors in conditions which no one can foresee and which may be years ahead, to
impose great new expenditures on the State without any relation to the circumstances which
might prevail at that time to make them pledge themselves to particular schemes without relation
to other extremely important aspects of our post-war needs.”88
It was, in short, a caustic and uncertain time and it was debatable that efforts to reform
the colonies as articulated in the CDWA would in fact be fulfilled—precisely the outcome the
Fabians were keen to safeguard. Thus, considering the “virtual suspension” of the CDWA, the
society undertook to exert pressure on Whitehall to ensure its operation.89 The instrument for
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doing so was the FCB, the founding chairman of which was the Labor MP and future Secretary
of State for the Colonies, Arthur Creech Jones.

The Fabian Colonial Bureau under Arthur Creech Jones: Labor’s Nestor in a Wartime
Coalition Government
In February of 1939, the Fabian Norman Leys was busy beavering away on a revision of
Labor’s colonial policy. As he sifted through the juggernaut of Britain’s eclectic schematic of
colonial governance, a thought occurred to him, prompting a note to Leonard Woolf. “The
problem,” Leys wrote, “is how to ensure that these…steps will in fact be taken within a month of
the next L[abour] G[overnment]’s taking office.” A champion grudge-holder, Woolf responded
that getting the “Labour Government when it is sitting there in power to implement its promises”
was the “real difficulty, as we found, with Passfield.”90 Four months later, Leys rendered a
politely damning verdict: “The Labour Government of 1929-31,” he declared, “left scarcely a
mark on Africa.”91 Ironically, this very evanescence birthed an enduring corollary, for following
the demise of the government in 1931, Labor’s leadership, subject to suspicion and resentment in
the wake of Ramsay MacDonald’s defection and subsequent expulsion,92 lapsed into near total
“silence” on colonial reform.”93 Indeed, while it is true that the ACIQ produced a number of
reports, most notably its policy statements of 1933 (The Colonial Empire) and 1936 (The
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Demand for Colonial Equality of Economic Opportunity), these were largely ignored by the
party.94 In the absence of any clear sense of direction in matters colonial, Labor defaulted to a
position of paternalistic trusteeship towards Africa that was designed, on the one hand, to prevent
capitalism from exploiting vulnerable people while, on the other, ensuring that Britain acted as a
guardian of native rights.95 This policy had the effect of ossifying, rather than advancing, native
interests, a state of affairs which persisted until the establishment in 1940 of the FCB, which
soon was positioned to carry forward its CDWA campaign within a framework of Fabianfavored social trusteeship.
At its inaugural meeting on October 26, 1940, chaired by Creech Jones, the Bureau
enumerated a scope of work that positioned it as a “clearinghouse for colonial information and
research.”96 To build the necessary consultative network, the FCB drew on the well-established
Fabian tactic of permeation by launching an aggressive campaign designed to connect its nascent
investigative machinery not only to the CO,97 but to the Labor Party and to a consortium of nongovernmental agencies as well. In its early stages, this aggregation of private institutions
included the British and Foreign Anti-Slavery Society, the Institute of Education’s Colonial
Department Library at the University of London, the West Indies Parliamentary Committee, 98 the
think-tank Political and Economic Planning (PEP), and the League for Coloured Peoples—all of
whom shared a broad swathe of ideological territory with the FCB.99 This, of course, raised the
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specter of overlap, and its concomitant Moloch, inefficiency; it was therefore agreed that a
member from each group should sit on the Bureau’s Advisory Committee.100
Once the committee was established, and its constituent elements coopted, it remained to
elaborate the apparatus of outreach, beginning with what the committee identified as one of the
Bureau’s “most important lines of work.” That is, the raising of questions on colonial affairs
before the House. It was to this end that Creech Jones vigorously applied himself, meeting with
and enlisting a panel of like-minded MPs to ask questions in Parliament relating to colonial
affairs.101 Having ensured that matters of interest to the Bureau remained part of the legislative
ferment by feeding questions to friendly parliamentarians, it was decided to augment the
Bureau’s efforts by having members of the advisory committee, including the Labor MP John
Parker, Frank Horrabin, Dr. Rita Hinden, Leonard Woolf, Wilfred Benson, W. Arthur Lewis,
Prof. W. M. MacMillan, and Dr. Julian Huxley, exercise their personal influence with the press
by giving interviews and contributing articles relating to colonial affairs.102 In so doing, the
Bureau secured an important means of “publicity for its work.”103 To this end, Horrabin’s leftistsocialist journal Empire,104 which he offered to the FCB in early 1941,105 proved especially
effective.
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And yet it would be some time before the Bureau promulgated its position in relation to
the colonial empire. Indeed, it was not until its weekend conference on The Colonies, the War
and the Future, which the Fabians convened at St. Peter’s Hall, Oxford, in July 1941, that the
Bureau openly defined its attitude. During the conference, speeches were presented on a variety
of topics, including the obstacles of establishing a sound colonial economy against the backdrop
of war and colonial-level intransigence, as well as on the benefits of educating colonial peoples.
Appropriately enough, however, it fell to Creech Jones to make the declaration of policy in his
chairman’s address. In an interesting twist on the Chamberlainite metaphor, Creech Jones
described the colonies as Britain’s “neglected estates” and evoked the essence of Fabian social
trusteeship when he spoke of the “government’s and the public’s responsibility to ensure that in
future (the colonies) were justly treated,” and argued that it was “incumbent upon Fabians
interested in colonial affairs to insist on (the CDWA’s) good intentions being fulfilled and that
money voted in Parliament be spent for the benefit of the colonial peoples, not for that of white
entrepreneurs.”106
In the meantime, the process of connecting the Bureau’s web-like research network to the
Labor Party’s policy-making machinery proceeded apace. For by 1941, Labor was already in the
habit of consulting the Fabian Society as it formulated its initiatives, even going so far as to
coopt certain members of the FCB, including Sorensen, Wilfred Benson, Woolf, and Leys, to
draft and revise the party’s policy proposals—a process which all but abrogated the newlyreconstituted society’s self-denying ordinance. This was an especially fruitful enterprise in the
early 1940s, for it was primarily Woolf, Leys, and Benson who worked alongside their fellow
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Fabians Sir John Maynard107 and Creech Jones on the ACIQ to thrash out Labor’s embryonic
colonial policy.108
To get some sense of the emerging dynamic between the party and the FCB, we need
look no further than the “Imperial Questions” section of Labor’s The Old World and the New
Society: An Interim Report of the National Executive of the British Labour Party on the
Problems of Reconstruction. Published in advance of the annual party conference of 1942, the
intent of the report was to establish a baseline for Labor’s postwar reconstruction regime,
prefiguring in many ways the later domestic implications of the “Beveridge boom.”109 As the
following excerpts demonstrate, the “Imperial Questions” section of the The Old World and the
New Society was a near word-for-word reproduction of Woolf’s commentary on the color bar,
which he developed at some length for the ACIQ in 1941.
Woolf: The colour bar policy is a negation of the idea of colonial administration as a
trust in the interest of native inhabitants. … The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to
the colour bar in every shape and form. Wherever it exists in territories for which
Parliament is responsible the laws and administrative practices upon which it rests must
be immediately abolished, and Governors of colonial territories should be instructed to
see that every kind of legal or administrative discrimination (whether by disabilities or
privileges) on the ground of race, colour, or religion must cease. Furthermore,
Parliament should refuse to resign its responsibility for and control over any territory in
Africa unless it is assured that the colour bar will not be introduced there in any form. ...
The colour bar system is, however, so insidious and can take so many forms that a
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general renunciation of it by governments Is not enough, and specific instructions on
specific measures to be taken against it should be given to all colonial governments.110
Labour’s Interim Report: The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to the colour bar in
every shape or form. … In other words, the interests of those (native) inhabitants are and
must remain paramount, and to those interests Parliament is the trustee. … The negation
of this policy for which the Party stands is the policy of the colour bar, the object and
effect of which are to ensure, by law, administration and every other available means that
the native inhabitant is given a different and subordinate status, civil and social, from that
of the European. It is in Africa that the colour bar as a ‘native policy’ can be seen in its
most undisguised form, but it does, less evilly but more insidiously, affect British
colonial policy in other continents. The Labour Party is absolutely opposed to the colour
bar in every shape and form. It maintains therefore that in territories which Parliament is
responsible the laws and administrative practices upon which the colour bar resets should
be abolished and colonial crimination (whether by disabilities or privileges), on the
grounds of race, colour, or religion, should cease. … It follows that in all colonial
territories in which white settlers are in a minority, Parliament must remain trustee of the
native interests, and the Labour Party cannot therefore agree to any conferment of
responsible government upon any territory or union of territories which would involve
delegation of its duties to a legislative body in which native races were in a minority. 111
The fact that the section on “Imperial Questions” comprises little more than one full page
in the 32-page report exposes two things about the Labor Party of the early 1940s: first, it is clear
that Labor remained more confident in its ability to formulate initiatives concerning the party’s
long-privileged realm of domestic policy-making; and, second, borrowing so heavily from the
Fabians in proportion to its declaration vis-à-vis matters imperial indicates the depth of the
party’s growing dependency on the FCB’s research operation. This is not to say, however, that
the Fabians themselves were entirely satisfied with the final iteration of Labor’s postwar policy
statement in 1942. Indeed, at a meeting of the society’s International Bureau some four months
after it was promulgated at the party’s annual conference, Woolf criticized The Old World and
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the New Society for being long on resolution, but short on content.112 Moreover, such was the
general sense of disappointment amongst the Fabians that the FCB felt compelled to issue a
rejoinder, which it sent to the NEC under the heading “Note to the Labour Party Executive on the
Imperial Section of the Party’s Interim Report.”113 Although the Bureau acknowledged that the
report could not be amended ex post facto, it nevertheless went to some length making
significant revisions to the whole of the “Imperial Section,” including pointed references to the
preservation of native paramountcy in relation to the predatory interests of white settlers.
Notwithstanding the Bureau’s frustration over the final form of The Old World and the
New Society, Fabian permeation continued to deepen the society’s philosophical presence in
Labor’s colonial policy. At the annual conference of 1943, for example, Labor’s executive
secured the party’s endorsement of the tract The Colonies: The Labour Party’s Post-War Policy
for the African and Pacific Colonies.114 Originally drafted by Woolf in 1941, the pamphlet was
prepared for publication in March 1943 by the party’s postwar Reconstruction Committee, then
under the “guiding hand” of its leading member, Creech Jones.115 In many ways, The Colonies
signifies a watershed moment in the advance of Fabian influence on Labour’s colonial policy; for
as Goldsworthy explains, it represented the “first detailed policy statement—by any party” to
take full account of the “new concepts of dynamic development and metropolitan financial
responsibility” as embodied in the CDWA. Not only were there “specific proposals for long-
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term economic plans; for agriculture, mining, transport, controlled industrial growth,
cooperation, and trade unionism; for an equitable redistribution of colonial wealth; for health and
education services and the elimination of social and economic colour bars;” but there were also
“specific proposals about ways and means, about the administration of development and the
sources of finances.”116 That Woolf’s treatise on the International Post-War Settlement117 was
approved by an overwhelming majority at the party’s annual conference the following year
demonstrably confirms this tendency toward Fabian entrenchment.118
Given this, it is little wonder that by the time Creech Jones assumed the chairmanship of
the ACIQ in 1944, the FCB had become, unofficially, the research organization responsible for
the creation of Labor’s colonial policy.119 That the party’s advisory committee included a
sizable contingent of Fabians—a survey of the minutes between 1941 and 1944 reveals no fewer
than 11 members of the FCB sat on the ACIQ at any given time—helps, in part, to explain
this.120 Despite this, however, no amount of policy-making on the part of the Fabians could help
the society overcome one glaring problem: Labor was not in power. Indeed, it was but the
minority partner in the wartime Coalition Government dominated by the Conservatives,
circumstances no amount of rhetoric could tangibly alter. This, of course, raises an obvious
question: Were the Fabians able to influence the Coalition Government’s colonial development
policy on a substantive level during the war? If so, how and in what ways?
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What follows, then, are two case studies designed to assess Fabian influence on Britain’s
wartime colonial development policy. As discussed above, wartime conditions made it unlikely
that the Coalition Government under Churchill would go too far in its embracement of colonial
development, particularly as conceived within the costly rubric of the 1940 CDWA. When it
became increasingly apparent that the Allies would win the war, political considerations over the
shape of Britain’s postwar administration assumed an urgency that prompted a swift
recalculation of the cost-benefits equation which had hitherto stimulated the tenuous equanimity
of the Coalition Government. The result, as we have seen, was an increasing sense of friction.
Within such a context, there was no single path open for the Fabians to realize their aims vis-àvis social trusteeship and colonial development. Indeed, having so recently amalgamated with
the NFRB (1939), the society—let alone its philosophy—was itself very much in a state of flux.
Nevertheless, in both of the following instances, the Fabians overcame these and various other
obstacles to successfully give form to colonial thought.

From Mass Education in African Society to the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance: Case
Studies in Fabian Influence on Colonial Policy During the Second World War
The first case study examines the development of adult and mass education policy in
Africa between 1925 and 1944, when the CO Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies
(ACEC) published its report on Mass Education in African Society. The study takes as its point
of departure the work of Arthur Creech Jones, member of the ACEC, chairman of the FCB, and
future Secretary of State for the Colonies. The case study is important because it represents a
particular and unique instance of Fabian influence during the war. It marks the influence
exercised by a prominent Fabian who was already part of the authorized apparatus meant to
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advise the CO on related matters. Moreover, the process reveals a central theme of Creech
Jones’ development ethos, which he carried forward as Secretary of State for the Colonies: mass
education. The case study is, therefore, experientially distinct and should not be taken as
necessarily representative of the oftentimes torturous path of Fabian influence on colonial policy
during the war.

Adult and Mass Education Policy
One of only a handful of Fabian-affiliated Labor MPs elected to the House of Commons
in 1935,121 Creech Jones immediately set about carving a niche for himself in Parliament, where
early on his special interest in colonial education led to his cooption by the CO’s Advisory
Committee on Education in the Colonies (ACEC).122 The ACEC, which functioned until 1961,
was only the most recent bureaucratic think-tank launched to assess education policy in the
colonies. For following the publication in 1922 of the Phelps-Stokes Commission123 report
Education in Africa, the CO launched the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical
Africa (ACNETA) with a remit to establish the basis of educational policy in Britain’s African
dependencies.124 Toward that end, the ACNETA issued the white paper Education Policy in
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British Tropical Africa in March 1925 which, as Hodge notes, put forward several “broad
principles” as the basis of a “sound educational policy.” The “central tenet” of the new policy,
largely the work of the humanitarian lobbyist and missionary J. H. Oldham, was the “adaptation”
and development of education “along native lines.”125 In theory, this meant that:
Education should be adapted to the mentality, aptitudes, occupations and traditions of the
various people, conserving as far as possible all sound and healthy elements in the fabric
of their social life; adapting them where necessary to changed circumstances and
progressive ideas, as an agent of natural growth and evolution. Its aim should be to
render the individual more efficient in his or her condition of life, whatever it may be,
and to promote the advancement of the community as a whole through the improvement
of agriculture, the development of native industries, the improvement of health, the
training of the people in the management of their own affairs, and the inculcation of true
ideals of citizenship in service. It must include the raising up of capable, trustworthy,
public-spirited leaders of the people, belonging to their own race.

To realize this, the white paper suggested the training up of native teachers and the
establishment of a system of visiting instructors as a “means of improving village schools.” It
advocated the use of vernacular languages and the preparation of vernacular textbooks. It also
proposed the education of women and girls in hygiene, child welfare, domestic economy, and
care of the home, since these were considered key to the improvement of public health.
Furthermore, it laid stress on the importance of “discipline of work” and the development of
habits of industry as part of the “foundation of character.” Lastly, the white paper acknowledged
the need to train those required to fill administrative posts, to which end “higher education…in
Africa must be increasingly opened for those who by character, ability and temperament show
themselves fitted….”126
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At the same time, however, the white paper put forward recommendations that were
paternalistic and increasingly outmoded, including the endorsement of religious teaching to build
“character” and official recognition of the place of Christian missions as “partners” in the
provision of schooling in Africa.127 Some four years later, the prominence of these Victorian
archaisms, doubtless reflecting Oldham’s influence, was diminished by the CO when it
reconstituted the ACNETA as the ACEC,128 the functions of which not only expanded to serve
all of Britain’s colonies, but also weakened missionary influence on the formulation of colonial
education policy by instead coopting a raft of prominent British academics and experts.129
When the ACEC’s Memorandum on the Education of African Communities was
published in 1935, it represented both the outcome of ten years’ study and experiment in the
application of the principles which had earlier been outlined as well as developments in the
attitude toward education in Britain itself. It therefore stressed that school-based education in
rural communities was most profitable when it not only targeted the young, but was incorporated
into an overarching program designed to improve the “living forces of the society which the
school is meant to serve.”130 As Oldham remarked, “The main purpose…was to emphasize the
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idea that, if the object of education in Africa was to advance backward communities, the best
results would not be obtained if only the education of the young was considered; the community
must be envisaged as a whole.”131 This holistic approach endorsed by Oldham, once again a
leading architect of the policy, insisted on an interrelation between education and local
environment, arguing that schools should act as progressive forces in terms of spreading new
knowledge and skills while, at the same time, incentivizing interest in environmental
improvement. Furthermore, it emphasized the importance of adult education—which was
broached but inchoate in the 1925 memorandum132—and recommended “the appointment of
agents, European and African, who are specially trained to develop this type of education.”133
Cumulatively, the work of the ACNETA and the ACEC in formulating colonial
education policy constitutes something like a program of educative social betterment and
embodies what has described as the “pre-history” of Britain’s postwar community development
regime.134 Despite this, however, colonial education policy during the interwar period was
fraught with much confusion of purpose and lack of resources135 which, at the level of colonial
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administration, manifested educational practice characterized by “improvisation, vacillation, and
sheer expediency.”136
It is against this backdrop that Creech Jones joined the ACEC. A fervent supporter of the
cause of adult education, he had already spent the better part of a decade serving as vicechairman of the British Institute of Adult Education, a noteworthy tenure characterized by an
emphasis on adult education as a “vital factor” in responsible democratic government.137 He
brought this sensibility with him to the ACEC, where he proved instrumental in promoting both
adult and mass education as a means of encouraging equality in developing countries. For it was
in these countries that the problem of education was especially acute: across the whole of British
colonial Africa, for example, it was estimated in 1939 that only 12 per cent of school-age
children received any sort of education. “It was because I appreciated all this,” Creech Jones
later recalled, “that before the war when I was a member of the Colonial Secretary’s Education
Advisory Committee I emphasized the importance of the subject until Sir Fred Clarke and Dr.
Margaret Read produced their excellent memoranda on its place in Colonial development.”138
The memorandum in question was Mass Education in African Society (1944).
It was in May 1940, some six months before chairing the inaugural meeting of the FCB,
that Creech Jones first raised the subject of adult education at a gathering of the ACEC. During
the meeting, he made it clear that the expansion of adult education was imperative since it
provided indigenous people with the means to help them cope with rapid socioeconomic
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change.139 He stressed, however, that adult education was not to be “confused with
‘fundamental’ education or attacks on illiteracy or with technical or trade instruction;” rather, it
was intended to “raise the standards of a community and pave the way for interest and
responsibility in the practice of local and national government” while encouraging “political
democracy and voluntary movements,” from cooperatives to trade unions.140
Creech Jones’ line of reasoning proved persuasive, for in 1941 the ACEC launched the
Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee to survey education in the African colonies. The
subcommittee, which counted among its membership the Fabians Margery Perham, Dr. Huxley,
Margaret Wrong, and Prof. MacMillan,141 took two years to “consider the best approach to the
problem of mass literacy and adult education…in the more backward dependencies, taking into
account the emphasis which the Advisory Committee has laid…upon community education.”142
The result of the subcommittee’s investigation was Mass Education in African Society,143 which
advanced the idea that mass education could overcome “a narrow sectionalism, operating behind
barriers which divide people from their fellows.” As Barbara Ingham and Paul Mosley have
observed, this perspective embedded within the blueprint of the colonial education project the
notion that it could help “build stronger and more accountable states that were less vulnerable to
fragmentation and internecine conflict.”144
When coupled with its successor, Education for Citizenship in Africa (1948), the two
reports made education a key component of Britain’s progressive colonial development
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regime.145 Indeed, recalling sentiments expressed by Lord Hailey at a 1939 meeting of the
ACEC that mass education was to be a “popular type” of education “suitable” to the
“community-oriented” conditions in Africa,146 the initiative made a “direct appeal to the great
majority of adults and adolescents in the community, so that they and their families will really
benefit from it.” The essential focus was “upon the whole community as a unit to be educated”
so that “people everywhere” might “be aware of, to understand and take part in, and ultimately to
control the social and economic changes which are taking place among them, and which are
being advocated for their welfare….”147 And in a nod to the ACEC’s Memorandum on the
Education of African Communities of 1935, the prime agent of education was identified as “mass
education officers,” experts who, through the coordination of on-the-ground campaigns, would
link local-level community projects with the wider plans of the colony.148 Local need would,
moreover, be assessed through surveys; contact would be made with “likely elements in the
community who would support the campaign” (e.g. 4-H clubs and teachers’ associations); and a
“curriculum” planned in relation to the main obstacles to progress in the area. If the figures
responsible for mass education were its officers, their work, it was suggested, could be
coordinated through a framework of like-minded Fabian-favored social trustees, such as trade
unions and cooperatives. “We have only to look at the last hundred years of English history,”
the Sub-committee for Adult and Mass Education observed, “to see how powerful an incentive to
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mass education both cooperatives and the trade unions have turned out to be. English experience
shows too how wide a view [cooperatives and trade unions] took of education, regarding it not
only as literacy and improved technical skill but as involving a new outlook in both local and
central government on citizenship.”149
As the subcommittee worked to draft its memoranda, Creech Jones played a vital role not
only in the formulation and shaping of community-level mass education policy, but also in its
practice. In point of fact, he regularly corresponded with minor and major mass educators as
well as administrators throughout the colonies.
For example, in late-summer 1942, C. A. Grossmith, the secretary of the Adult and Mass
Education Subcommittee, wrote to Creech Jones inviting his feedback on the draft memorandum
of Mass Education in African Society submitted by fellow-committeeman, Sir Fred Clarke. In
his response, Creech Jones commended Clarke for having crafted “an excellent piece of work”
that “was meaty…and covered the ground splendidly.” But in Creech Jones’ eyes, Clarke’s draft
was flawed; it lacked inspiration and was too cerebral. “While my head had been satisfied,” he
noted to Clarke, “I remained little moved. I wanted the argument to glow, to convince, to stir to
action, to stimulate the imagination.” Although Creech Jones was evidently looking for
something more visceral, he was nonetheless generous with substantive suggestions for
improving the final draft of the memorandum. “You have made clear,” he began, “the
relationship of adult education with other aspects of education, but I felt it was desirable to make
clearer that education was a process which shoul[d] extend through life, that adult work was as
necessary as other work – in some respects more so. … You bring out the importance of
community education, of the relation of adult education with the primary school and adolescents.
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… But I felt that these connections, and the whole-ness of the problem called for a little more
emphasis.”150
While Creech Jones’ critique prompted polite acknowledgment from Clarke, who was
“grateful” for his colleague’s candor, such banal acceptance proved a sharp contrast to the
incendiary, carpet-biting harshness such policies were exposed to when they found their way into
the hands of colonial officials in Africa.151 For instance, Zanzibar’s director of education
condemned as “unrealistic” the plan outlined in Mass Education in African Society,152 while Sir
Philip Mitchell, the governor of Kenya, launched into a pages-long diatribe against Education for
Citizenship in Africa. The scheme, he argued with barely a modicum of professional restraint,
was shrouded in “a mist of unreality,” aspiring to a citizenry and a “polity the pattern of which
may be laid up in heaven but is hardly yet to be seen on earth. Colonial Governments,” Mitchell
concluded, “beset by many and pressing real problems, must be excused if they decline to direct
their energies to the preparation of their subjects for a state of society which never has existed on
this earth, which there is certainly no prospect of establishing anywhere in Africa….”153
While Mitchell’s sentiments echoed typical concerns over the nebulousness of Fabianinfluenced policy initiatives, as we have seen, voices of dissent were not the only ones in the
chorus of colonial officialdom. Others, such as Tom Askwith, Kenya’s future commissioner for
social welfare, praised mass and adult education, arguing that it constituted an essential adjunct
to Britain’s development regime, even crediting it with creating the “climate of understanding
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necessary to win the cooperation of the people.”154 Moreover, Secretary of State for the
Colonies Oliver Stanley confirmed the CO in its belief as to the efficacy of the project when he
noted in the House of Commons that “a very successful campaign in mass education on lines
similar to those suggested in (Mass Education in African Society) has been carried out in part of
the Sierra Leone protectorate and that a grant made under the C.D.&W. Act is being made for its
extension to a wider area.”155 As we shall see, in time, that “wider area” became British Africa.
~~~
The second and final case study is meant to contrast with the first and takes as its point of
departure the work of the FCB’s Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the Colonies, which
was formed in 1942. Unlike Creech Jones’ curriculum vitae, the Fabians who sat on this
committee, while prominent, were not standing members of a similarly-tasked body housed
within the CO. Rather, through research and agitation, the committee’s work came to the
attention of the CO, which eventually invited it to help craft an ordinance governing cooperatives
in the colonies—that is, the Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance of 1946, at the back of
which lay the initial report of the Fabian Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the
Colonies, which it produced in 1944.

The Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance
The idea that cooperation could enhance imperial development gained traction early,
particularly in India, where recurrent famines and rural poverty combined with peasant
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indebtedness (itself the result of these conditions) to threaten the colony’s putative stability,156
hence the Cooperative Credit Societies Act of India (1904), Britain’s first colonial cooperative
measure. As formalized by that legislation, the colonial cooperative movement’s marriage of
low-cost development and self-sufficiency was arguably the quintessential Chamberlainite
development scheme: the cooperatives funded themselves, increased production and
profitability themselves, and, by virtue of the indigenous sociocultural framework that dictated
interpersonal relationships among members and helped prevent indebtedness, were largely selfregulating.157 Success in India brought with it similar and still-more-sweeping legislation in
places like Ceylon (1911), Mauritius (1913), and Cyprus (1914).158
Relatively cheap with limited administrative oversight and with the potential for a decent
return on imperial investment, a full-fledged program of colonial cooperation was a politically
attractive way to ensure the operation of the CDWA during the Second World War—and, in
many respects, the thin end of the developmental wedge. The Fabians recognized this early on
and, as part of their campaign to ensure the operation of the CDWA even in wartime,159 the FCB
formed its Committee for the Study of Cooperation in the Colonies in 1942.160 Chaired by Lord
Winster, the committee set to work with many prominent colonial cooperators, such as C. F.
Strickland,161 author of Cooperation for Africa and an important contributor to the CO’s 1930
Rita Rhodes, “British Cooperative History” (paper, the Swedish Project, Stockholm,
November 20, 2009), 17-18.
157
C. F. Strickland, “The Cooperative Movement in Africa,” Journal of the Royal African Society
34, no. 134 (January 1935): 8.
158
Cooperation in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories, April 1930, NA CO
323/1102/3/40554.
159
Minutes, FS, January 12, 1939-July 26, 1948, November 1940, LSE FSA C/26.
160
The Fabian Society, 79th Annual Report 1962 (London: The Fabian Society, 1962), 19.
161
Strickland served for many years as registrar of cooperative societies in the Punjab. In 1925,
he advised on cooperative development in Ceylon with W. K. H. Campbell, another noted expert on
cooperatives. Following an extensive study in Nigeria in 1928, Strickland recommended the introduction
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156

176

Conference on Cooperation in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories; H. Calvert,
former registrar of cooperative societies in the Punjab; and A. Cavendish, former director of
cooperation in Malaya, to develop a picture of the colonial cooperative enterprise.162 The
committee’s report, published in 1944, “roundly criticized”163 past colonial cooperative policy
and blamed the “failure to effect any adequate improvement” on the “laisser-faire [sic] attitude
of British governments. Colonial policy,” the report continued, “was less directed to promotion
of colonial welfare and prosperity than to the maintenance of law and order so that trading
companies might pursue . . . their business of securing a steady flow of raw materials to the
wealthier industrial countries.”164 This state of affairs, coupled with the “lack of skilled
direction,” had the effect of perpetuating a system of “degrading colonial poverty.”165 The
corrective here was development, as prescribed by the CDWA and as achieved through
mechanisms of Fabian social trusteeship like cooperatives, an ideological and practical marriage
Winster emphasized in a speech before the House of Lords in August, 1944. Winster noted that,
“The Colonial Development Act, 1940, recognizes that the Colonies cannot build up reasonable
standards of living while relying on their own resources. It recognizes that while they must be
helped, the Colonies must also be encouraged to tackle these problems in their own way. To my
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mind cooperation is one [of the] most hopeful way[s] in which those problems can be
tackled.”166
That the “Colonial Secretary himself…stressed the importance of cooperatives”167
encouraged the Bureau which instigated a campaign to persuade the CO to adopt a new
“enlightened” cooperative approach.168 Accordingly, the Committee presented its final report to
Secretary of State Oliver Stanley by April 1944.169 Although the report covered familiar
cooperative territory, such as the need for the “appointment of specially trained staff,” its
recommendations for the establishment of “separate Cooperative Departments inside the
Colonial Office” and “in the separate colonies” and, most importantly, the “revision of Colonial
Cooperative laws” represented a “pioneer piece of work on the scope and function of the
Cooperative Movement in the Colonies.”170 As it considered the Bureau’s findings, the CO,
responding to a request from the government of Kenya,171 dispatched noted cooperative expert
W. K. H. Campbell to explore the possibilities of developing the cooperative movement among
Africans in East Africa.172
In the meantime, the Fabians ratcheted up the pressure on the CO by peppering the
Secretary of State for the Colonies with questions in the House of Commons. In June, the Fabian
and Labor MP John Dugdale inquired “what action has been taken within the Colonial Empire to
carry out the recommendations of the [UN] Hot Springs Conference” on Food and
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Agriculture,173 which emphasized “the important role which cooperative movements can and
should play in post-war reconstruction.”174 Stanley responded cautiously that the CO had
commended the resolutions of the conference to the territories, hedging that the “general sense of
the replies is that the Governments accept the broad aim of the resolutions and to give effect to
them in so far as they are applicable in local conditions.”175 When Creech Jones asked less than
a month later, “what general policy is being followed to extend cooperation among producers
and consumers throughout the Colonial Empire,”176 Stanley provided a brief update on existing
cooperative legislation, but added that, “measures to stimulate the growth of cooperation in the
Colonies are in the first place a matter for the Governments concerned and it will be appreciated
that local circumstances and conditions vary considerably. I am, however, giving consideration
at the present time to the sending out of some general advice on the subject.”177
If the government was still on the fence regarding cooperative policy when Winster made
his remarks on the floor of the House of Lords in August, it came off the fence by November,
when “a deputation from the Bureau was received by an inter-departmental committee of the
Colonial Office to discuss the recommendations for the encouragement of the Colonial
cooperative movement which had been put to the Colonial Office by the Bureau earlier this
year.”178 The deputation was led by Lord Winster and included Creech Jones, Sir Malcolm
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Darling, and Dr. Hinden, secretary of the FCB. Following the discussion, “the Colonial Office
agreed that the time had come to revise the laws on Cooperation in the different colonies, and
also to prepare plans for the training of personnel to man cooperative departments. The Bureau
was asked to help in both these tasks.”179
With the CO on board, the Fabians set about work on two of the report’s more important
suggestions: the formation of a Cooperative Advisory Committee, renamed the Advisory
Committee on Cooperation in the Colonies and charged with determining “how the colonies
should be advised on cooperation, and what changes in organization within the Colonial Office
should be made to enable the subject to be dealt with adequately,”180 and the formulation of a
Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance to be “drafted on sufficiently elastic lines to cover the
diverse conditions of the various Colonies, to be made effective in territories where cooperative
legislation is at present inadequate.”181 Designed by former cooperative registrars E. H. Lucette
and B. J. Surridge and augmented by Campbell’s Memorandum on Cooperation in the Colonies
(1944), which outlined the principles of cooperation, the Model Ordinance was meant to serve as
an “archetype,” a blueprint to “prevent the restriction of Cooperation to one form, and would
preclude such freak legislation as the requirement of a minimum of fifty members in certain
Pacific Islands.”182 The resulting template was chiefly defined by its flexibility, one that was
general enough not to “cramp development,” but nevertheless outlined the objects a cooperative
society could legitimately pursue—and the consequences should it not.183
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In concert with the overtures made by the CO and certainly reflective of the new
emphasis placed on colonial cooperation, the governor of Kenya introduced A Bill Relating to
the Constitution and Regulation of Cooperative Societies to the Legislative Council in Nairobi.
Informed by Campbell’s investigations earlier in the year, in which he noted that the
“pessimists” must disabuse themselves of “visualizing a complex organ like the ‘English
Cooperative Wholesale’” working at the incipient level in Africa,184 and his subsequent
testimony before the select committee,185 the bill repealed the 1932 legislation that withheld the
resources necessary for the support and organization of African cooperative societies. It also
suggested the creation of a registrar and the provision of a staff to educate, train, and oversee an
indigenous cooperative movement—the first of its kind in Kenya.186 Recognizing this decisive
change in policy, the Attorney General Stafford Sutton-Foster remarked that “it is in a sense
breaking new ground” in that “we are making a departure from normal practice and we are doing
it because conditions in this Colony justify” it.187 The bill was debated by the LegCo in July
1945, during which several modifications were made that increased the ordinance’s flexibility
and augmented the powers of the registrar, such as those surrounding the rights and duties of
cooperative societies to appeal decisions.188 In doing so, the council brought the new ordinance
in line with the Bureau’s recommendations to the CO, which were published earlier that year in
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Cooperation in the Colonies: A Report from a Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial
Bureau.189
~~~
In the final analysis, Mass Education in African Society and the Model Cooperative
Societies Ordinance can be seen as bellwethers of later Fabian influence. Indeed, as John D.
Hargreaves has observed, the fact that both innovations received vital impetus from the
Conservative-dominated Coalition Government during politically and economically uncertain
times indicates the Fabians’ reforming conscience had made considerable ideological inroads,
laying the groundwork for a burgeoning colonial consensus that was enormously suggestive of
postwar developments.190 However minor, a precedent of Fabian influence had been set.

Colonial Development Interrupted: The Sterling Crisis of 1947
Incipient and quietly effective “Fabianization” of colonial development policy between
1939 and 1945 exposes the Janus-faced nature of Britain’s colonial development regime. On the
one hand, Britain’s wheelhouse of development programs included an array of modest,
inexpensive schemes concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its most basic level—that is,
the African community—by way of projects meant to encourage local-level betterment in terms
of health, education, welfare, and economic equality. On the other hand, there is the postwar
“colonial development offensive,” to borrow Cowen and Shenton’s militant-sounding
phraseology, which is renowned for its large-scale and costly mechanized development projects.
Inspired in part by Fabian ideas about the state as an agent of progress, designed by experts,
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implemented by bureaucratic “planners,” and coordinated through such bodies as the CO, the
various colonial governments, and the newly-created Overseas Food Corporation (OFC) and
Colonial Development Corporation (CDC), this singular aspect of colonial development
dominates the historiography—and it is heavily criticized for its phenomenally expensive
failures.191 Perhaps the most potent examples of this scholarly penchant involve the OFC’s East
African Groundnuts Scheme (1947)192 and the CDC’s Gambia Egg Scheme (1948),193 the abject
failures of which historians routinely haul out, dust off, and then promptly use as a stick with
which to thrash the postwar planners who stand accused of “maladministration” and “waste.”194
These projects have been copiously examined elsewhere and, suffice it to say, scholars agree that
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the schemes were neither planned nor managed particularly well.195 The question therefore
becomes why? How do we explain these failures? The answer lies in the postwar sterling crisis
of 1947.
The Second World War devastated Britain’s economy. In the period between 1938 and
1945, for instance, Britain’s external debt skyrocketed from £500 million to £3.355 billion while,
during the same period, the value of its reserves of gold and dollars was nearly halved, falling
from £864 million in 1938 to about £453 million by October 1945.196 Nearly bankrupt and left
with no other alternative following the end of the American Lend-Lease program,197 Britain
turned to the United States for a $5 billion loan.198 But policy-makers in Washington, who
believed the best way to achieve global trade was through the elimination of trade barriers,
viewed the sterling area—which, during the war, was the site of hard currency rationing “through
the operation of the gold and dollar pool”—as a “discriminatory economic bloc” and, therefore, a
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massive obstacle to trade—precisely what the Americans proposed to dismantle.199 Thus, the
United States was unwilling to provide more than $3.5 billion in credit to Britain—and, at that,
only on condition that the UK government “made sterling convertible for current transactions
into any other currency.”200 As this allowed “private citizens and companies to purchase US
exports with dollars passing through Britain,” the immediate result was a “frantic run on the
Bank of England’s reserves and the rapid depreciation of the pound against the dollar.”201 As the
value of the pound plummeted—and, with it, the basis of exchange in the sterling area—the
empire-wide dollar deficit, accumulated through the importation of goods produced in the dollar
area, soared. Indeed, to get some sense of the scope of the problem, we need look no further
than the West Indies, where the Bahamas, which in 1948 had a total population of 85,000,
incurred a net-dollar import deficit of $6,495,000.202 Such were Britain’s postwar economic
woes and they fashioned a bleak prognosis for the empire: officials projected a “cumulative
balance of payments deficit” of £1.25 billion between 1945 and 1950.203
This crisis framed Britain’s novel postwar status as the “world’s leading debtor
country”204 and it did much to undermine Creech Jones’ “welfarist agenda.”205 In fact, from
1946/7, British policy-makers sought not only to “restrain” imports from the dollar area,206 but
also to bend colonial development initiatives toward the production of dollar-earning and dollar-
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saving commodities otherwise imported from outside the sterling area.207 As Sir Stafford Cripps,
Minister for Economic Affairs, observed in a speech to the African Governors’ Conference in
November 1947, “What I think is most important is that we should get right ahead with as many
large scale experimental schemes as possible.”208 It was not long before Sir Stafford’s sentiment
was given an institutional basis. For in February 1948, Parliament legislated the Overseas
Resources Development Act and established the CDC and the OFC, bodies which, in tandem
with the CO and the Treasury, were charged with the coordination of Britain’s postwar colonial
development regime.
It was to be a fraught working relationship.209 Indeed, while the OFC and the CDC were
tasked with “securing the investigation, formulation and carrying out of projects for production
or processing in places outside the United Kingdom of foodstuffs or agricultural products other
than foodstuffs, and the marketing thereof,” and “securing the investigation, formulation and
carrying out of projects for developing resources of colonial territories with a view to the
expansion of production therein of foodstuffs and raw materials, or for other agricultural,
industrial or trade development therein,”210 respectively, and could, therefore, initiate
development schemes, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, who had “overriding
responsibility for the political and economic well-being of the Colonies,” had no such
authority.211 Moreover, the CO was granted only minimal oversight of corporation-approved
schemes, as Section 1 of the Overseas Resources Development Act made plain: “The
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Corporation can therefore undertake a wide range of projects by widely differing methods, and
neither the commercial soundness of a project nor the methods by which it is to be carried out,
can be questioned by the Secretary of State [for the Colonies] unless the project, or the methods
of its operation, conflicted with public policy.”212
These limits, which prompted a lengthy rebuke from Creech Jones, effectively restricted
CO influence to brokering, along with the Treasury, “policy and allocation clearances” for
projects already approved by the new corporations.213 Yet, even this constraint had its limits, for
both the OFC and the CDC could embark on schemes “of a preliminary or urgent character”
even in advance of sanction from either the CO or the Treasury.214 The board of the CDC
justified this latitude in its first annual report: “the board have sometimes felt, during the course
of this first year, that if they are required to move always and only on the rails of exact planning,
obtaining the full concurrence of various Government Departments and outside interests which
may have views to assert, it may be difficult to move at all; and they have therefore welcomed
every measure of freedom and independent initiative, within the general requirements of
economic policy, which the Secretary of State [for the Colonies] and the Chancellor of the
Exchequer have felt able, in their interpretation of the terms of the Act, to concede.”215
Rationalized within the context of the sterling crisis and the urgent, postwar call for
“resource mobilization” throughout the empire, these circumstances combined to elevate largescale colonial development schemes to a position of importance several magnitude above
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projects concerned chiefly with indigenous social betterment.216 Little wonder, then, that, as
Riley observes, there emerged within the Attlee government a polarity of development
philosophies: on the one hand, figures such as John Strachey, the Minister of Food charged with
overseeing the OFC and, consequently, the East African Groundnuts Scheme, and Lord
Trefgarne who, as chairman of the board of the CDC, was ultimately responsible for oversight of
The Gambia Egg Scheme, were adherents to this new fiscally-driven ethos, one motivated by the
idea that development should aid in the postwar reconstruction of Britain.
Of course, given the scope of the crisis confronting the empire, and the purported
outcome of the development schemes it compelled—it was estimated, for example, that the East
Africa Groundnut Scheme alone would produce £10 million per annum in dollar-savings, while
it was reckoned that egg production in The Gambia would produce something on the order of 20
million eggs per annum following a relatively minor capital outlay on the part of the UK
government of £500,000—this ethos, while not justifiable, is certainly explicable.217
Nevertheless, the change in development philosophy embodied by the work of these agencies has
prompted certain scholars, such as Kelemen and Fieldhouse, to frame the resultant “colonial
development offensive” in the bleakest of terms, characterizing them as exploitative of Africans
in the vein of Chamberlain’s imperial estates doctrine—precisely the circumstance the Fabians
set out to correct in 1929.218
Indeed, it is the positivist vision derived from Sydney Olivier’s Imperial Trusteeship,
published in 1929, with its prescriptive moral responsibility, its humanitarian precepts of civil,
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economic, and social equality, and a belief in the fundamental benevolence of state-sponsored
development-based progress favored by Creech Jones, the FCB, and many within the CO, that
stood in such stark contrast to the new development philosophy and the monstrous
manifestations of midcentury modernity it obliged. This dichotomy not only prompted an
institutional tension between the CO and the OFC and the CDC, but led, pace Heinlein and
Riley, to resistance on the part of CO officials “on moral grounds” to development plans that
“might engender exploitation, or even the perception of exploitation, of colonial populations for
British financial gain.”219

Conclusion
Britain’s postwar development strategy was about more than writing progress across the
landscape of Africa in the mechanized language of industrialization—a fact that is clouded by
the very historiography that scholars such as Kelemen and Fieldhouse perpetuate. Indeed,
obscured by this tendency is an equally significant strand of development: modest, inexpensive
schemes concerned to nurture indigenous progress at its most basic level—that is, the African
community. Eclipsed by the ambitious and flashy plans of revolutionary large-scale
mechanization and agricultural production, local-level initiatives were nonetheless critical to the
development of Britain’s African territories. That such schemes go unnoticed or are treated as
asides in the historiography fosters not only a grim assessment of postwar colonial development
and the Fabianism which often lay at the heart of its ideals, but also one that is woefully
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incomplete, particularly in light of the primacy Creech Jones assigned to one such colonial
development stratagem: mass education.
Indeed, Creech Jones felt very strongly that the successful marriage of progress and
development in Britain’s African territories hinged on this particular community-level initiative.
The byzantine path wended by Creech Jones and the Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee
that led to the unspectacular promulgation of Mass Education in African Society in 1944 testifies
to this. But the success of colonial development projects, Fabian-influenced or otherwise, lies
ultimately not in an effective policy formulation, but whether or not—and if indeed, how—that
proposal manifested itself tangibly on the ground in African communities. This, of course, is the
problematic at the very center of the question of postwar Fabian influence on the British Empire.
In the end, when the Tribune announced that the “Fabianising” of the empire had begun in 1947,
was this meant to herald something more than the rhetorical comeuppance of a society whose
members had spent years permeating the upper echelons of government—or was it simply the
gleeful announcement of a long-awaited—and ultimately hollow—succession?
To answer this question, we must turn to the vehicle arguably best situated to Fabianize
the British Empire following the Second World War: the Cambridge Summer Conference of
1948, convened under the auspices of the CO to “encourage initiative in African society.”
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CHAPTER 4: 1948-1956
On Colonial Summer Schools and Community Development in Kenya and Uganda: Case
Studies in the Fabianization of the British Empire

Through Mr. Creech Jones and Mr. Jim Griffiths our programme was largely put
into effect by the Labour Government.1
–Dr. Rita Hinden, Secretary of the
Fabian Colonial Bureau, to the
House of Commons, November 20,
1953

Introduction
By the time the CO Summer Conference on African Administration convened in August
1948, the schematic of Fabian social trusteeship had crystallized into a positivist marriage of
progress and development, a conjugation of Fabianism and Sydney Olivier’s imperial trusteeship
designed to bring about the betterment of colonial peoples through a regime of state-interference
under the guiding agency of state trustees. Although the Great Depression’s impact on Britain’s
political and economic circumstances had a cumulative suppressive effect on advancing these
ideals in the realm of colonial development policy during the 1930s, the Fabians remained
faithful to the basic principles of Olivier’s design. Yet the formula of Fabian social trusteeship
was not immutable; by the 1940s, circumstances prompted revision, particularly in light of the
move toward colonial self-government. As the FCB observed: “In the move forward of colonial
territories…it is of great importance that a modern system of government should be laid.”2
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As we have seen, for the Fabians, the foundation of this modern system of government
had a basis in the experiences of Britain’s nineteenth-century working-classes, which had been
excluded from “the exercise of full political rights.”3 As they gained and exercised these rights,
the working-classes derived strength from what the Fabians saw as a host of "principal sources,"
notably trade unions, cooperatives, and local government. These institutions, long-cherished by
the Fabians as both generators of a sense of community4 and incubators of democracy,5 provided
not only a blueprint for eventual self-government, but also its requisite social trustees, the statesupported bodies best positioned to train Africans in the administrative skills needed to
(eventually) take over from the imperial state.6 As important “staging posts” along the road to
eventual self-government, the Fabians saw these institutions as logical counterparts to trusteeship
in an age when Lord Lugard’s indirect rule, the preferred method of governance in Britain’s
African colonies, had become increasingly outmoded, especially as educated Africans came to
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see it as a barrier to progress. Coupled with mass education, the institution particularly favored
by Arthur Creech Jones and the subject of this chapter, local government, trade unions, and
cooperatives comprised what the Bureau referred to as “The Social Foundation” of trusteeship.7
While the ideological bricks of this foundation were being laid, the Labor Party gradually
devolved its colonial policy formulation machinery into the hands of the increasingly betterpositioned Fabians. We get some sense of this movement as early as 1933, when something very
much like the FCB’s Social Foundation made a tentative appearance in The Colonial Empire,
one of Labor’s largely-disregarded Depression-era treatises on colonial policy. Promulgated
following the party’s electoral implosion, retreat into opposition, and subsequent lunge to the
left, The Colonial Empire outlined a plan of “socialisation and self-government” in the colonies
that depended partly upon a framework of local government, the organization of cooperatives
and native trade unions, and an educational curriculum that included mass education.8 The
obvious parallel with the Social Foundation is rather more than historical happenstance; for at the
time, the party relied on the ostensibly apolitical NFRB, a Fabian-led research department (the
LRD), and an executive whose policy committee was dominated by Fabians to formulate its
colonial initiatives.9 As suggestive as this is, however, the ultimate significance of The Colonial
Empire lay not in its affirmation of Fabian permeation, but rather in its status as an exemplar of
Labor’s prewar tendency to draw upon what became the nuts-and-bolts of Fabian social
trusteeship. As Kelemen has observed, with the passage of time these rudiments became a
“long-standing” and distinctly Fabian contribution to Labor’s postwar colonial policy
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formulations.10 Indeed, it is the climax of this trend which prompted Morgan to describe the
postwar CO as “the Fabian Colonial Bureau writ large.”11
By the 1940s, a dense ideological network stretched between and connected Labor and
the Fabians, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. Little wonder, then, that the party’s
1945 election manifesto, Let Us Face the Future, should itself have been written by the Fabian
Michael Young.12 Yet, in many ways, it is no less emblematic for having been so; for as
Callaghan has noted, in terms of sheer political clout—that is, the proportion of members in the
governing body as an expression of influence—1945 represents something of an apex for the
Fabians.13 In point of fact, the election that year, which brought to power Labor’s Third
Ministry, a landmark occasioned by Labor’s historic landslide victory, and coincided with the
promulgation of an amended CDWA, manifested an astronomical change in the political fortunes
of the society: of the 394 Labor MPs elected, 229 were Fabians;14 ten cabinet ministers,
including the premier, Clement Attlee; 35 undersecretaries of state and 11 parliamentary private
secretaries were also Fabians.15 So transformative was the election of 1945 in terms of Fabian
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representation that the wife of John Parker, the MP and general secretary of the Fabian Society,
remarked on being introduced to the new PLP: “Why, it looks just like an enormous Fabian
School!”16 Though we should not confuse numerical preponderance with anything like a
mandate for the Fabian agenda, Mrs. Parker’s effervescence was not too far wide of the mark; for
the fact remains that for the first time since 1929, a type of political context existed that was
theoretically favorable to the “Fabianization of the British Empire.” “At last,” Dr. Hinden wrote
of the elation felt among certain members of the FCB, “the policies which had been pondered
over and pressed during the preceding years of hard work would be carried into effect, and
enthusiasm ran high.”17
Of all the advisory mechanisms at the disposal of the Colonial Office to commence with
this “Fabianizing,”18 to borrow from the Tribune, none was better situated than the CO Summer
School19 on African Administration, which met for the first time in 1947 under the tutelage of
the Fabian and newly-minted Colonial Secretary, Arthur Creech Jones. Convened annually over
a two-week period in August and September between 1947 and 1949 and again from 1951, the
conferences were designed to bring the experience of “serving officers,”20 who were given leave
to attend, to bear on the problems confronting postwar-Britain in the administration of its
dependent territories. In their turn, the conferences that met while Creech Jones was Secretary of
State considered the subjects of African Local Government (1947), The Encouragement of
Initiative in African Society (1948), and Agricultural Development in Africa (1949). Officially,
these conferences were consultative in nature; they were not substitutes for the “ordinary
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machinery” of policy-making in the African territories or in London. Rather, they were intended
to pool experience and to produce practical suggestions for consideration by everyone concerned
with African development. Unofficially, however, the position of the conferences vis-à-vis the
official policy-making functions of the CO was less straightforward, as attested by Creech Jones'
assurance in 1948 that the conference was not meant “to put something across to the officers
from Africa.”21
There was no more appropriate setting for Creech Jones’ caveat. For the centerpiece of
the 1948 summer conference was mass education, a project in which the Secretary of State’s
faith was so deep and abiding he had garnered a reputation among certain colonial officials as its
“apostle.”22 For Creech Jones, mass education was the “essence” responsible for stimulating the
most elusive of all the alchemical quanta of colonial development: African initiative, which, in
the eyes of many colonial officials, had been hitherto circumscribed by the commingling of
hidebound “(native) lethargy and ignorance” and the more advanced Africans’ generalized
“distrust” of British intentions.23 Yet, like all crusading apostles, Creech Jones’ message was
only as effective as the proselytizing missionary network on which it depended: in this case, the
British Colonial Service. But the Secretary of State for the Colonies could not govern by fiat;
instead, constitutional convention obliged him to work through colonial governors who, like
himself, drew authority from the royal prerogative, and whose decisions he had, by and large, to
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support.24 Within such a framework, the cooperation of the Colonial Service could only be
solicited, not compelled—an administrative impediment complicated by the fact that, as
Goldsworthy has pointed out, “many people had a stake in resisting (Creech Jones’) policies.”25
Almost as a matter of routine, then, the task of winning over colonial officials was
nothing short of Sisyphean: requiring navigation of the convoluted structure of an ossified, stillconservative colonial regime studded barbwire-like with what Creech Jones referred to as
“unimaginative reactionaries,”26 hostile toward “planning,” who saw CO Fabians as idealistic
and their policies unrealistic. To say nothing of indigenous, nationalist resistance to colonial rule
itself.27 Thus, in many ways, Creech Jones’ best hope to further his progressive agenda lay in a
well-executed summer conference populated by sympathetic colonial officials and partisans.28
This chapter explores both the policy implications and practical ramifications of the
“Fabianization of the British Empire.” It takes as its point of departure the CO Summer
Conference of 1948. Convened under the sponsorship of Arthur Creech Jones in his capacity as
Secretary of State for the Colonies, the conference met and deliberated on a topic in which the
minister and the FCB were both keenly interested: mass education. This chapter shows that, as
implemented within the framework laid out in Mass Education in African Society, the CO policy
promulgated in 1944 and guided to a considerable extent by Creech Jones in his capacity as a
Goldsworthy, Colonial Issues in British Politics, 50-51. As Creech Jones noted, “you cannot in
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member of the ACEC, mass education policy had been revealed to be an ill-defined and
unwieldy concept. In the colonies, the resultant muddle manifested a variegated efflorescence of
mass education regimes which were noteworthy, above all, for their lack of consistency. As a
result, the 1948 summer conference set out to reimagine mass education policy and bring to it
some much-needed clarity. The conference accomplished this by framing what was essentially
the same policy but within the rubric of “community development.” To get some sense of the
efficacy of these formulations, and thus some idea of the nature of a “Fabianized” British
Empire, this chapter pivots to an examination of community development in situ—that is, in
Africa. As such, we conclude here with a pair of case studies on the evolution and practical
effects of community development as realized in Kenya and Uganda.

The Fabianization of the British Empire: Fabians and the 1948 CO Summer Conference
on African Administration
In his opening address to the 1948 Cambridge Summer Conference on African
Administration, the Secretary of State for the Colonies Arthur Creech Jones laid out his vision
for the future of development in Africa to a roomful of colonial officials. The nub of his speech,
which faulted past development efforts for emphasizing the “substance” of development
programs over the encouragement of indigenous “motive power,” was that the political and
economic development of colonial societies depended ultimately upon their own peoples.29
“Looked at by any real standard of values,” Creech Jones reasoned, “it is less important that a
particular African territory should have a progressive constitution with full African participation
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than that there should exist in the territory a considerable group of people capable of effective
political capacity, by which is meant…the capacity to take part effectively in public life and to
shape political development themselves. At the other end of the scale it is less important that
there should be a village school than that the people should have the initiative, not only to want a
school and ask for a school, but actually to build and run it by their own efforts.”30
For all its ostensible altruism, this high-minded rhetoric is jarring to modern ears,
reminding us that the Secretary of State was no less subject to the “genie of colonial
paternalism”31 than any other colonial administrator. Indeed, it was more a matter of degree than
of completeness, since Creech Jones clearly believed Africans were capable of achieving
progress, they lacked only the initiative to realize it. Little wonder, then, that Creech Jones
concluded in his speech that the “primary task” of Britain’s colonial development regime in
Africa was the stimulation of “initiative…to encourage people to want change” and “to equip
them with the power themselves to create change.”32 In other words, the tangible ends of a
planned development scheme—be it dams and irrigation canals, groundnut schemes or egg
production, or schools and community buildings—were not, in fact, the point of development at
all. Rather, it was the means by which development was accepted, understood, and achieved by
the indigenous peoples—that is, the fostering of enterprise in African society itself as a sort of
bastardized version of “development from below”33 that depended, paradoxically, on
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paternalistic European encouragement—which would far outlast any metropolitan-imposed
framework34 and ultimately “allow Africans to take over from the imperial state.”35
If, as Creech Jones held, African progress was a dynamic fueled by initiative, what
remained was its arousal and sustainment; the means by which the bulk of the population who
lacked the requisite “motive power” was to be induced to “become the pioneers in building the
institutions and works most suitable to their needs.”36 For Creech Jones, the necessary
provocateurs in this scheme were the colonial state and, in time, the Fabian-favored institutions
of social trusteeship—i.e. local government, trade unions, and cooperatives—whose job it was to
supply “the spark to kindle the flame” of collective initiative. As opposed to market incentives,
the chief mechanism for igniting this spark was mass education,37 itself, as we shall see, the
imprecise conceptual tinder which underpinned the philosophical basis of the 1948 Cambridge
summer conference.
The 1948 summer conference stood astride the nexus of an extensive, years-long, and
somewhat ad hoc information collation project, which gathered together technique analyses as
well as experiential and experimental data with a view toward assessing the “whole problem” of
colonial mass education and determining, in Creech Jones’ words, “what can be done to get the
Colonies directed [to] carry this thing [mass education] further.”38 Organized and spearheaded
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by a group of Fabians and a clique of like-minded CO administrators, parliamentarians, and
colonial and international officials who saw communal activity and training in administrative
skills as the necessary precursors to self-government,39 the conference was the second in a series
of annual summer conferences on African Administration that were the brainchild of Andrew B.
Cohen,40 the Fabianized head of the African Division of the CO.41
When it met in Cambridge, the 1948 summer conference was packed virtually stem to
stern with Fabian partisans, comprising a veritable “who’s who” of colonial development
specialists and planners that included: Cohen, chairman of the conference; G. B. Cartland,
general secretary of the conference and contributor to the FCB’s report on Local Government
and the Colonies;42 Leonard Barnes, Fabian and co-chair of the panel tasked with examining the
“Incentives to Progress in African Society;” the Fabian Dr. Margery Perham who, along with
Prof. C. H. Philips, himself a Fabian collaborator, spoke on nationalism as a motive force in
African societies; Dr. Huxley, a long-serving Fabian, former member of the ACEC, and director
general of UNESCO who spoke of the inspiration his agency had drawn from the CO’s mass
education policy; the Fabian Prof. Arthur Lewis, who spoke on the “indirect approach” of
encouraging African initiative in “betterment schemes;” W. E. F. Ward, Deputy Colonial
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Education Adviser, chairman of the panel charged with elaborating “The Content of Mass
Education,” and contributor to the New Fabian Colonial Essays;43 as well as Colonial Education
Adviser Sir Christopher Cox, who served as deputy chair of the conference, and Dr. Margaret
Read, who spoke on the necessity of encouraging “key individuals” to promote progress—both
of whom were long-time Fabian collaborators and contributors who worked alongside Creech
Jones in the formulation of Mass Education in African Society.
Planned, prepared, and delivered by this group of Fabians and their collaborators and
correspondents, the conference was pumped and primed to diffuse a Fabianized vision of
colonial mass education policy throughout the empire.44 Appropriately, it took as its point of
departure the CO’s report on Mass Education in African Society, the “prime begetter” of which
was Creech Jones.45 Published in 1944, the report did much to encourage an empire-wide
dialogue about mass education, while rendering it increasingly amorphous, a duality
acknowledged by Creech Jones in his opening remarks at the Conference: “There has been a
great deal of talk over the past three or four years about mass education,” Creech Jones noted,
“and many people have failed to understand what it means.”46
By 1948, this lingering sense of nebulousness was felt most acutely in the colonies.
Between 1944 and 1946, the “dilemma” of mass education came up in a variety of colonial
contexts. For example, the educationalist V. L. Griffiths, the principal of Bakht-er-Ruda College
in Sudan, argued that mass education, even assuming it was properly understood and
implemented, was but a constituent part of the solution to a much larger problem facing Britain’s
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postwar colonial empire. “If we really mean to develop the Colonies until they are capable of
governing themselves within measurable time,” he wrote Cox in 1944, “I suggest that the civic
training of the educated and the gaining of their cooperation is as important a subject as Mass
Education.” Griffiths punctuated his appraisal with a warning that “without some such
complement to Mass Education, the latter is likely to go sour on us through the interference and
rivalry of flamboyant and bitter nationalists. This has happened in India….”47 Griffiths’
paternalistic concerns that African initiative without proper “supervision” could be dangerous—
and, hence, the need for vesting trusteeship in the hands of “experts”—were echoed by Uganda’s
social welfare adviser, who reflected in 1946 that: “My experience here in Uganda has utterly
convinced me…that the CO Report on Mass Education would remain only paper until such time
as Africans were called up for training in citizenship….”48 This “training in citizenship”
encompassed a wide range of vague-sounding initiatives framed by the notion that “good
citizenship” was a “way of living,” rather than a “body of knowledge.” As such, it included both
a direct classroom approach and an indirect classroom approach, from fostering “elementary
social habits”—learned through the constant contact of pupils with teachers and staff—
reinforced by cleanliness and self-control; “character training,” where Africans learned how to
be what Europeans considered “good citizens” by observing and following the examples of good
behavior set by their teachers while simultaneously maintaining “good relationships” with those

47

Griffiths to Cox, June 14, 1944, BLUO, MSS. Brit. Emp. s. 332, ACJ 36/1. By this time,
Griffiths had acquired a considerable reputation for character training as “citizenship training for the
educated native.” As such, he became a key figure in the formulation of the CO’s training for African
citizenship, given form in the 1948 report, Education for Citizenship in Africa. See: J. M. Lee, Colonial
Development and Good Government: A Study in the Ideas Expressed by the British Official Classes in
Planning Decolonization 1939-1964 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1967), 165; Education for Citizenship,
Colonial No. 216 (London: HMSO, 1948), 18-24.
48
Dickson to P. E. W. Williams, April 2, 1946, BLUO, MSS. Afr. s. 1843 (1), Papers of P. E. W.
Williams [henceforth PEW].

203

around them; to field trips where classes visited government offices (post offices, police stations,
railways stations, etc.) to attain an understanding and even appreciation of the work officials do;
and classroom-based studies in such subjects as politics, where more advanced students could
learn about the “machinery and spirit of Government: in the native authority and the Crown
colony system, in Dominion status, in the working of the parliamentary and Cabinet system, and
the functions of the Crown.”49 It was, in other words, meant to be a regime of inculcation in a
specifically British (and generally Eurocentric) vision of citizenship.
When, in the summer of 1947, an investigation was launched under the auspices of the
CO “to advise on problems of mass education and literacy” in East Africa with a remit to discuss
related plans of campaign in Kenya, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Uganda, the survey confirmed
that progress regarding mass education had been irregular. Carried out by Prof. Philips of the
School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, the survey recognized that while the
“underlying conception” of mass education in colonial society had “long been part of British
rule,” the term “mass education” was itself “much misunderstood” in the colonies. In Kenya, for
example, the survey found a robust infrastructure existed to help facilitate mass education
projects, but that administrative overlap between the Departments of Education, Training, and
Social Welfare had coupled with resource limitations to create an incoherent and inefficient
policy.50 Meantime, in Uganda, where it fell under the purview of the Department of Public
Relations and Social Welfare, mass education consisted, in part, of traveling demonstration
teams exhibiting everything from latrine maintenance to the proper planting of banana trees and
posters exhorting the moral virtues of hard work. While favorably impressed by the teams’ “fine
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method of mass teaching,” Prof. Philips cautioned that the lack of coordination and delay in
follow-up could derail their efforts.51
In his final report, Prof. Philips assessed candidly the state of mass education in East
Africa. “To some [mass education] means simply literacy for all within a couple of years and
properly is dismissed as impracticable;” by others it was “taken to mean nothing more than
universal schooling for children, which, in any event, is unlikely to be achieved…in under a
generation;” while “for most it carries the connotation of formal education within the walls of a
classroom.”52 By any of these measures, Prof. Philips concluded, mass education was not
happening in certain of Britain’s East African colonies, most notably Tanganyika, the soon-to-be
site of the East African Groundnuts Scheme.53
Given this, and despite Cox’s own remark to Creech Jones in 1945 that “action” on mass
education was “overdue,”54 it is evident that little progress had been made in capturing and
caging the ponderous mass education phenomenon before 1948. Yet, an almost inexorable
centripetal momentum had been triggered with the promulgation of Mass Education in African
Society, which first broached the idea of coupling mass education with native initiative, albeit
inchoately. Centered on the CO, what at first was an epiphenomenal byproduct of a policy
pronouncement had, by 1947, become a deliberate campaign under Creech Jones to canvass the
empire’s mass education regime, drawing in data from across Britain’s African colonies and,
gradually, building up a framework for the conference—a blueprint which included everything
from the controversy surrounding the meaning and intent of mass education, to its configuration,
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utility, and, ultimately, its practice. These components converged at King’s College, Cambridge,
where, over the course of a fortnight’s deliberation between August 19 and September 2, 1948,
the future of colonial mass education policy and its place in Britain’s development arsenal was
decided.
As had been the case with its predecessor, the summer conference of 1948 was carefully
orchestrated by its chairman, Cohen, who “sat in the Chair from the first lecture to the last every
day.”55 The officers at King’s were divided into six groups, each of which attempted to elaborate
certain aspects of colonial mass education policy and its role in stimulating African initiative.
The groups were concerned with the technique and content of mass education, the question of
incentivizing progress in African society, exploring the connections between citizenship and
education, and the role of women in the colonial mass education project. For all this, the most
important discussion was that of Group VI. Chaired by P. E. W. Williams, Commissioner of
Social Welfare in Kenya and himself a former critic of Mass Education in African Society, the
group’s chief concern was the organization of mass education.
Conscious of the vexatious confusion which surrounded the term “mass education,”
practically the first thing the group did was to adopt “community development” as a suitable
complementary alternative.56 This rationalization not only clarified the modus operandi of mass
education—the encouragement of a “popular self-help movement,” of which Creech Jones was a
principal fosterer in Africa,57 designed to motivate “better living”—but also bequeathed to it a
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multi-tiered organizational framework designed to ensure its perpetuation.58 Eager to assuage
concerns that such an alteration obliged a costly, and therefore prohibitive, restructuring of
colonial administration, it was stressed that mass education was not, in fact, a new field of
activities, but rather constituted the application of new techniques within the extant framework—
albeit one adapted to the purpose. Indeed, while the framework could be retained, it had to be
“flexible” enough to accommodate Creech Jones’ prescription that community initiative ought to
be stimulated from below as well as from above.59 With this caveat in mind, the group defined,
and the conference accepted, mass education as follows:
We understand the term “mass education” to mean a movement designed to promote
better living for the whole community, with the active participation and, if possible, on
the initiative of the community; but if this initiative is not forthcoming spontaneously, it
should be aroused and stimulated by special techniques designed to secure the active and
enthusiastic response of the community. Mass education embraces all forms of
betterment. It includes the whole range of community development activities in the
districts, whether these are undertaken by Government or unofficial bodies; in the field of
agriculture by securing the adoption of better methods of soil conservation, better
methods of farming and care of livestock, in the field of health by promoting better
sanitation and water supplies, proper measures of hygiene and infant and maternity
welfare; and in the field of education by spreading literacy and adult education as well as
by the extension and improvement of schools for children. Mass education must make
use of the cooperative movement and must be put into effect in the closest association
with local government bodies.60

Bristling with voguish catchwords and key concepts that were the hallmarks of postwar
development theory, the basis of which was later roundly encapsulated in Rostow’s
modernization theory of development, this definition suggested a system that not only
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encouraged in Africans a deep desire for their own progress and betterment, but one that
sustained it.61 This required a complex ideological calculus, one that married popular inspiration
with civic awareness, an “education for citizenship” designed to complement colonial mass
education policy. For, as the CO’s report on Education for Citizenship in Africa, published
ahead of the summer conference and the basis of its deliberations on the same topic, cautioned
officials, “political machinery or economic devices will not ensure true democracy. Democracy
requires a temper of the general mind which will only spring from a temper of mind found in the
individual citizen. Unless the true democratic temper is present, the most beautifully devised
political or economic machinery will result in nothing but slavery…. If this temper is present,
details of the machinery matter little.”62
In practice, such considerations situated the village unit, possessed of a collective
knowledge of its own economy, infrastructure, and society63 and, therefore, “the starting point
from which the original ideas…must emanate,”64 at the very heart of the mass education project.
It therefore constituted the organizational basis of the colonial Mass Education Movement and,
as such, the locus of Creech Jones’ crucial initiative-building regime. Centered around a “hard
core”65 of villagers (a preferably “large and fluid body” to include ex-army servicemen,
“Africans that have put in useful work in the African Civil Service and Local Government
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Service,” and their wives66) and specialist staff consisting of local-level field officers and
“Provincial Community Development (or Mass Education) Officers” charged with “stimulating
local enthusiasm” within the widest possible rubric, this regime manifested a circuitous system
of “community mobilisation”67 designed to canalize African motive power by inspiring it
through emphasis on a complex of mutually-reinforcing local-level interests, hobbies, and
occupations.68 The soundness of this approach was later explicated by Jackson, who, in
language which suggests a belief that African society was somehow frozen in time, notes in his
study on community development in eastern Nigeria that “village communities form the obvious
area for community development work” for they were “still by far the strongest
community…bound by a common history and the beliefs in a common ancestor, by the common
ownership of land and the ties of intermarriage, by a common social life and a common
custom.”69
If the village unit and its assorted communal activities stood at the heart of the
motivational enterprise that undergirded mass education, it was cooperatives, trade unions, and
local government—the institutional essence of the social foundation of Fabian trusteeship—that
were its civic lifeblood, the means by which the critical village-level initiative could be mustered
and translated meaningfully into nascent self-governance along the lines of the “democratic
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British model.”70 For Kelemen, the reciprocal initiative-encouraging schematic that
characterized mass education policy constituted something like a “new system of governance,”
the principles of which were laid down at the summer conference as a guide for wider
application across Britain’s colonial territories.71 As the new Fabian-influenced paradigm,
Creech Jones made it the crux of his opening address at the African Governors Conference,72
which convened nearly a month later on September 29, 1948. “The dynamic of progress must be
created by the people themselves,” he surmised, adding that:
The devolution of responsibility, the transfer of executive power, is no simple problem,
but little progress can be made unless the people cooperate in the work of government,
assume some direct responsibility in their own affairs, develop a sense of public service,
and do not wait on government but initiate and attack their social and economic problems
themselves. It is for this reason that in recent colonial policy we have sought so
strenuously to promote voluntary service and mutual aid, we have talked much about
breaking through ignorance by community education, about extending mass education
and literacy, and encouraging individual and community initiative. … As we emphasised
many years ago in our Report on Mass Education, we must secure the interest and
cooperation of the local people in their advance so that they themselves become pioneers
in building the institutions and works most suitable to their needs.73
Before the year was out, mass education (alt. community development) was adopted as
one of the central features of Britain’s African policy.74 Corona, the journal of the British
Colonial Service, heralded the event as pioneering; it was “practical” and “constructive,” noted
the editor, distinctions which suggest its predecessors, Mass Education in African Society and
Education for Citizenship in Africa, were not.75 At the same time, however, Corona sounded a
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note of caution, admonishing colonial officials then-engaged in mass education not to take for
granted the cooperation of local peoples. “Everybody will not be interested in the same thing,”76
the journal explained, a fact which complicated the already-formidable work of community
development (mass education) officers in “getting to know as much as possible about the people;
their way of life, language, customs; their natural leaders; wants, hopes, and aspirations.”77
Couched as an oblique indictment against indirect rule, the intent was to might stimulate and
arouse native initiative, the vital element identified by Creech Jones as the essence of mass
education and, by extension, Britain’s postwar colonial development enterprise. Thus, Corona’s
warning that “no scheme will be successful” if initiative was not aroused had serious
implications for Britain’s imperial future.78
For all this, however, as an expression of Fabian influence on colonial development, the
work of the 1948 summer conference gets us closer to understanding the phenomenon of
“Fabianization” only at the level of policy formulation. Absent any sense of how Fabian
influence revealed itself in practice, our evidence lacks the kind of granularity necessary for a
reasonably comprehensive understanding of the process implied by the “Fabianization of the
British Empire.” As this suggests, the vital corollary is an examination of mass education in
context; that is, a study of Fabianized colonial development policy in situ, at the level of the
colonies. This, however, is a deceptively straightforward proposition. For, in the end, how do we
choose which of Britain’s colonial territories to examine?
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The answer to this question can be found at the juncture of the central conceit of this
study—that is, Fabian influence as realized in both the theory and practice of Britain’s colonial
mass education policy—and the nature of the summer conference itself. Logic dictates that the
officials who attended the conference from the colonies were those best positioned to determine,
or at least exercise, related initiatives in their respective territories. Given postwar retrenchment
and the concomitant imperial belt-tightening it engendered, suggesting otherwise is dubious.79
Thus, in the search for exemplary colonial candidates who manifested Fabianization, the summer
conference is an ideally-suited starting point. Moreover, there is no prerequisite built into this
study that argues candidates from the conference must also be members of the Fabian Society.
Indeed, as with the historic operation of Fabian “permeation,” affiliation is neither obliged nor
expected; rather, as agents of Fabian-favored policies, officials need only to endorse said
initiatives, a sanctioning surmised either through outright approval (as, for example, quantified in
correspondences) or, more tangibly, through implementation (be it partial or, more hopefully,
complete).
Subjected to these considerations, and excluding CO staff from London who had no hand
in administering the conference, speakers and participants not affiliated with either the CO or
any other official organ of state, attendees from territories not under the purview of the CO (e.g.
Sudan), clerical workers (e.g. stenographers) and students, and the number of potential
candidates drops from 160-plus to below 70. Of these, two figures stand out both for their role in
guiding the deliberations of the conference and in the formulation and ultimate implementation
of the policies as enunciated at Cambridge in 1948. They are Williams, Kenya’s Commissioner
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of Social Welfare, the chairman of the conference group responsible for defining mass education,
and future principal of the Local Government and Community Development Training Center at
Entebbe, Uganda; and Cohen, the Fabianized conference chairman and future governor of
Uganda. Thus, in the search for tangible manifestations of Fabianization in the colonies, the
field is considerably narrowed to these two East African territories.
What follows is a pair of case studies designed to plot the trajectory of colonial mass
education policy against the backdrop of the evolving political and social landscape of postwar
Kenya and Uganda. In the end, the findings reveal not only the breadth and scope of postwar
Fabianization, but also underscore the fact that nowhere did (or, for that matter, could)
development policy (Fabianized or otherwise) persist unadulterated following promulgation;
indeed, policy formulations rested on a design that was intentionally negotiable80 so that it might
be rendered legible within the framework of a particular colonial context.81 For the “British
Empire” was hardly the monolithic, homogeneous entity the name suggests; rather, it was an
aggregation of territories and cultures, an umbrella under which a vast array of peoples with wide
differences were collected and administered in vaguely similar ways—inherent and unavoidable
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circumstantial particularity that played an important part in the shape of mass education in both
Kenya and Uganda.

Mass Education in Context: Case Studies of Postwar Social Welfare and Community
Development in Kenya and Uganda

Kenya

I have got so far, far enough to see that community development is on the edge of
the map.82
-P. E. W. Williams, November 16, 1949

Some fourteen months after the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration,
Williams wrote to Cox lamenting the future of community development in Kenya. Williams’
five-year community development plan (Mass Education or Rural Community Development,
Kenya Colony), placed before the executive council in 1948 and accepted “in principle” (an
invariably ominous turn of phrase), had suffered a series of ghastly and humiliating setbacks at
the hands of Nairobi’s bureaucrats, including the deletion of the mass education budget, funds
for Williams’ assistant, and the money for the development of rural industries.83 So catastrophic
was this turn of events, nearly unimaginable just eleven months before, that Williams not only
declared his community development plan “dead,” but also resigned as Commissioner for Social
Welfare.84 Fabianization, it seemed, was stillborn in Kenya. Or was it?
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The story of mass education in Kenya is one of oscillation and contradiction, starting
with Williams himself. After graduating from Cambridge with an MA in Modern Languages, he
joined the British Colonial Service as an Education Officer in Tanganyika Territory in 1926. At
the outbreak of the Second World War, he enlisted with the King’s African Rifles (KAR) in East
Africa where, as Staff Officer until 1943, he was tasked with forming and directing the East
African Army Education Corps (EAAEC). The origins of the EAAEC, which was formally
inaugurated in 1942 and headquartered at the Center “C” Jeanes School (Kabete) on the outskirts
of Nairobi, lay in the expulsion of the Italians from East Africa in 1942. As Parsons explains,
following the defeat of the Italians in the Ethiopian campaign, senior colonial officials began to
worry about the African soldiery’s declining morale. These concerns were exacerbated when, in
February 1942, the KAR 25th Brigade in Eritrea, believing the expulsion of the Italians from East
Africa signaled the end of the war, refused to board ships bound for Southeast Asia. General
William Platt, the officer in charge of the East Africa Command (EAC), concluded that a basic
education program was needed to explain Allied war aims to the African soldiery.85 Once built,
such a program could be bent to complementary purposes. For example, colonial military
authorities believed that bored askaris (African soldiers) were more likely to drink and seek the
company of prostitutes than those engaged in things like course work. Properly conceived,
military education could not only elucidate Allied war aims, but also serve to improve health and
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morale by providing a more “wholesome” and “productive” use of soldiers’ spare time.86
Moreover, it provided askari with the opportunity to learn useful technical skills that, once they
returned to civilian life, could help them secure well-paid jobs. For their part, East African civil
officials welcomed formal army education as a tool to blunt CO criticism that they had
unnecessarily cut back on African education during the war.
Over time, the AEC had a profound impact on rural populations throughout East and
Central Africa. Indeed, as Holford has observed, the AEC formed a touring army unit “not as a
recruiting organization, but to inform millions of villagers in East and Central Africa about what
their young men were doing in the forces.”87 These units, Mason notes, were composed of
“hand-picked young Africans from various branches of the army…using ingenious techniques of
demonstration, play-acting, and showmanship.”88 One such “show,” which anticipated greatly
the later work of mass education demonstration teams in Uganda and Togoland, toured the
United Kingdom in 1945 and so impressed Cox that he sought out its creator. “Who had the
lion’s share,” he wrote in May 1945 to Creech Jones, at the time Under-Secretary of State for the
Colonies, “in bringing into being the remarkable Army Education business of the Jeanes School,
Kabete, in the last three or four years and is now on show here in UK[?]”89
Having so recently published Mass Education in African Society which, as we have seen,
was subject to no small amount of criticism—even Williams described it as “insufficiently
realistic” in the context of Britain’s poverty-stricken African colonies90—Cox was eager to see if
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Williams’ wartime work on education in Kenya could somehow be translated to the civilian
sphere. After meeting with Creech Jones and Read, Cox hastily sent an air mail to Williams. “I
feel that you’ll understand that people here,” he scrawled, “particularly those who had anything
to do with the Mass Education Report, who’ve seen or heard anything of the work of the AEC in
East Africa & your Jeanes show in particular, are extremely keen that its distinctive features &
assets & spirit should somehow have a chance of being carried over into the civil set up. It’s a
great piece of work…if anything can be done, you’re the person to see how.”91
Possibly one of the most astute judges of the vital correlation between mass education,
native interests, and native capabilities in all of British Africa, Williams welcomed Cox’s
invitation to contribute to the postwar mass education discourse—an inducement reified by
subsequent (and multiple) visits to Kenya from the likes of Creech Jones, Cohen, Elspeth
Huxley, and indeed Cox himself.92 All were enthusiastic about Williams’ “effective and
impressive” education centers at Kabete, particularly the innovative Jeanes School.93 Host to a
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noteworthy curriculum of experimental and progressive coursework, such as homecrafts for the
wives of ex-servicemen and even training courses for their children, Williams hoped the school
would be the future home of mass education in Kenya.94
In the meantime, as he worked with Cox on how best to position the Jeanes School as the
colony’s mass education training center,95 Williams shared what he believed ought to be the
basis of mass education with the newly-reconstituted Mass Education Subcommittee in
London.96 “It seems to me,” he wrote, “that what all our…work should be based on [is] a group
of men of sound character living in a village. If we could only get groups of such men—some
perhaps working as craftsmen, one or two as petty traders, and an agricultural instructor, a
teacher and a health worker or two—and work outwardly from this group, getting them to run
boy scouts, farmers clubs, welfare clubs etc., I feel we should very gradually build up a better
spirit.”97
Williams’ invocation of “a better spirit” derived from activities centered on a village unit
anticipates, at least in part, the focus of Creech Jones’ community-based initiative-building
regime, the struts and armatures of which were emplaced the following year at the 1948 summer
conference. Although absent the vital bridge connecting this collective “spirit” or motivation
with self-government, and thus devoid the civic dimension of the Fabians’ social foundation of
trusteeship, Williams clearly envisioned a mass education regime that in some measure
accounted for progressive development from below. Such an expression (albeit incomplete) by
an official with twenty years’ experience educating Africans, increasingly au courant with
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Creech Jones’ own thinking, could but have endeared Williams to the Secretary of State. It is
perhaps little wonder, then, that Williams should have played an important part in that
conference’s deliberations. Indeed, when the time came to organize the 1948 conference, he was
asked to chair Group VI, which, as we have seen, originated the definition of mass education (alt.
community development) ultimately accepted by the conference.
The crystallization of policy achieved at Cambridge had an almost immediate effect on
mass education in Kenya; for it effectively saved the Jeanes School from being decommissioned.
Opened in 1925 to provide special training for rural village teachers as instructors, the school
was closed down at the start of the Second World War and commandeered as a training center
(Center “C”) for the EAC.98 Following the end of the war, the center was repurposed as a civil
re-absorption organization at which ex-servicemen were given training to equip them for their
return to civilian life—a program which had decidedly mixed results.99 Indeed, as Williams
wrote to Heely Jowitt, his opposite in Bechuanaland, the efforts of the civil re-absorption officers
to concentrate on village welfare had revealed a subversive and disheartening duality at the back
of British development efforts in postwar Kenya: on the one hand, educated Kenyans often had
“absolutely no desire to assist their less educated brethren;” on the other hand, African literacy
training was an at-best fraught endeavor given the abundance of subversive anti-government,
anti-settler, and anti-white literature which virtually saturated the colony. As he surveyed this
increasingly vehement vanguard of anti-colonial sentiment, punctuated by a massive strike at
Mombasa in January 1947 that was itself the culmination of years of unaddressed or partially-
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addressed African grievances vis-à-vis labor conditions,100 Williams jadedly concluded that
“Kenya is a very unhappy place at the moment and generally speaking the African population are
getting completely out of hand. … I suppose these are all growing pains, but it does rather shake
one’s belief and tempers one’s enthusiasm.”101
And yet, insofar as native education and training was concerned, the challenges posed by
these “growing pains” were hardly mitigated by the fact that the civil re-absorption program was
set to expire in 1949 and, with it, the postwar rationale which underlay the continued operation
of the Jeanes School.102 The future looked undeniably bleak for the center at Kabete—until, that
is, the summer conference of 1948, the advent of which brought with it a new raison d’être for
the school: “community development” (this was the term Williams preferred to “Mass
Education,” although they meant the same thing).103 Accordingly, as the re-absorption scheme
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gradually wound down, the Jeanes School underwent an overhaul, becoming not only the “main
adult education centre” for the colony, the principal activities of which included enlightening
leaders about the “working of government and local government” to “open the eyes” of the
people as to the requirements of the “modern state,”104 but also the “nucleus” of Kenya’s nascent
community development regime.105 At the heart of this regime lay a series of recommendations
derived entirely from the conference, massaged to fit Kenya’s prevailing colonial context, and
detailed by Williams in the memorandum Mass Education or Rural Community Development,
Kenya Colony.
Williams’ five-year plan took as its point of departure mass education as defined and
accepted at Cambridge.106 The decision to do so was not inconsequential; for in recognizing the
conference’s definition as the key principle of Kenya’s new community development plan,
Williams implicitly accepted the framework for mass education it obliged, beginning with the
“setting up of an organization whereby the African people of the Colony can be led to appreciate
the part they must play in…district, provincial and departmental development plans of the
Colony. The organization must be designed to win their interest and cooperation by instruction,
discussion and adult teaching techniques generally and thus arouse their initiative and
enthusiasm.”107 Aware, however, that recommendations for new capital expenditures on social
welfare and mass education were the economic equivalent of a blind date with a cold sore—
indeed, a full report on “Social Welfare, Information and Mass Education” had been submitted to
the council in January 1946 where, nearly three years later, it remained, writhing in fiscal
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purgatory—Williams stressed that community development was not a new field of activities.108
Rather, as accepted at Cambridge and confirmed by Williams, it constituted the application of
new techniques within the colony’s extant mass education framework adapted to the purpose of
“arousing initiative.” In the end, then, Williams drew up a plan that grafted community
development onto Kenya’s existing social welfare superstructure and assumed the ongoing
cooperation and financial assistance of Local Native Councils.109 In doing so, his plan steered
clear of any major reversals of existing policy; instead, it consisted chiefly of the expansion of
then-current work, accelerating the features that appeared to be “worthwhile,” and jettisoning
those which did not. In other words, it hewed closely to the summer conference’s
recommendations.
Ultimately, the form to be given expression by Williams’ proposed community
development plan consisted of three essential parts: first, it required a sound training
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organization, beginning with an effort to inculcate an awareness in government staff that they
were all, in fact, “Mass Education Officers” and that, as such, they were to regard themselves as
teachers as well as “exponents of government and British colonial policy.” Second, a field
service was needed, working at the village as well as the district level “distributing information,
stimulating initiative, arousing interest and generally preaching the gospel of responsibility and
self-help within the community.” Here, Williams’ intent was to instill a sense of “realism”
among those in the field responsible for implementing development plans by giving them a voice
in their preparation. Finally, there was to be “no rigid control from above” concerning the
disposition of central funds after they had been allocated for community development work.
Instead, once estimates were planned on the village unit, district, and provincial bases, and
monies accordingly disbursed, the local village committee was to have “greater latitude” as to
their use with an absolute minimum of oversight. This devolution of responsibility, with its
attendant local government implications, Williams pointed out, was a necessary component of
the whole “enthusiasm” building scheme.110
To achieve all this while simultaneously keeping overhead down, it was necessary for
Williams to splice community development with Kenya’s Social Welfare Department, the
infrastructure of which was arguably best-positioned to facilitate the necessary work. Staffed by
European district welfare officers and African welfare workers and equipped with numerous
social welfare halls throughout the colony, the reach of the department was considerable—as
indeed was its curriculum and workload, which included demonstrations illustrating better
farming methods and improved hygiene and sanitation, adult literacy and English programs, field
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trips, spinning, weaving, and sewing classes, and handicrafts.111 At the center of all this stood,
hub-like, the re-purposed Jeanes School, with its newfound emphasis on “Social Education,”
offering citizenship courses in local government, marketing and trade, and the function of
cooperative societies; lectures on agricultural, medical, and veterinary matters of interest; and
rural development coursework on the social impact of education, marriage customs and dowry,
and the inheritance of land and its consequent fragmentation.112 Thus, even while endeavoring to
depress costs, the assumption of more work by an organization so encumbered unavoidably
entailed further expenditures. Indeed, Williams’ plan called for additions in both personnel (six
more European district welfare officers, four in the newly-devised post of African assistant
district welfare workers, as well as an increase in the number of African welfare workers from 41
to 50 so that each location had one, and a rural industries officer) and infrastructure (both new
constructions as well as renovations to standing structures and the implementation of temporary
“Welfare Rooms”).113
In accordance with the Secretary of State’s Despatch No. 86 (dated November 10, 1948)
requesting “immediate action” on community development, Williams submitted this plan to the
Executive Council in Nairobi.114 From the outset, the response from Government House was
patently hostile. Indeed, after he “glanced” through Creech Jones’ initial despatch, Kenya’s
Governor Sir Philip Mitchell dismissed the idea of financial devolution envisioned by the
conference and carried forward in Williams’ proposal. The Legislative and Executive Councils,
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Mitchell is reported to have said, “always expected to have estimates very cut and dried and were
always desirous of seeing that expenditures followed very closely to that shown in the detailed
estimates.”115 Making matters worse was Mitchell himself who, at the time, was preoccupied
with trying to push his legacy project—the Nairobi Cultural Center—through the LegCo before
the end of his term in office.116 The governor’s penchant for tangentially referring to this
complication during meetings concerned with community development made it quite clear that
he was unwilling to sacrifice his posterity at the altar of some newfangled CO novelty.
The strong headwinds blowing from Government House were exceeded by those
emanating from the white settler-dominated LegCo, which was “greatly perturbed at the
proportion of money being spent in Kenya on Social Services as opposed to what they call
productive services.”117 While the legislators grudgingly accepted the role of education, medical
care, community development, and welfare in native progress, they resented the government’s
emphasis on such programs, preferring instead that the funds be invested in transport
infrastructure, soil and water conservation, and stock improvement. After attending a council
session at which the colony’s social welfare budget was heatedly debated and the Jeanes School
nearly deleted altogether,118 Williams reported to Cox: “I cannot over emphasize [sic] the
strength of this opinion supported on the Government side…. I listened to some of the debates
and it seemed to me that the C[hief] N[ative] C[ommissoner]’s voice was crying alone and
almost unsupported.”119 Beyond the confines of the LegCo, European popular sentiment was no
less discouraging. For there was throughout the colony a sort of generalized sense that the
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money spent in the past on schooling Africans had produced very little. Williams, alive to this
reality, conceded as much. In his acknowledgement, we find warnings of a deep social malaise,
the ramifications of which would be realized in 1952: “Never before has the African shown such
disturbing traits in his character; a complete dislike for work, lack of application even in office
work and no understanding of honesty not only in dealings with other races but among members
of his own race.”120
It had been less than two months since Williams optimistically put forward his plan to the
Executive Council and in that span of time he had gone from being an upbeat and energetic
purveyor of the benefits and possibilities of community development in Kenya, to being a
demoralized, borderline misanthrope mired in seemingly hopeless disillusionment. Little
wonder, then, that his cohort of supporters had grown cynical. As he confessed to Cox in
January 1949: “Even those who have expressed agreement with the plea of the Cambridge paper
that the African should be encouraged to think for himself given the opportunity to take part in
planning right down to the village level and then authority to put accepted plans into operation,
do so rather in the spirit of ‘It’s worth while [sic] trying but I doubt if it will work.’ It is the sort
of last despairing hope.”121
None of this boded especially well for the success of a mass education-based
development plan that hinged critically on the building up of native initiative and enthusiasm.
Indeed, despite a meeting of provincial commissioners in February during which it was agreed
that the Cambridge recommendations, including greater financial devolution, should be put into
action, and majority support for Williams’ five-year plan by such groups as the African Affairs
Sub-Committee of the Electors’ Union, resistance was strong. So strong, in fact, the year

120
121

Williams to Cox, January 3, 1949, BLUO, MSS. Afr. s. 1843 (1), PEW.
Ibid.

226

following the 1948 summer conference witnessed an almost comprehensive breakdown over the
future of community development in the colony,122 events which culminated in Williams’
bittersweet resignation. “I feel at the moment that I am stale,” he wrote to Cox in November
1949. “I certainly have no right to feel this, but yet for the last 9 months this has certainly been
so.” Given what we know about the struggle over his community development plan, one could
hardly blame him. And yet there was an encouraging upshot. For in standing aside, Williams
opened the necessary (and, most crucially, budgeted) slot for his replacement as Commissioner
for Social Welfare: “a person…who is 100% enthusiastic, having behind him that little
necessary personal push because it does make a difference.”123 That person was Tom Askwith,
to whom responsibility for the realization of Williams’ community development plan passed.
Formerly Municipal African Affairs Officer, Nairobi, Askwith was hand-picked by
Williams to be his successor not only because of his “wide interests, a real love of matters
African and an understanding of the African mind to an extent that is rarely found,” but also
because of his proven ability “for getting initiative among the African population.”124 Described
by Joanna Lewis as a curious blend of paternalism, progressivism, and inclusiveness, Askwith
was “instrumental” in promoting a concept of community development “based on the devolution
of resources to Africans.”125 At root, he believed that if Africans generated their own local-level,
small-scale initiatives after technical officers (such as agricultural, veterinary, and medical
specialists) ran campaigns of awareness-raising (from demonstration teams showing how to
build latrines and cowsheds to the use of hand-puppets in curriculum focused on child-rearing),
then the big administrative challenges of the day—be it soil erosion, disease, or even transport
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constraints—would gradually be solved. In working to accomplish community development,
which required acting as a corporate body to collectively determine what resources to use and
what projects to prioritize, villagers gained direct, hands-on experience in the democratic
process. Such elemental aspects of self-government and citizenship would, Askwith believed,
remedy the perceived lack of native experience in British-style local government.126 For all this,
however, no community development plan, be it Williams’, Askwith’s, or Creech Jones’, could
possibly have accounted for Mau Mau, which “blew apart” the “edifice of colonial rule” in
Kenya in 1952.127
Mau Mau violently stripped the veneer from the colonial façade in Kenya, exposing the
bricks and mortar of manipulation and repression which constituted the foundation of imperial
rule in the colony. Fueled by years of compounding (and largely unaddressed) grievances over
the progressive circumscription and abolition of native land rights, inequitable labor practices,
and discriminatory agricultural policies—factors which converged to effectively normalize
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African poverty—Kenya erupted in 1952 into a “dirty war”128 between the empire and a
nationalist insurrectionist movement (“Mau Mau”), resulting in the deaths of nearly 15,000
people.129 Throughout the conflict, a key component in the government’s strategy to gain and
maintain control over the colony was its “rehabilitation program,” a polite euphemism for the
imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of Africans in detention camps and enclosed villages.130
Viewed through the lens of these fraught circumstances, it is rather difficult to imagine a state of
affairs less conducive to fostering the kind of initiative-building mass education campaigns and
progressive self-government that constituted the means and ends of Fabian-favored community
development. And yet, unquestionably, community development was an important fixture in
Britain’s Emergency-era program of pacification and rehabilitation in Kenya. Indeed, as Lewis
has noted, it was the seemingly irrevocable, inertia-like “slide” toward Mau Mau that first
prompted the CO to press Nairobi into restoring the deleted line items from Williams’ five-year
community development budget.131
To get some sense of the degree to which Kenya’s Emergency-era community
development regime was “Fabianized,” we need look no further than the work of the colony’s
Department of Community Development and Rehabilitation under Askwith.132 It is worth
noting, however, that while the remit of the department not only accounted for community
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development, but also the “re-education and re-settlement or re-employment”133 (i.e.
“rehabilitation”) of tens of thousands of Mau Mau detainees and convicts, we are concerned here
only with projects whose lineage has a basis in the work promulgated at the 1948 summer
conference. Since the accepted definition of mass education or community development that
emerged from that meeting did not reckon with prisoners or convicts or the exigencies of war,
“rehabilitation projects” designed to “repatriate” Mau Mau are necessarily excluded from
consideration.
Of the remaining projects,134 one in particular stands out for its near-universal application
of community development as defined at the conference: the Machakos Betterment Scheme, a
wide-ranging community development project which brought together schemes on soil erosion,
water conservation, and animal husbandry; communal homestead improvement projects; an adult
literacy program; and even nascent elements of self-government and citizenship along the lines
of the democratic British model of local government—all of which was undergirded by a regime
of initiative-building.135 The scheme was so effective that, by 1958, it was being described by
the Commissioner of Social Welfare as a “model” development project.136

The Machakos Betterment Scheme
Machakos District had been the site of welfare schemes since 1948/9, when an expatriate
social welfare officer engaged in a campaign to get Kamba communities interested in adult
literacy programs, the building of meeting halls, the formation of women’s clubs (focusing on
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things like domestic management and homecrafts), and improved farming management and
related techniques.137 For assorted reasons, these efforts were met with frustration. For example,
not only was the labor required to engage in soil conservation arduous, but the measures
proposed entailed the reduction of livestock, which possessed an almost religious significance
for the district’s inhabitants. When the campaign prompted a protest march on Government
House in Nairobi, and the district’s residents rebuffed a subsequent proposal to introduce
machinery to help with the project, the government found itself at an impasse. For the next
several years, the land continued to deteriorate, poverty increased as a result and, with it,
unrest.138
Social welfare development languished in the district until 1953, when Askwith
introduced a betterment scheme based on a community development approach. The first step in
the process was a propaganda campaign meant to build awareness among the Kamba population
and “convince” residents not only of the necessity of soil conservation, but also to accept the use
of machinery to undertake it. Led by John Malinda, a local man appointed African
Administrative Officer, the inhabitants were gradually persuaded to accept Nairobi’s offer of
assistance. But Government House, no less cognizant of the ramifications of expensive largescale operations on native self-reliance, considered it essential that a self-help campaign along
the lines articulated at Cambridge in 1948 be introduced in tandem with its soil conservation
project.139
So it was that a “homestead improvement campaign” was born. Rooted in earlier work
carried out in Central and North Nyanza Districts, the campaign drew together the training
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efforts of the Jeanes School at Kabete, which in this instance focused its energies on developing
a plan based on modern agricultural methods and the promotion of farm consolidation, with the
technical field staff from Machakos District.140 The objective of the campaign was to connect
community development with popular support by way of a single, initiative-generating
homestead improvement project. The first step in doing so was the identification of a
demonstration homestead in the district to serve as the project centerpiece. When that was
accomplished, what remained was to persuade the neighbors of the homestead to assemble on a
given day and, under the guiding hand of the community development technical staff, tackle the
jobs which the householder wanted carried out, but was unable to do unaided. Acting together,
the group would set about improving the homestead by re-plastering and repairing the house,
building a shed for cattle, paddocking and cultivating a vegetable garden, building a lavatory,
and cleaning up the compound.141 The field staff believed that, in seeing the fruits of their
labors, achieved quickly and through group effort, the project would serve as the mass education
spark that would kindle the flame of collective initiative in Machakos.
Of course, all this was easier said than done, since the Kamba homesteaders had first to
be convinced of the merits of investing valuable time and industry in the repair and upkeep of
their neighbors’ compounds. To this end, the heads of the different homesteads were invited to
the Jeanes School where the plan, along with its attendant logic, was discussed.142 While the
reasons for the various improvements were explained and it was emphasized that they could only
be carried out quickly and effectively by a group of people working together, the community
development staff made absolutely no mention of the problems of soil conservation or of
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reducing stock, since both issues were still, in Askwith’s words, “explosive.”143 Moreover, the
European team stressed that the project was not compulsory; rather, the leaders were asked to
return home and to discuss the campaign with the villagers who, if the project appealed to them,
were to let Malinda, the district’s African Administrative Officer, know and to fix a day for the
project.144
This democratic consensus-building campaign reaped almost immediate rewards; for
days later, the “Betterment Team”145—as the multifaceted staffs responsible for community
development came to be called—was in full swing at the demonstration homestead. By day’s
end, it was the site of a veritable “transformation”: the house had a new thatch, with “new large
windows and smooth walls;” there was a cow shed, fences, and a vegetable garden.146
Encouraged by their achievement, the Kamba agreed not only to continue the scheme, but to
extend it.147 Extension, however, brought with it difficulties, since resources—from manpower
to the availability of the necessary tools—were finite. Prioritization was therefore essential.
Thus, the population formed a sort of corporate system, working communally under locallyelected village committees to determine which homesteads were repaired and in what order,
going so far as to develop their own methods to ensure compliance—this, rather than relying on
the chief’s sanctions.148 The result, over the course of the project, was a unique marriage of a
genuine (if embryonic) institution of self-government with a variant of the traditional mwethya
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ethic,149 the nucleus of which was clan-based “voluntary and traditional self-help groups.”150 As
Creech Jones had argued was essential, the necessary stimulus for the homesteading project was
multi-directional; that is, it came “from below as well as from above.”151
As a “considerable measure of popular support”152 was harnessed and channeled in
precisely the “community betterment” terms outlined by the 1948 summer conference153—
which, as noted earlier, also called for the canalization of self-help—homestead after homestead
was refurbished. Alongside these efforts, a terracing project was launched to augment soil
conservation work. Over the course of about two years, these efforts at preventing erosion
resulted in the furrowing of hundreds of miles of ridges, which trapped water underground and
produced higher crop yields in subsequent years.154 At the same time, groups made boundaries
for newly-demarcated land, constructed dams, and built roads.155 According to Askwith, these
infrastructural improvements spread to villages throughout Machakos and the attitude of the
Kamba toward conservation and surplus stock began to change.156 The district also became the
site of Kenya’s “first adult literacy scheme.”157 Administered by the recently-established District
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Council from 1954, the pilot scheme was so successful that a year later it inspired a companion
scheme in South Nyanza.158 But while comparatively-speaking the adult literacy program
flourished in Machakos, the “response was poor” in South Nyanza, prompting the scheme’s
closure and the withdrawal of its organizing officer.159
And yet there were also significant problems with the Machakos Betterment Scheme
itself. To begin with, one man’s “motivation” is another man’s “compulsion;” indeed, a study
conducted by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development160 soon after Kenya’s
independence found that some of the villagers in Machakos District felt “considerable pressure
to participate” in the betterment scheme, prompting a “reaction against all communal effort” in
the early 1960s. This retrogression was linked also to the diminution of government staff in the
district after 1959. At the same time, the project lays bare a deep contradiction of Britain’s latecolonial enterprise; for despite the impressive modernizing efforts of a betterment scheme fueled
by propaganda, supported with progressive training methodologies and industrial machinery, and
backed by an army of technical “experts” in agricultural, medical, and veterinary practice, the
colonial state found it necessary to revive and exploit mwethya, a traditional system of mutual
assistance, to achieve its ends. It was this very negotiation between modernity and “the energyproducing molecules” orbiting a time-honored indigenous convention which Askwith himself
credited with the success of community development in Kenya.161
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Even so, the policy lineage which constituted the basis of the Machakos Betterment
Scheme belies the notion, broached at the beginning of this case study, that the Fabianization of
Britain’s colonial development policy in Kenya was stillborn with the advent of Williams’
resignation in 1949. Indeed, even allowing for the unavoidable impingement of context-specific
vicissitudes, as indicated by the exploitation of mwethya, it is quite clear that Askwith effectively
carried forward his predecessor’s community development plan, which, as we have already seen,
was rooted in the work of the heavily-Fabianized 1948 summer conference at Cambridge.
Moreover, such rural development schemes based, at least in part, on the democratic
organization of the people gave, as Askwith himself observed, a “reality and foundation” to the
“more sophisticated organs of local government” then emerging.162 Given this, Machakos stands
as an exemplar, an exceptional interface that allows us to witness the form and efficacy of
Fabian-influenced colonial development policy at a granular, village level typically obscured by
the tendency of scholars to focus on the failure of large-scale and costly postwar industrial
development initiatives.
~~~
Uganda

I believe profoundly myself that the rapid building up of local government
through the process of devolution…is the most important of all methods by which
we must seek to foster political evolution in Africa, in the hope of securing, when
self-government eventually comes, a stable political system really representative
of the whole body of the people rather than an oligarchy based on a
comparatively limited intelligentsia or professional class.163
– Andrew B. Cohen, October 29, 1947
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Mass education (community development)…must be put into effect in the closest
association with local government bodies.164
– 1948 Summer Conference on African
Administration

These schemes are unspectacular; but, as one who has travelled widely in every
part of the country, I can assure Honourable Members of their very great
value.165
– Sir Andrew B. Cohen, Speech to the Uganda
Legislative Council, December 18, 1956

The Fabian Andrew B. Cohen, unlike his conservative predecessor at Entebbe, Governor
Sir John Hathorn Hall, was a bullish force for modernization in Uganda Protectorate.166 Having
served as head of the African Division of the CO under fellow Fabian Arthur Creech Jones, in
which capacity he presided over the Cambridge summer conferences on Local Government
(1947), The Encouragement of African Initiative (1948), and Agricultural Development in Africa
(1949), few colonial officials at the metropole were as deeply involved with, or indeed intimately
aware of, the progressive direction of Britain’s postwar colonial development regime. It is little
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wonder, then, that when viewed through the lens of his own liberalism, Cohen saw Britain’s
postwar colonial crisis—characterized by labor strikes and disturbances in Tanganyika, Kenya,
and Uganda and insurgencies in Gold Coast and Kenya—in terms of a reckoning; a settling of
accounts that had been forged, grievance by grievance, over years of conservative and “illinformed” colonial policies.167 Acutely aware of the capacity of these grievances to fuel the fire
of African nationalist sentiment,168 Cohen believed that the necessary corrective was devolution;
a movement, as Apter explains, toward “African freedom and African responsibility.”169 It was
this reality that indicated to Cohen the “great value” of community development, alluded to
above, which both he and Creech Jones held possessed an almost organic capacity to build locallevel initiative and, in so doing, foster self-government.170
When he arrived at Entebbe to assume the governorship of Uganda in 1951, Cohen
brought with him a near gospel-like faith in community development, a temperament which
revealed itself soon after his inaugural tour of the colony. For the findings of this extensive,
district-by-district perambulation—during which the governor met not only with his district
officers, but also with large numbers of Africans—laid bare the reality of postwar colonial rule in
Uganda: neither social welfare nor the devolution of responsibility had kept pace with economic
development in the colony. This disparity troubled the populist, reform-minded Cohen, as he
wrote in a despatch to the CO dated July 22, 1952: “From all that I have so far seen and heard in
this country, I am convinced that a vigorous program of community development is
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needed…urgently.”171 Cohen warned that the growing imbalance between economic and social
development witnessed under the regime of Governor Hall threatened to blunt, if not retard,
progress (and here he cited the protectorate’s recent industrial advances on the Owen Falls
hydroelectric station and the Kilembe copper mine), an upshot which could easily dovetail into
popular disaffection and, in the worst possible scenario, violence.172 The risk posed by the
advent of a yawning and potentially unbridgeable chasm between these developmental priorities
was therefore not insignificant, as testified by Uganda’s disturbances in 1945 and again in 1949,
leading Cohen to reason that “economic projects…must be accompanied by solid and
progressive advance in the Protectorate and local government services in the rural areas; it is
here that the need for a vigorous program of community development is felt.”173
The correspondence suggested by Cohen between local government and community
development was not merely a marriage of ideological convenience. It was altogether more
significant, as he concluded in his despatch: “an organized program of community development
cannot succeed without an efficient system of local government.”174 Here we have a crucial
caveat; for while it recalls the terms of community development as summarized and accepted at
the summer conference of 1948, Cohen’s despatch presents an important emphatic difference
between community development as envisioned by the conference and community development
as realized in Uganda. Whereas the conference recommended the “closest” possible
“association” between community development and local government, Cohen invoked the
relationship in terms that effectively framed their interdependence as vital: you could not have
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one without the other.175 But the nature of colonial governance in Uganda presented Cohen’s
populist agenda with a near-insoluble problem, and it came in the form of the semi-autonomous
Kingdom of Buganda and its ruler, the Kabaka.
Prior to the arrival of the British, the Kabaka (king) of Buganda occupied an autocratic
position and governed his kingdom through the agency of ministers and chiefs, all of whom were
nominated by himself. The Kabaka, his three chief ministers, and senior chiefs sat in the Great
Lukiko (council) and the orders of the Kabaka were communicated from this body to the people
through Enkiko (subordinate assemblies), local bodies devoid any legislative or executive
functions, instead serving as channels of communication between Buganda government officials
and the people.176 The polity, in other words, lacked any tradition of local-level (to say nothing
of democratic) decision-making. This pattern of governance persisted in Buganda long after the
arrival of the British who, in 1900, concluded an agreement with the Kabaka that guaranteed a
large measure of autonomy to the royal regime.177 Although by 1945, the colonial government
could optimistically report that there had been a “considerable extension of popular
representation on the Great Lukiko,” creating the means of channeling unofficial criticism and
constructive thought to the royal government, the Enkiko remained “only advisory.”178 Cohen’s
plans at devolution ran headlong into this political reality when he attempted to impose
constitutional reforms and a framework that made Uganda a unitary state. When weeks-long
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negotiations to transform the autocratic Kabaka into a constitutional monarch broke down,
Cohen responded by deporting the king, a step that galvanized the Buganda, who united in
indignation against the colonial state. Cohen broke the impasse which followed, which lasted
two years, only by bringing the Kabaka back and by making major concessions to Buganda in
the form of more autonomy, rather than less.179

Introducing Community Development in Uganda
It was not Cohen who introduced the rudiments of community development to Uganda;
rather, it was Hall, who, following the promulgation of the CO’s report on Mass Education in
African Society in 1944, set about welding together something like a basic framework for mass
education in the colony. This was, however, to be a rather fraught process; for at the time, the
protectorate government was neither temperamentally nor institutionally disposed to realize mass
education along lines favored by the report, which suggested the “effective co-ordination of
welfare plans and mass education plans so that they form a comprehensive and balanced
whole.”180 To begin with, the protectorate was the site of a series of massive and violent labor
strikes and riots in January 1945. Fundamentally a byproduct of postwar economic conditions in
the colony (the by-now characteristic formula of low wages coupled with commodity shortages
and a steep rise in the cost of living), the riots were initially centered on the quasi-autonomous
Kingdom of Buganda.181 Over the course of about three weeks, however, the disturbances
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spread, erupting in all the main towns of Uganda, including some just outside Kampala, the
Bugandan capital city.182 In the shadow of this pandemonium, which was finally subdued only
after reinforcements arrived from Kenya, Entebbe launched a full-scale inquiry into both the
country’s economy as well as its developmental prospects.183
The results, which indicated that “it was doubtful if a policy of progress would be
possible by example and persuasion,” were discouraging.184 In the absence of inducement by
encouragement, there was only compulsion which, as we have seen in the case of the Machakos
Betterment Scheme in Kenya, risked hampering both current and future development.
Moreover, the report cited several factors as being the principal impediments to progress in
Uganda, including a lack of fundamental information about the country, an outmoded and
wasteful agricultural system, use of the “most inefficient of fuels” for power (wood), and,
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especially, “the low capacity of the African for physical and (less important for the time being)
mental work, coupled with a lack of desire for economic or social advancement.”185 This
patently racialized assessment, in light of the recent unrest, suggested to Government House that
a series of indigenous and perhaps insurmountable brakes existed on the system that would make
a development-based program of reform difficult, if not impossible, to attain.186
Nevertheless, a program did eventually emerge—albeit one that was, to paraphrase Apter,
unimaginative and fitfully executed.187 To a considerable degree, the dithering that characterized
its early implementation was down to Hall himself, who confessed to being uncertain as to what
social welfare was, let alone where and how mass education fit into it all.188 Indeed, it was only
after several postponements and delays—a kaleidoscope of oscillation that elicited frustrated, if
mostly sympathetic, murmurings from the CO—that the governor and his administration finally
began “hastening slowly” to forge something like a combined mass education/social welfare
scheme in the protectorate. To this end, a preliminary outlay of £50,000 in development funds
was made available for the construction of “permanent” and “lavishly equipped” district welfare
centers throughout the colony. Once completed, these constituted the infrastructural backbone of
Uganda’s newly-amalgamated Department of Social Welfare and Public Relations, under whose
purview mass education somewhat controversially fell.189
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Over the course of the next several years, the sluggish pace of mass education in the
colony—and social welfare development, generally190—was matched only by the lack of
enthusiasm which emanated from Hall. The governor was “pessimistic” about the potential of
Ugandans to sustain development projects once the CDW funds allocated for them were
exhausted.191 In point of fact, Hall’s racialized attitude encouraged in the governor not only an
aversion to requesting any social welfare development funds whatsoever from Whitehall but, on
one occasion, the reallocation of nearly £50,000 in social welfare-designated CDW monies to
other projects in the protectorate.192 Moreover, when, in March 1949, he submitted to the CO a
request for CDW funds in accord with the revised Uganda Development Plan of 1948, it
included an annual fixed outlay of only £10,000 for public relations and social welfare
schemes.193 Augmenting the governor’s apprehension was a dubiousness, stimulated to some
extent by the disturbances and subsequent unrest witnessed in Uganda in 1945, that the formal
education of Africans, particularly in a secondary school setting where politics featured as a part
of the curriculum, would achieve little beyond increasing nationalist agitation among Ugandans.
Yet, the governor did show a genuine interest in, and appreciation for, the merits of nonformal (that is, non-academic) education for the illiterate and barely literate to learn proper
agricultural techniques so that they might increase production—although he believed such ends
could be achieved far more simply and cost-effectively through the combined propagandizing
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techniques of mobile cinema units and demonstration teams.194 Indeed, so convinced was Hall
of their educative value that, as of 1949, six amalgamated “propaganda teams,” consisting of
between six and ten members and outfitted with a lorry, camp equipment, a portable stage, a
mobile cinema van (occasionally), models, and posters constituted the “main Mass Education
development in Uganda”—this, despite the creation of the Department of Social Welfare and
Public Relations.195 Although Hall’s faith was not entirely displaced, for such teams had already
shown a noteworthy facility for instruction in Uganda,196 this was hardly tantamount to the
vision of mass education then being propagated by Creech Jones and, in turn, the CO.
The upshot of Hall’s dull conservatism—which one scholar has referred to facetiously as
“reform without politics” and precisely the opposite of what Creech Jones had intended—was a
regime of community development that, by the end of the decade, had very little to show for
itself.197 As the Fabian Colonial Bureau (FCB) pointed out in a series of correspondences
addressed to Creech Jones at the CO on “Some Causes of Discontent in Uganda,” Entebbe had
failed to create the kind of initiative-building framework anticipated by the Secretary of State at
the 1948 summer conference; for Africans had neither become more meaningfully associated
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with the decision-making apparatus of local self-government198 nor witnessed the kind of
devolution of responsibility (fiscal or otherwise) Governor Hall had earlier promised.199 And
since Government House had decided that “the field where the abilities of Africans will find the
best scope is employment in the professional and technical departments of Government,”
Africans seemed also to be excluded from opportunities in the civil administration.200 Thus, in
spite of Creech Jones’ assurances to the contrary, the FCB could not but conclude that “no
responsibility for any of the decisions is given to the people. This is a serious gap which has
alienated opinion in many Colonies.”201 When, in 1949, Uganda was once again the site of labor
unrest and violent disturbances, the Fabians no doubt felt somewhat justified in their bleak
assessment.
Some two years later, the findings of the Wallis Inquiry on African Local Government in
the Uganda Protectorate did much to confirm the Bureau’s appraisal.202 Commissioned by
Cohen soon after his appointment in 1951 and conducted by the noted expert on British local
government, C. A. G. Wallis, who had earlier collaborated with Dr. Hinden on the FCB’s report
on Local Government in the Colonies (1950),203 the investigation found that, notwithstanding the
“encouraging” and “admirable” talk which periodically bubbled up from Entebbe, local
government had, in fact, languished under Hall.204 Indeed, contra Apter, even the formal
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establishment of district councils mandated by the 1949 African Local Government Ordinance
had resulted in no meaningful devolution of authority in the protectorate.205 As Wallis
concluded:
African Local Governments as such have no functions or responsibilities other than those
arising from the Native Administrations (Incorporation) Ordinance, 1938. The councils
equally have no responsibilities, for the bye-laws they make depend on the approval of
the Provincial Commissioner or Governor and the budgets they pass are subject to the
final instructions of the Protectorate Government. … In practice a grave defect has been
found to be the absence of any position function for the minor councils other than their
triennial duty of electing members of the next higher grade of council. … There is doubt
even about the Government’s own intentions.206
Wallis’ report revealed also that Hall’s obduracy had had a serious subsidiary effect on
community development/mass education in the colony.207 For the absence of a responsible
intermediary body (i.e. “local government”) to canalize African ingenuity from village units—as
we have seen, the nucleus of Creech Jones’ all-important initiative-building regime—to district
councils (hitherto the large and cumbersome “local authority,” some of which could meet only
twice a year208), had effectively thwarted a vital stimulant of African “motive power.”209

Cohen’s Joint Community Development and Local Government Regime
These circumstances converged with Cohen’s conviction as to the collective and
corresponding merits of devolution and community development to map a new way forward in
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Uganda: the institution of a comprehensive program that weaved together local government and
community development under the auspices of a central authority fully invested in the “modern
philosophy of colonial administration,” one which advocated the “democratic spirit” fostered by
the marriage of economic development and social advance.210 Guiding the protectorate on this
innovative and progressive trajectory was the newly-created Department of Community
Development,211 the scope of which was extended to embrace training not only in the sphere of
community development, but also in local government as well.212
What followed was the prosecution of a protectorate-wide community development
program, at the head of which was situated nearly a dozen district-level community development
officers. Charged with enlisting “the support and active participation of the people in the process
of economic development and to prepare [them], especially by the training of their leaders, to
adapt themselves to the social changes that…follow in the train of economic development,” the
functions of these officials ran an exhaustive, and at times contradictory, gamut: from
community betterment and self-help schemes undertaken in rural areas, to adult education
activities carried out in association with the protectorate’s Education Department, to social
welfare programs meant to alleviate the “social ills” arising from the very changes the colonial
administration was attempting to realize.213
At first, the “fewness” of these officials “hampered” the department’s work, but in time
each district came to have not only its own officer, but also teams with whom they worked in
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conjunction with county councils (or ssazas, in the case of Buganda), who, in turn, helped
facilitate their activities down to the village level.214 At the nexus of all this work, providing
“maximum collaboration”215 between county councils and both the community development
officers and the district officials, stood the newly-built Local Government and Community
Development Training Center at Nsamizi.216 The principal and lead curriculum designer of this
center was P. E. W. Williams, Kenya’s former Commissioner for Social Welfare, who arrived in
Uganda alongside Cohen to help install and launch the protectorate’s community development
program. Under Williams, the scope and breadth of the training syllabus at Nsamizi mirrored
that which he had developed at Kabete, including special courses for training officers of
cooperative societies, adult education courses, courses on local government, chiefs’ leadership
courses, child welfare, progressive farming techniques, literacy, and so on.217
In a “Visitor’s Handout,” Williams explicated the objectives of the new center, which
included: giving “a fuller understanding of the duties of a good citizen” (covering an eclectic
range of subjects, from water, food, and health, to transport, the postal service, freedom, and
education); the training of “Chiefs and Local Government staffs in their duties while at the same
time increasing their understanding of some of the problems facing us here in Uganda” (based on
the coursework in good citizenship, but considerably enhanced to include “Protectorate and
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Local Government organization, local government,” finance, judicial systems, industrialization,
infrastructure, and cooperatives); training “Community Development Assistants in their duties,
broadening their outlook and instructing them in the use of some of the techniques suitable for
adult education work;” instructing “Government staff, who have acquired their technical
knowledge at their departmental training centres, in the art of how ‘to put over’ that knowledge
to the general public;” training “the wives of some of the above in homecraft;” and giving “a
knowledge to Councillors and leading citizens of Local and Protectorate government
organizations.”218
It was an impressive program, all the more so because the curricular DNA that comprised
the matrix of the center’s syllabus—with its emphasis on community and adult education,
devolution of responsibility, public service, betterment and citizenship schemes—augmented the
initiative-building of community development officers and their assistants to create a body of
work that, at both the level of design and practice, represented a recognizable hereditary link
back to Creech Jones and the work of the 1948 Summer Conference on African Administration.
This program manifested itself rapidly across the protectorate. Thousands of village selfhelp schemes were launched, ranging from bridge and road repair to the construction of schools,
swamp crossings, spring protection, fish ponds, and even clubs.219 In 1957 alone, hundreds of
community development schemes were either underway or had already run their course, an array
of projects that included everything from those aimed at small-scale adult literacy development
(e.g. a £5 funding allocation for books to expand the holdings of Kisoko Men’s Club Library in
Bukedi) to large-scale training facility construction and improvement (e.g. a thousand-pound
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outlay each for workshops in Kyadondo and Buganganzsi), and everything in between (from pest
control to latrine maintenance and sports ground repair to the construction of permanent showgrounds).220 It was an awesome gamut, notable not only for its specificity, but also its
comprehensiveness.
Several comprehensive community development schemes were launched annually, a pair
of significant ones in 1953. In Buganda, a full campaign was opened in Butambala District in
mid-August. Organized by a committee of the county council with the help of the various
departments concerned, including Community Development, Veterinary Services, the
Department of Agriculture, and the Medical Services branch, and begun with a six-day course
attended by some 200 local leaders, the program’s syllabus included demonstrations and lectures
on disease vectors (e.g. dirt), the importance of housing upkeep and the maintenance of water
supplies, child welfare and diet, plant diseases and increasing crop yields, and incorporated
cinema shows on dysentery and cooperative coffee growing in “Chorgoria (sic)” and a play on
“The Good Banana Garden.” When the course ended, the demonstration team launched a
months-long tour of the gombolola (parish) of Mumyuka through early October. Spending five
days in each gombolola parish, the team—consisting of between six and ten members and staff
from the various invested departments—ran through a compressed version of the syllabus: the
first day was devoted to plays and demonstrations, followed by three days of practical work on
latrines, soil conservation, and housing of stock. On the final day, a course for village headmen
was held covering methods and techniques of village and local governance.221 In its 1954
summary of the campaign, the Community Development Department concluded that “real
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progress resulted,” citing specifically the emergence of a number of small “better living
societies” throughout the county, whose members engaged in self-help campaigns to improve
each other’s homes.222
Meanwhile, in Kaberamaido County, Teso District, Eastern Province, an ambitious, yearlong community development project unfolded. Begun in February 1953 with a four-day course
for 60 chiefs aimed at improving housing and animal husbandry in the county, what followed
was a series of month-long demonstrations by teams in each of the county’s seven gombololas.
The teams worked on some “thirty or more houses” which were improved, with the assistance of
“volunteer labor,” to act as “examples for the rest of the area.” The results, the Community
Development Department reported, were promising; for by the end of the year, Kaberamaido had
at least two hundred houses complete with “doors, windows and ventilation together with
kitchens, bath places, chicken houses and hide and skin drying apparatus.” Most encouraging of
all, however, were indications that the team’s work had paid off in terms of initiative-building, a
dividend realized with the continuation of housing improvements long after the team had left the
county. Indeed, so impressive were the results that not only did Cohen visit several of the
improved homes, but film showing the work of the district team then-engaged in the campaign
was shot.223
A few years later, the governor delivered a speech in the LegCo in which he confidently
noted that “these schemes are unspectacular; but, as one who has travelled widely in every part
of the country, I can assure Honourable Members of their very great value.”224 As honest an
assessment as this may have been, at least insofar as Cohen’s expectations were concerned and
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bearing in mind that he was addressing the group of people who, by virtue of their
constitutionally-obliged fiscal responsibility, effectively held the fate of the Department of
Community Development in their hands, it is an inescapable fact that progress had been
painstakingly slow.225
Additionally, and despite Cohen’s optimistic reportage, evidence suggests that something
was not quite right with community development in the protectorate between 1952 and 1956.
We get a hint of this only as early as 1956, when the department noted, at the end of a lengthy
passage in the “Campaigns” section of its annual report on the “considerable amount of
progress” witnessed in Mengo District, Buganda, that villagers in the county of Buwekula were
unenthusiastic about pursuing work related to community development. “When the campaign
ended in March,” it was noted, “most of the tasks had been completed but it was found that while
the majority of the villagers understood and appreciated the measures recommended, very few
were energetic enough to keep up the work unless pressed to do so.”226
This could simply be an anomaly, of course, but for the fact that the same report signaled
a potentially deeper problem. For in the gombolola of Busoga Kapyanga, a rural betterment
campaign was launched using a “new technique”: “Instead of the campaign being initiated from
the top through the various councils the initiative was taken by the people themselves in the
villages. Community development staff first toured the area speaking with the people and
discovering their problems. Then followed a course at the district training center for selected
leaders. When the leaders returned to their villages 54 different groups of people were formed
each with its selected leader, to tackle the various problems….”227
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The trouble here is the indication that, through 1956, community development in Uganda
had depended on a framework of paternalistic compulsion—this, rather than cultivating the kind
of bottom-up, village-level initiative-building enterprise Creech Jones had anticipated. Such an
observation is more than simply a case of pedantism run amok; for it suggests that community
development in the protectorate had failed in what Creech Jones viewed as the “primary task” of
colonial development: the stimulation of “initiative…to encourage people to want change” 228 so
that they might “become the pioneers in building the institutions and works most suitable to their
needs.”229 This failure was confirmed, at least in part, by Entebbe when it published its Review
of Community Development Policy in 1957. Launched in 1956 to “assess what has been
achieved,” the review found not only that some project leaders placed too much emphasis on the
“building up of many projects rather than encouraging the self-help and cooperation that should
result” from them, but also that, in some cases, the community development leader was “far
more enthusiastic for a project than the people it was intended to serve.” The report went on to
stress that community development should “stimulate [the people] to take an active part in
schemes for their own betterment,” and concluded, in a statement rife with implication, that “the
people themselves must play a greater part in initiating and carrying out local schemes.”230
At the same time, the nature of British rule in the Uganda Protectorate acted as a brake on
the community development/local government package in Buganda. The threatened secession of
Buganda from the protectorate in the face of Cohen’s reformist agenda was halted only with the
recall of the Kabaka Mutesa II in 1955. To quell the nationalist furor that had plagued Buganda
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since the king’s deportation in 1953, the British had further to concede more autonomy to the
Kingdom of Buganda under the reinstated Kabaka. Rather the opposite of what Cohen had
intended. Buganda’s new political circumstances had the effect of suppressing the more ardent
democratizing elements embedded within Uganda’s broader community development program.
While community development schemes continued to move forward, the aspects designed to
foster self-governance were modulated, if not jettisoned altogether.231
Nevertheless, the fact remains that Uganda Protectorate possessed one of the most
heavily Fabianized community development regimes in all East Africa. Having proceeded under
the sponsorship of Cohen, a leading Fabian figure who was not only deeply influenced by the
work of ACreech Jones, but who also played a vital role in the process which defined community
development at the 1948 summer conference; equipped with an educational system built literally
from the ground up by Williams, a leading evangelist of Fabianized community development;
and born aloft by the very organizational structure all three men helped forge, the protectorate
presents, in theory at least, an ideal paradigm. That Uganda was no less subject to the
vicissitudes and vagaries of colonial rule than any of Britain’s other territories during the latecolonial period makes the protectorate’s “solid” community development accomplishments all
the more remarkable.232 Indeed, the very breadth and depth of Fabian penetration in the
protectorate presents us with a singular context in which to witness the unfolding of Fabian
influence against a rapidly evolving and enormously complex colonial backdrop. By virtue of
precisely these circumstances, community development in Uganda warrants a great deal of
further study, particularly as it evolved in the final years of colonial rule.
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CONCLUSION

The Inescapable Contradictions of Fabian Designs
The efforts of the Fabians continue to be subject to criticism. As we have seen, numerous
scholars have scorned—to a point, justifiably—the failures of Fabian-influenced postwar
development, both in terms of the sheer cost involved and because the associated projects are at
times viewed as being exploitative, recalling the dreadfulness of Chamberlain’s imperial estates
doctrine. It is also evident that Britain’s efforts to develop her African territories, regardless of
the magnanimous rhetoric which at times surrounded them, were framed in the overtly
paternalistic language and ideology of empire-builders. Indeed, it would seem the one thing
postwar planners, developers, and imperialists could agree on was that Europeans knew what
was best for Africans, be it government by white settler minorities and the degradation and
suppression of the African population which resulted, or by the colonial state and its associated
trustees in whom the responsibility of governance was to be vested until Africans could govern
themselves.1 The principle, as we have seen, which underlay community development.
In part, such considerations informed the Fabian perspective on the question of
immediate colonial independence, a calculus that was not as straightforward as Riley has
suggested. For the Fabians, colonial self-government depended crucially on a series of gradual,
incremental changes—this, rather than the sweeping grant of self-government many desired.
Equally important to the Fabians was that self-government either within or without the
Commonwealth was unthinkable if it meant rule by white European settlers. As a result, the
FCB routinely invoked the need for Labor to foster the conditions they believed would ultimately
“Government in Africa: The Socialist and the Conservative Attitudes,” Empire 10, no. 11 (May
1948): 6-7, BLUO, MSS Brit. Emp. s. 365, FCB 58/2.
1
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lead to independence. As Creech Jones himself opined in a letter to the editor of the Times
following the election of 1951, “It is imperative that Labour should continue its work of
debunking imperialism and assist in creating the conditions of viability and independence in the
dependent territories in the Commonwealth.”2 As far as Creech jones was concerned, such
conditions did not yet exist in all of Britain’s African territories.
It is a testament to the Fabians’ thorny and paradoxical position as socialists rationalizing
the empire that, on the one hand, they were criticized for opposing the independence of colonial
territories while, on the other, they were excoriated for advocating colonial self-government. As
Dr. Hinden wrote in Socialists and the Empire, “There are some very vocal colonials who wish
Britain to evacuate all the Colonies at once—nothing short of immediate and absolute
independence will satisfy them. The Bureau, on the other hand, while favouring the grant of
independence in certain Colonies at once, has regarded others as being unfit for it immediately,
and has considered the immediate task to be to prepare all Colonies for independence at the
earliest possible moment. The Bureau has therefore been very bitterly attacked by some of these
people who have misrepresented its position, even to the extent of suggesting that it is against
independence altogether.”3
That Dr. Hinden could unselfconsciously argue against paternalism in the language of a
paternalist is jarring, but symptomatic of the broader ideological contradictions which underscore
the Fabian position. For their part, the Bureau’s stance on any given colony’s independence
seems to have hinged on what they perceived as the relative maturity of those institutions which
fostered democracy—that is, trade unions, cooperatives, local government, and the like. In
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colonies where these were still-nascent, and thus the basis for democratization weak, the Fabians
seem to have been cool to the notion of self-government. Where they had become entrenched,
the Fabians were more apt to support immediate independence, as had been the case with
Ceylon.4
Nevertheless, the subtle nuance of these distinctions was and is impossible to quantify,
being invariably subject to the vicissitudes of circumstance. As a result, the argument over the
nature of Fabian colonial perspectives and intentions persists. As a result, scholars often
characterize Fabian intentions as being somehow nefarious; less trustworthy and altruistic than
what the Fabian rhetoric would have us believe. To paraphrase Dr. Hinden, it is the “stick” with
which the Fabians can always be chastised.

The “Partial” Fabianization of the British Empire?: The Cold War and the Globalization
of Community Development
In “Reflections on Colonial Affairs,” a speech before the House of Commons on
November 11, 1953, Dr. Hinden, the recently-retired secretary of the FCB, declared that the
“work of the (Bureau) is responsible for a great deal that has been achieved…in the colonies.”
Sometime later, Dr. Hinden reviewed the transcript of her speech and inserted the word “partly”
into the sentence. It now read: “The work of the (Bureau) is partly responsible for a great deal
that has been achieved…in the colonies.”5 This otherwise innocuous adverbial interlineation by
the figure positioned second only to Creech Jones in terms of formulating the Fabians’ colonial
policy recommendations doubtless remains the best possible assessment of the complicated
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legacy of Fabian influence on Britain’s colonial enterprise. Indeed, despite unprecedented
political conditions which witnessed, for the first time, a Labor-dominated Parliament whose
majority membership identified as Fabian, the Fabianization of the British Empire could only
ever be partial. This sense of incompleteness is to a considerable extent the result of the
dynamics that have been outlined in this dissertation.
As we have seen, conditions aligned to forestall what Hodge has referred to as a hopedfor postwar “imperial renaissance.”6 These conditions included intransigence at the level of
colonial administration, which had the effect of blunting in many ways Creech Jones’ efforts at
social betterment evangelization, as well as the sterling crisis, which, in the immediate term,
acted to relegate colonial development that was not designed to achieve dollar-earnings or dollarsavings to a semi-peripheral position in the development discourse. Despite this postwar
colonial development revision, however, Britain’s fiscal position remained parlous and resource
mobilization by way of mechanized agricultural production, no matter how rapid, could not
realistically be expected to offset the looming crisis, with all its attendant political and social
implications both for Britain, specifically, and Europe, generally.7
As a result, the United States, fearful that prevailing economic exigency would render its
wartime European allies vulnerable to the siren-like call of Soviet Communism in the early Cold
War years, launched the Marshall Plan. More suggestion than a statement of policy when first
articulated by the American Secretary of State George Marshall in 1947, the eponymous plan
(formally, the European Recovery Program or ERP) dovetailed with the Truman Doctrine’s antiSoviet containment strategy and was intended to help rebuild the economies of those Western
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European nations devastated by the war.8 Although some $98 million in ERP funds were
eventually directed toward colonial development, mostly through the CDWA,9 it was earmarked
for three purposes only: “providing technical assistance, for the development of strategic
materials, or for financing the dollar equipment required in Government projects of which the
Americans approve.”10 The encumbered magnanimity of the ERP notwithstanding, considerable
practical obstacles remained for British administrators in the colonies, not least of which had to
do with the notion of “technical assistance.” As Dr. Hinden wrote in an article for The New
Statesman, “Each Colonial Office has to hunt for the experts it wants, and they are hard to find.
… The total number of American technicians who have actually gone to the British Colonies
may be counted easily on less than ten fingers.”11 The Point Four Program, announced as part of
Truman’s Inaugural Address in 1949,12 only compounded these concerns. Meant to extend
technical and economic support to developing countries as Marshall Plan aid tapered off, Point
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Four replaced the agency of government institutions with that of “private American capitalist”
firms whose investment and entrepreneurial spirit—lured to the world’s “undeveloped areas” by
“guaranteed” profits underwritten by public funds—would facilitate the “long process of
negotiating agreements, working out country-wide development plans, and setting up effective
organizations and technical staffs for carrying them out.”13 It was these considerations which led
Dr. Hinden to conclude gloomily that “American help, as at present envisaged, is doing
nothing…to meet our real difficulties.” Hers was not a singular perspective, particularly when
framed by the United States’ blatant and well-known anti-colonialism, which was nowhere more
succinctly (and in extraordinarily impolitic terms) expressed than by US Congressman
Emmanuel Celler, who characterized the problems faced by postwar Britain as “too damned
much Socialism at home and too damned much Imperialism abroad.”14
Such sentiment, expressed by a pro-Zionist15 as Britain’s hold over its mandated territory
in Palestine looked increasingly tenuous, reflected the broader US commitment to
decolonization,16 a reality which made the Marshall Planners, “Fourth Pointers,” and Britain’s
imperial policymakers unlikely—and, at times, uncomfortable—bedfellows. As Riley notes,
there was no “natural affinity” between these groups, a complicated reality made all the more so
when seasoned with British distrust over US intentions vis-à-vis imperial sovereignty. At
Westminster, for example, there was palpable bipartisan anxiety surrounding the potential risks
of American meddling in Britain’s postwar colonial affairs: Conservative MPs like Beverley
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Wilcox worried that the US would try to dictate terms of production to meet American needs,
while, on the opposite bench, Labor parliamentarians such as Major Geoffrey Bing expressed
concern that American aims, devoid of any moralizing element, would precipitate the
exploitation of the colonies—a retrogression the Fabians were themselves keen to avoid.17
Meanwhile, the corridors of Whitehall were positively alive with the sound of wringing hands as
bureaucrats in the CO fretted that the Americans’ basic lack of knowledge in colonial matters
would lead to an emphasis on what became known internally as the “major project approach,”
which assessed colonial development chiefly from the perspective of “large-scale, expensive
programs”18—a fear exacerbated by the idea that the Americans intended to create a kind of
catalog of such schemes from which they could “pick and choose” a la carte-style where to
intervene directly in the colonies.19 Worse still, should such a “horrifying” prospect become
reality,20 it would mean an absolute sundering of the “unspectacular” social development
projects that many in the CO considered vital to the long-term development of Britain’s
colonies.21
Although Colonial Office administrators such as A. H. Poynton, Deputy Undersecretary
of State in charge of the Economic Division, and W. A. C. Mathieson, an Assistant Secretary of
State, were deeply suspicions of US aims relative to the empire, and equally concerned over the
prospect of US interference, American observers were nonetheless routinely present at the CO’s
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summer conferences. Given that attendance was by invitation only—and, at that, limited to
“people with experience of Colonial administration or Colonial problems”22—the presence of
American officials at the conferences is certainly suggestive. On one hand, of course, it reflects
the inescapable reality of the postwar world, one in which Whitehall had necessarily to reconcile
itself with the hegemonic influence of US interests both at home and abroad. Yet, on the other
hand, American attendance presented the British with an educative opportunity, a chance to
bridge the knowledge gap between themselves and US officials, who were, in the Fabian view,
“completely uninformed as to the essence” of colonial policy and the “proper role” of colonial
development.23
How effective the conferences were in achieving this is open to debate, since edifying the
half-dozen or so State Department officials who attended them between 1947 and 1949 on the
nuance of colonial rule and development was hardly the remit. What is certain, however, is that,
at first, the Americans were “not favorably impressed” by what they saw and heard. Initially, at
least, the observers seem to have detected “defeatism” among the participants; a vague sense of
resignation surrounding the question of British imperial longevity in the wake of the war. This
pessimism, it appears, made the British “overly sensitive” to international criticism, particularly
when it was intimated that they were pushing local government reforms “too rapidly”—a
development which had, in the view of the American observers, triggered in the colonies a “race
for control of a self-governing state” between the “educated minority” and the “ignorant
majority.” It is possible, however, that the American impressions were themselves overdrawn,
the result, perhaps, of entrenched anti-imperial sentiment; for the next year, US officials rendered
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a decidedly more upbeat assessment of deliberations surrounding mass education and community
development, characterizing them as constructive and enlightened.24
While it seems clear that the observers neither made a substantive contribution to
conference discussions nor tried to influence those of others, US policymakers soon coopted
community development as a principle of their overseas development efforts. For a year after
the 1948 summer conference, which was attended by several bureaucrats from the US
Department of State, President Truman enshrined community development in American foreign
policy as part of his Point Four Program—and in terms Creech Jones, Cohen, Dr. Hinden,
Askwith, and Williams would have found strikingly familiar:
Community Development is a technique for stimulating organized self-help undertakings
through the democratic process. It aims to mobilize the principal resource of most
underdeveloped areas—their manpower and their interest in improving their own lot—
once they have become aware that improvement is possible. 25
Combined ostensibly with an emphasis on fostering political and economic stability
through participation and inclusion, US policymakers adopted a model of community
development that had much in common with that of the British. Soon after, the notion that, pace
Daniel Immerwahr, “villagers could shape their own destiny” through development built “from
the bottom up” became, for a time, an important weapon in the US arsenal in the global fight
against Communism.26 As Lane Holdcroft observes, it is this potent reality, encumbered with all
the attendant complexities of the still-nascent East-West polarity, that more than any other
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informed the character and subsequent globalization of community development in the 1950s.27
Considered within the context of the Cold War, the “political rationale” for community
development was rendered clear: “Essentially, community development was seen by its free
world advocates as the democratic response to totalitarianism. In the ‘Cold War’ era of the
1950’s, American leadership believed that the developing nations in the free world were under a
two pronged [sic] threat from international communism: a) the potential for external military
aggression and, b) the possibility of internal revolution growing out of subversion via communist
agrarian movements.”28
As such, American promotion of community development was reflective of a larger trend
in the West inspired by the Cold War’s inherent dichotomy—one made manifest by the
subsequent “wave” of related research and reports originating with the United States and the
United Nations throughout the 1950s.29 Indeed, pace Holdcroft, this efflorescence in community
development, laden with such virtuous and propaganda-friendly principles as political and
material emancipation was, in reality, a façade masking social and political control—albeit one
based, Olivier Charnoz explains, on “consent and self-involvement.”30
The Cold War-inspired evolution of community development should not, however,
detract from the social betterment rationale which was fundamental to the earlier, Fabianized
version which took root in Kenya and Uganda. Indeed, it is a testament to the resilience and
appeal of this Fabian-favored paradigm that, despite British skepticism surrounding American

Lane Holdcroft, “The Rise and Fall of Community Development, 1950-1965,” (master’s thesis,
Michigan State University, 1976), 3-9.
28
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Analysis of Scales, eds. Olivier Charnoz. Virginia Diaz Pedregal, and Alan L. Kolata (London:
Routledge, 2015), 163-165.
30
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involvement in colonial affairs (understandably heightened by prevailing attitudes in US political
circles vis-à-vis decolonization) and the fact that fiscal circumstances clearly favored largish
dollar-generating development schemes (and, of course, efforts to make something of them did
not go away), the “unspectacular” projects characteristic of the community development regimes
found in Uganda and Kenya remained both popular and vital mechanisms of progress in the
colonies—and, at that, not only to British colonial development policy, but to US foreign policy
as well. Framed and delivered in large part through the agency of the Fabians and their likeminded sympathizers in and out of government following the Second World War, there is
perhaps no more fitting postscript in terms of the Fabianization of the British Empire—partial or
otherwise.

Assessing the Impact of Partial Fabianization: Study Findings and Outcomes
Fabianized community development programs in Kenya and Uganda in the 1950s are an
important link connecting the rhetoric of midcentury Fabianization with its practice, despite the
kind of context-specific limitations that prompted Dr. Hinden’s circumspection. Undertakings
like the Machakos Betterment Scheme and the numerous community development projects in
Uganda discussed above complicate a historiography that for decades has emphasized the highprofile failures of Britain’s postwar colonial development regime to the detriment of smallerscale initiatives. The case studies presented in this dissertation therefore suggest a need for
scholarly revision.
First, the findings of this study indicate that community development led to qualitative
improvements in local level living conditions. From the application of soil conservation
strategies and the use of small-scale mechanization, to the introduction of health, education, and
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welfare initiatives, the lives of many Africans were tangibly altered for the better. Furthermore,
where elements of devolution and responsibility for local governance were present, Fabianized
community development fostered a democratic spirit among indigenous populations. That this
transpired against the backdrop of rapid political and social change suggests the designers of
community development anticipated the inevitability of self-government.
Second, the findings of this study indicate that at the village level, the processes inherent
to development required negotiation between the community targeted for development and the
agents of initiative-building on which the regime largely depended. As much as anyone, the
Fabians understood that the dynamic interaction of consultation with communities and
cooperative decision-making were crucial to the success of development schemes. Time and
again, we witness this dynamic being employed to effect by the community development
regimes in Kenya and Uganda, be it in the form of propaganda campaigns to encourage village
buy-in of soil erosion prevention techniques and the necessity of farm consolidation, or the
promotion of rural homestead improvement schemes through village-wide demonstrations.
Third, the findings also indicate that, despite the high-mindedness of its rhetoric and its
designs, the “inspiration of motive power” on which the Fabian ideal of community development
rested was difficult to achieve when it came cloaked in the mantle of European paternalism, no
matter how well-intentioned. That the FCB could not effectively fathom out how to
comprehensively realize development solutions beyond this framework speaks to their inability
to rationalize development independent of centuries-old European prejudice and signals the
limits of their capacity. Indeed, even Fabianized community development, at root a village-level
enterprise designed to promote development from below, required top-down European
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involvement. It often took colonial officials years to recognize this paradox, as shown by the
evidence from both Kenya and Uganda.
Despite this, it can reasonably be argued that community development was relatively
successful, at least in terms of its positive impact on the lives of many villagers in Britain’s
African territories. While this finding goes some way toward alleviating the obscurantist’s view
of postwar colonial development, which is often rationalized within the unhelpful framework of
the vaunted and controversial colonial development offensive, it comes encumbered with the
caveat: this conclusion hinges on evidence derived chiefly from British sources and, thus, reflect
a primarily European perspective on community development in Uganda and Kenya. Until the
African voice can be isolated and included, which will undoubtedly complicate the narrative, the
conclusion is necessarily tentative. The future study of the Fabianization of the British Empire
lay in this direction.

268

Bibliography

Primary Sources

Archival Sources

Africa
Nairobi University Library (NUL), Kenya
Afr. J. 750.75.c.6w5

Mass Education or Rural Community Development, Kenya Colony

UK
The London School of Economics (LSE), London
Passfield Papers
Passfield/1

Diaries of Beatrice Webb. Typescript.

Fabian Society Archives
Fabian Society/C/36

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1883-1888.

Fabian Society/C/37

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1888-1891.

Fabian Society/C/4

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1891-1893.

Fabian Society/C/5

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1893-1895.

Fabian Society/C/8

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1899-1903.

Fabian Society/C/18

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1933-1937.

Fabian Society/C/19

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1938.

Fabian Society/C/20

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1939-1946.

Fabian Society/C/26

Minutes of the Fabian Society, 1939-1948.

Series L/1

Agenda and Reports of Annual Conferences

Labour Party Archive, Labour History Archive and Study Centre (LP LHASC), Manchester
J. S. Middleton Papers
International

Box 6

International

Box G-L

269

National Archives, Kew, London (NA)
Series CAB 24/187/41

Future Policy in Regard to Eastern Africa

Series CO 323/1102/3

Cooperation in the Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated
Territories

Series CO 417/265

Despatches, South African Republic

Series CO 536/215

Uganda: Original Correspondence

Series CO 536/218

Uganda: Original Correspondence

Series CO 822/656

Reports of the Department of Community Development, Uganda

Series CO 822/1142

Community Development in Uganda: Establishment of Training
Centre

Series CO 847/38/7

African Conference, 1948

Series CO 852/941/3

Despatch No. 86, Secretary of State to all the Colonies, November
10, 1948

Series CO 1071/403

Uganda: Colonial Reports

Bodleian Libraries, University of Oxford (BLUO)
Mss. Afr. s. 1843

Papers of P. E. W. Williams

Mss. Afr. s. 2166

Papers of T. G. Askwith

Mss. Afr. s. 2234

Papers of T. G. Askwith

Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 332

Papers of Arthur Creech Jones

Mss. Brit. Emp. s. 365

Papers of the Fabian Colonial Bureau

BLUO 600.17 r. 147

Colonial Office Summer School on African Administration, 1947

BLUO 600.17 r. 147 (2)

Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration,
1948

BLUO 600.17 r. 147 (4)

Colonial Office Summer Conference on African Administration,
1951

University College London, Institute of Education (UCL IOE)
Uganda Protectorate

Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for
the Year Ended December 31, 1953.

270

Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for
the Year Ended December 31, 1955.
Annual Report of the Department of Community Development for
the Year Ended December 31, 1956.

US
Harry S. Truman Library and Museum, Independence, Missouri (HSTLM)
David D. Lloyd Files, 1951-1953
The Point Four Program

Point IV Conference (ca. April 1952)

Official Publications

UK Government
Colonial Office, Colonial Reports and Memoranda
African Education: A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.
Education for Citizenship in Africa. Colonial No. 216. London: HMSO, 1948.
Mass Education in African Society: Report of the Adult and Mass Education Subcommittee of
the ACEC. Colonial No. 186. London: H.M.S.O., 1943.
Memorandum on the Education of African Communities. Colonial No. 103. London: HMSO,
1935.
The Model Cooperative Societies Ordinance. Colonial No. 199. London: HMSO, 1946.
Proceedings of a Conference Between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and the Premiers of
the Self-Governing Colonies. London: HMSO, 1897.
Records of the Colonial Office, Dominions Office, Commonwealth Relations Office, and
Commonwealth Office, Vol. I. London: HMSO, 1989.

Sessional Papers
Education Policy in British Tropical Africa: Memorandum Submitted to the Secretary of the
State for the Colonies by the Advisory Committee on Native Education in the British
Tropical African Dependencies. Cmnd. 2374. London: HMSO, 1925.

271

Further Correspondence Relating to Proposed Political Reforms in the South African Republic.
Cmnd. 9518. London: HMSO, 1899.
Indians in Kenya. Cmnd. 1922. July 1923.
Parliamentary Papers, House of Commons and Command, Vol. 17. Reports from Committees:
Nine Volumes: Volume 8. February 11, 1890-August 18, 1890. London: HMSO, 1890.
Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in British East and Central
Africa. Cmnd. 3234. London: HMSO, 1929.
Report on the Gambia Egg Scheme. Cmnd. 8560. London: HMSO, 1952.
Second Report from the Select Committee on British South Africa; with the Proceedings of the
Committee. London: HMSO, 1897.

Parliamentary Debates
Arnold, (Lord) Sydney. Speech to the House of Lords, July 22, 1929. Parliamentary Debates,
Lords, 5th ser., vol. 115 (1909-), cols. 988-989.
Bledisloe, Viscount. Speech to the House of Lords, March 20, 1940. Parliamentary Debates,
Lords, 5th ser., vol. 107 (1909-), col. 830-831.
Broadhurst, Henry. Speech to the House of Commons, April 27, 1885. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 3rd ser., vol. 297, col. 820.
Creech Jones, Arthur. Speech to the House of Commons, November 13, 1940. Parliamentary
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 361 (1909-1980), cols. 55.
----. Speech to the House of Commons, July 12, 1944. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th
ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 1744-1745.
----. Speech to the House of Commons, January 22, 1947. Parliamentary Debates, Commons,
5th ser., vol. 432 (1909-1980), col. 206.
Dugdale, John. Speech to the House of Commons, June 21, 1944. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 180-181.
Grigg, Edward. Speech to the House of Commons, July 25, 1935. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 204, col. 2069.
Hall, George. Speech to the House of Commons, November 13, 1940. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 365 (1909-1980), cols. 1709-1710.

272

Hurd, Anthony. Speech to the House of Commons, March 13, 1951. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 485 (1909-1980), cols. 1328-1329.
Lennox-Boyd, Alan. Speech to the House of Commons, March 13, 1951. Parliamentary
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 405 (1909-1980), cols. 1318-1319.
Marley, James. Speech to the House of Commons, December 11, 1929. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 233 (1909-1980), cols. 581-582.
MacDonald, Malcolm. Speech to the House of Commons, May 21, 1940. Parliamentary
Debates, Commons, 5th ser., vol. 361 (1909-1980), col. 45.
Olivier, (Lord) Sydney. Speech to the House of Lords, December 7, 1927. Parliamentary
Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol. 69 (1909-), cols. 551-600.
----. Speech to the House of Lords, March 13, 1929. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser., vol.
73 (1909-), col. 480-481.
----. Speech to the House of Lords, February 23, 1938. Parliamentary Debates, Lords, 5th ser.,
vol. 107 (1909-), col. 830-831.
Stanley, Oliver. Speech to the House of Commons, June 21, 1944. Parliamentary Debates,
Commons, 5th ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), col. 180-181.
----. Speech to the House of Commons, July 12, 1944. Parliamentary Debates, Commons, 5th
ser., vol. 401 (1909-1980), cols. 1744-1745.
Winster, Lord. Speech to the House of Lords, August 1, 1944. Parliamentary Debates, Lords,
5th ser., vol. 133 (1909-), col. 26-28.

Colony and Protectorate of Kenya
LegCo, Gazette
Legislative Council Debates. Third Session, vol. 22.
Official Gazette of the Colony and Protectorate of Kenya 47 (14 November 1944).
Report on an Investigation of Cooperative Possibilities in Kenya. Nairobi: Government Printer,
1945.
Kenya Education Department Annual Report, 1955. Nairobi: Government Printer, 1955.

273

Uganda Protectorate
Cohen, (Sir) Andrew B. Report on Uganda. Speech by His Excellency the Governor to the
Legislative Council, November 19, 1954. Entebbe: Government Printer, 1954.

US Government
Executive Department Reports
U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. The Formulation of British Colonial
Education Policy, 1929-1961: Final Report. Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Research,
1969.

Organizations

The British Labour Party
The Colonial Empire. London: The Labour Party, 1933.
For Socialism and Peace: The Labour Party’s Programme of Action. London: The Labour
Party, 1934.
Labour and the Nation. London: The Labour Party, 1927.
Labour’s Immediate Programme. London: Labour Publications Department, 1937.
Report of the Annual Conference of the Labour Party. London: The Labour Party, 1930.

The Fabian Society
The Fabian Society: What it has Done and How it has Done it. London: The Fabian Society,
1892.
A Plan of Campaign for Labour. London: The Fabian Society, 1894.
Why Are the Many Poor? London: The Fabian Society, 1884.
59th Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1942 (Draft). London: The Fabian Society,
1942.
60th Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1943 (Draft). London: The Fabian Society,
1943.
62nd Annual Report for the year ending March 31, 1945 (Draft). London: The Fabian Society,
1945.

274

The Fabian Colonial Bureau
Cooperation in the Colonies: A Report from a Special Committee to the Fabian Colonial
Bureau. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1945.
Hinden, Rita. Socialists and the Empire. London: Fabian Publications Ltd., 1946.

Independent Labour Party.
Report of the Eighth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour Party. London: ILP Office,
1900.
Report of the Ninth Annual Conference of the Independent Labour Party. London: Independent
Labour Party, 1901.

Overseas Development Institute
Tiffen, Mary, ed. Environmental Change and Dryland Management in Machakos District,
Kenya, 1930-90. London: Overseas Development Institute, 1992.

Social Democratic Federation.
Report of the Twentieth Annual Conference of the Social Democratic Federation. London: The
Twentieth Century Press, n.d.

Books
Barnes, John and David Nicholson, eds. The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I: 1886-1929.
London: Hutchinson, 1980.
Chamberlain, Joseph. Foreign and Colonial Speeches. London: George Routledge & Sons
Ltd., 1897.
James, Robert Rhodes, ed. Winston S. Churchill: His Complete Speeches, 1897-1963: Volume
VII, 1943-1949. New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1974.
MacKenzie, Norman, ed. The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume I: Apprenticeships,
1873-1892. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978.
----. The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume II: Partnership, 1892-1912. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978.

275

----. The Letters of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, Volume III: Pilgrimage, 1912-1947. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978.
MacKenzie, Norman and Jeanne, eds. The Diary of Beatrice Webb, Volume Three: 1905-1924.
Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1984.
Webb, Beatrice. Our Partnership. Edited by Barbara Drake and Margaret I. Cole. London:
Longmans, Green & Co., 1948
Woolf, Leonard. Downhill All the Way: An Autobiography of the Years 1919 to 1939. San
Diego: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1967.

Secondary Sources

Books
Addison, Paul. The Road to 1945: British Politics in the Second World War. London: Pimlico,
1994.
Adelman, Paul. The Rise of the Labour Party, 1880-1945. New York: Routledge, 2014.
Alexander, Sally. Women’s Fabian Tracts. Abingdon: Routledge, 1988.
Apter, David E. The Political Kingdom in Uganda: A Study in Bureaucratic Nationalism.
London: Routledge, 1967.
Anderson, David. Histories of the Hanged: A Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire. New
York: W. W. Norton & Co. Inc., 2005.
Anschutz, R. The Philosophy of J. S. Mill (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1953.
Askwith, T.G. Kenya’s Progress. Nairobi: The Eagle Press, on Behalf of the East African
Literature Bureau, 1958.
----. From Mau Mau to Harambee: Memoirs and Memoranda of Colonial Kenya. Edited by
Joanna Lewis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
Attlee, Clement. As It Happened. London: Heinemann, 1954.
Adyanga, Omek C. Modes of British Imperial Control of Africa: A Case Study of Uganda, c.
1890-1990. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2011.
Baker, Bill. The SDF and the Boer War. London: The Communist Party of Great Britain, 1975.
Barker, Ernest. Political Thought in England from Herbert Spencer to the Present Day.
London: Williams and Norgate, 1915.

276

Basdeo, S. Labour Organisation and Labour Reform in Trinidad 1919-1939. St. Augustine:
University of the West Indies, n.d.
Baylies, Carolyn. History of the Yorkshire Miners, 1881-1918. London: Routledge, 1993.
Bernard Shaw, George. Fabianism and the Empire: A Manifesto by the Fabian Society.
London: Grant Richards, 1900.
----. Fabianism and the Fiscal Question: An Alternative Policy by the Fabian Society. London:
The Fabian Society, 1904.
----. The Fabian Society: Its Early History. London: The Fabian Society, 1906.
----. A Manifesto. London: Geo. Standring & Co., 1884.
----. The True Radical Programme. London: The Fabian Society, 1887.
----. What Socialism Is. London: The Fabian Society, 1890.
Bevir, Mark. The Making of British Socialism. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011.
Bolland, O. Nigel. On the March: Labour Rebellions in the British Caribbean, 1934-1939.
Kingston: Ian Randle, 1995.
Bowie, Norman and Robert L. Simon, eds. He Individual and the Political Order: An
Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc.,
1998.
Brady, R. Crisis in Britain. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950.
Brailsford, H. N. The Lifework of J. A. Hobson (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1948.
Britain, Ian. Fabianism and Culture: A study in British Socialism and the Arts c. 1884-1918.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Bruno, John Favato. Rosimini’s Contribution to Ethical Philosophy. New York: The Science
Press, 1916.
Bush, Barbara. Imperialism, Race and Resistance: Africa and Britain, 1919-1945. New York:
Routledge, 2002.
Busky, Donald F. Democratic Socialism: A Global Survey. Westport: Praeger Publishers,
2000.
Butler, L. J. Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial World. London: I. B. Tauris &
Co. Ltd., 2002.
----. Industrialization and the British Colonial State: West Africa, 1939-1951. London:
Routledge, 1997.

277

Cain, Peter J. and Anthony G. Hopkins, British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion 16881914. New York: Longman Group, 1933.
Callaghan, John. The Labour Party and Foreign Policy: A History. Abingdon: Routledge,
2007.
Carr, Wilfred. Education and the Struggle for Democracy (Buckingham: Open University
Press, 2002.
Carter, Matt. T. H. Green and the Development of Ethical Socialism. Exeter: Imprint
Academic, 2003.
Chambers, Robert. Settlement Schemes in Tropical Africa: A Study of Organizations and
Development. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969.
Champion, H. H. The Great Dock Strike of August 1889. London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1890.
Claeys, Gordon. Imperial Sceptics: British Critics of Empire, 1850-1920. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010.
Clarke, Peter. Liberal & Social Democrats (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.
Clayton, Anthony and Donald C. Savage. Government and Labour in Kenya, 1895-1963.
Abingdon: Frank Cass and Company Ltd., 1974.
Clough, Marshall S. Mau Mau Memoirs: History, Memory, and Politics. Boulder: Lynne
Rienner Publishers, 1998.
Cohen, (Sir) Andrew B. British Policy in Changing Africa. Evanston: Northwestern University,
1959.
Cole, Margaret. The Story of Fabian Socialism. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961.
----. The Webbs and Their Work. London: Frederick Muller, 1949.
Comte, A., trans. A General View of Positivism. Aberdeen: A. King & Co., 1865.
Constantine, Stephen. The Making of British Colonial Development Policy, 1914-1940.
London: Frank Cass and Co. Ltd., 1984.
Cole, G. D. H. The War on the Homefront. London: The Fabian Society, 1939.
Cooper, Frederick. Africa Since 1940: The Past of the Present. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2002.
----. Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996.

278

Cooper, Frederick and Randall Packard, eds. International Development and the Social
Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1997.
Corthorn, Paul. In the Shadow of Dictators: The British Left in the 1930s. London: Tauris
Academic Studies, 2006.
Cowen, Michael and Robert Shenton. Doctrines of Development. London: Routledge, 1996.
Cox, Michael and R. A. Gilbert. The Oxford Book of Victorian Ghost Stories. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003.
Cronin, James E. The Politics of State Expansion: War, State, and Society in Twentieth Century
Britain. London: Routledge, 1991.
Davidson, J. Morrison. The Annals of Toil: Being Labour History—outlines, Roman and
British. London: W. Reeves, 1899.
De Haan, Arjan. How the Aid Industry Works: An Introduction to International Development.
Sterling: Kumarian Press, 2009.
De Wilde, John C. Experiences with Agricultural Development in Tropical Africa, Volume II:
The Case Studies. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967.
Dilley, M. R. British Policy in Kenya Colony. London: Frank Cass & Co. Ltd., 1937.
Driver, Stephen. Understanding British Party Politics. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.
Du Maurier, Daphne. Jamaica Inn. Essex: Pearson Education Ltd., 2008.
Duignan, Peter and L. H. Gann. The United States and Africa: A History. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
Durbin, Elizabeth. New Jerusalems: The Labour Party and the Economics of Democratic
Socialism. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985.
Engels, Friedrich. The Condition of the Working Class in England in 1844. London: Swan
Sonnenschein & Co., 1892.
Ensor, Robert. England, 1870-1914. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Foldy, Michael S. The Trials of Oscar Wilde: Deviance, Morality, and Late-Victorian Society.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 197.
Foote, Gregory. The Labour Party’s Political Thought: A History. Basingstoke: MacMillan
Press Ltd., 1997.

279

Freeden, Michael. Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1996.
----. The New Liberalism: An Ideology of Social Reform. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 2011.
Friedmann, John. Empowerment: The Politics of Alternative Development. Malden: Blackwell
Publishers, 1992.
Gandhi, Leela. Affective Communities: Anticolonial Thought, Fin-de-Siècle Radicalism and the
Politics of Friendship. Durham: Duke University Press, 2006.
Gann, Lewis and Peter Duignan. Burden of Empire: An Appraisal of Western Colonialism in
Africa South of the Sahara. New York: Frederick A. Praeger Inc., 1967.
Goldman, Lawrence. The Life of RH Tawney: Socialism and History. London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 2014.
Goldsworthy, David. Colonial Issues in British Politics, 1945-1961: From “Colonial
Development” to “Wind of Change.” Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
Goodland, Graham. British Foreign and Imperial Policy, 1865-1919. London: Routledge,
2000.
Greenlee, James G. and Charles M. Johnston. Good Citizens: British Missionaries and Imperial
States, 1870-1918. Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1999.
Gregory, Robert G. Sidney Webb and East Africa: Labour’s Experiment with the Doctrine of
Native Paramountcy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.
Grey, (Viscount) Edward. Twenty-Five Years. New York: Frederick A. Stokes Company, 1925.
Gupta, Partha Sarathi. Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-1964. New York:
Holmes and Meier Publishers, 1975.
Hailey Lord (Malcolm). An African Survey. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1938.
Halevy, Elie. Imperialism and the Rise of Labour, 1895-1905. New York: Barnes & Noble
Inc., 1961.
Hamer, D. H. Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone and Rosebery: A Study in Leadership
and Policy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972.
Hargreaves, John D. The End of Colonial Rule in West Africa: Essays in Contemporary
History. London: Palgrave MacMillan, 1979.
Havinden, Michael and David Meredith. Colonialism and Development: Britain and its
Tropical Colonies, 1850-1960. London: Routledge, 1993.

280

Haworth, Alan and Diane Hayter. Men Who Made Labor. New York: Routledge, 2006.
Hettne, Bjorn. Development Theory and the Three Worlds. Essex: Longman House, 1990.
----. Thinking About Development: Development Matters. London: Zed Books, 2009.
Hewitt, Martin, ed. The Victorian World. Abingdon: Routledge, 2012.
Hicks, Ursula. Development from Below: Local Government and Finanace in Developing
Countries of the Commonwealth. Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1961.
Hill, Martin J. D. The Harambee Movement in Kenya: Self-Help, Development and Education
among the Kamba of Kitui District. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 1991.
Hinden, Rita, ed. Local Government and the Colonies: A Report to the Fabian Colonial
Bureau. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1950.
Hinds, Allistair. Britain’s Sterling Colonial Policy and Decolonization, 1939-1958. Westport:
Greenwood Press, 2001.
Hodge, Joseph M. Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development and the Legacies
of British Colonialism. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2007.
Hollander, Neil. Elusive Dove: The Search for Peace During World War I. Jefferson:
McFarland Books, 2014.
Howe, Stephen. Anticolonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire, 19181964. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
Howell, David. The Lost Left: Three Studies in Socialism and Nationalism. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1986.
Hubbard, James P. The United States and the End of British Colonial Rule in Africa, 1941-1968.
Jefferson: McFarland & Company Inc., 2011.
Hunt, Michael H. Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009.
Hyam, Ronald. Elgin and Churchill at the Colonial Office, 1905-1908: The Watershed of the
Empire-Commonwealth. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1968.
----, ed. The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945-1954: Pt. I: High Policy and
Administration. London: HMSO, 1992.
Immerwahr, Daniel. Thinking Small: The United States and the Lure of Community
Development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2015.
Jackson, IC. Advance in Africa: A Study in Community Development in Eastern Nigeria.
London: Oxford University Press, 1956.

281

Jackson, Patrick. Harcourt & Sons: A Political Biography of Sir William Harcourt, 1827-1904.
Madison: Farleigh-Dickinson University Press, 2010.
James, Robert Rhodes. Rosebery. London: Phoenix, 1963.
Kinzer, Bruce L. J. S. Mill Revisited: Biographical and Political Explorations. Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
Knight, William Angus, ed. Memorials of Thomas Davidson, the Wandering Scholar. London:
Ginn and Company Publishers, 1907.
Laurence, Dan H., ed. Bernard Shaw Collected Letters, 1898-1910. New York: Dodd, Mead &
Company, 1972.
Laybourn, Keith. Fifty Key Figures in Twentieth Century British Politics. London: Routledge,
2002.
Lee, Francis. Fabianism and Colonialism: The Life and Political Thought of Lord Sydney
Olivier. London: Defiant Books, 1988.
Lee, J. M. Colonial Development and Good Government: A Study in the Ideas Expressed by the
British Official Classes in Planning Decolonization 1939-1964. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1967.
Lee, J. M. and M. Petter. The Colonial Office, War and Development Policy: Organisation and
the Planning of Metropolitan Initiative, 1939-1945. London: Maurice Temple Smith
Ltd., 1982.
Lewis, Joanna. Empire State-Building: War & Welfare in Kenya, 1925-1952. Oxford: James
Currey, 2000.
Lineham, Thomas. Modernism and British Socialism. Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2012.
Louis, William Roger. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab Nationalism,
The United States, and Postwar Imperialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.
MacKenzie, Norman and Jeanne. The Fabians: The extraordinary story of that famous circle of
enthusiasts, reformers, & brilliant eccentrics—Shaw, the Webbs, Wells—whose ideas and
unconventional attitudes fashioned out modern world. New York: Simon and Schuster,
1977.
Mair, L. P. Welfare in the British Colonies. London: The Royal Institute of Royal Affairs,
1944.
Mann, Thomas. Tom Mann’s Memoirs. London: The Labour Publishing Company Ltd., 1932.

282

Matthijs, Matthias. Ideas and Economic Crises in Britain from Attlee to Blair (1945-2005).
London: Routledge, 2011.
Maxon, Robert. Conflict and Accommodation in Western Kenya: The Gusii and the British,
1907-1963 (Teaneck: Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 1989.
Mayhew, Arthur. Education in the Colonial Empire. London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1938.
McBriar, A. M. Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884-1918. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1966.
McCormick, Thomas J. America’s Half-Century: United States Foreign Policy in the Cold War
and After. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1995.
McHenry, Dean M. The Labour Party in Transition, 1931-1938. London: G. Routledge and
Sons Ltd., 1938.
McKinstry, Leo. Rosebery: Statesman in Turmoil. London: John Murray Publishers Ltd.,
2005.
Meredith, Martin. Diamonds, Gold, and War. New York: Public Affairs, 2008.
Michalos, Alex C. and Deborah C. Poff, eds. Bernard Shaw and the Webbs. Toronto:
University of Toronto Press, 2002.
Mill, John Stuart. Essays on Ethic, Religion, and Society. Edited by J. M. Robson. London:
Kegan Paul, 1985.
Milnes, Robert C. Rosebery, Volume II. London: Harper & Brothers, 1931.
Minkin, Lewis. The Labour Party Conference: A Study in the Politics of Intra-Party
Democracy. London: Allen Lane, 1978.
Moffett, John. “Bridging the Gap.” In Glimpses of Empire: A Corona Anthology. Edited by
Anthony Kirk-Greene. London: I. B. Tauris, 2001.
Morgan, A. J. Ramsay MacDonald. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1987.
Morgan, K. O. Labour in Power, 1945-1951. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984.
Mosley, Paul and Barbara Ingham. Sir Arthur Lewis: A Biography. Basingstoke: Palgrave
MacMillan, 2013.
Mukherjee, Ramkirshna. Uganda: An Historical Accident? Class, Nation, State Formation.
Trenton: Africa World Press, 1985.
Murphy, Philip. Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British
Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951-1964. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999.

283

Nettleship, R. L., ed. The Works of Thomas Hill Green: Philosophical Works. London:
Longmans, Green, and Co., 1888.
Noble, Virginia A. Inside the Welfare State: Foundations of Policy and Practice in Post-War
Britain. Abingdon: Routledge, 2009.
Norgaard, Richard. Development Betrayed: The End of Progress and a Coevolutionary
Revisioning of the Future. New York: Routledge, 1994.
Nwauwa, Apollos. Imperialism, Academe, and Nationalism: Britain and University Education
for Africans, 1860-1960. London: Frank Cass, 1997.
O’Hara, Glenn. Governing Post-War Britain: The Paradoxes of Progress, 1951-1973. London:
Palgrave-MacMillan, 2012.
Oldfield, Sybil, ed. Afterwords: Letters on the Death of Virginia Woolf. New Brunswick:
Rutgers University Press, 2005.
Olivier, Sydney. Imperial Trusteeship. London: The Fabian Society, 1929.
----. White Capital and Coloured Labour. London: Hogarth Press, 1929.
Oppenheim, Janet. The Other World: Spiritualism and Psychical Research in England, 18501914. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
Osborne, Myles. Ethnicity and Empire in Kenya: Loyalty and Martial Race Among the Kamba,
c. 1800 to the Present. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014.
Owen, Robert. The Book of the New Moral World, Explanatory of Elements of the Science of
Society, or of the Social State of Man. London: J. Watson, 1842-44.
Pakenham, Thomas. The Boer War. New York: Random House, 1979.
Parker, Jason C. Brother’s Keeper: The United States, Race, and Empire in the British
Caribbean, 1937-1962. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008.
Parker, Robert J. and Eldon M. Alexander. A History of Organized Labour in the EnglishSpeaking West Indies. London: Praeger, 2004.
Pearce, R D. The Turning Point in Africa: British Colonial Policy 1938-1948. London: Frank
Cass, 1982.
Pearce, Robert D. and Roger Stearn. Government and Reform: Britain, 1815-1918. London:
Hodder & Staunton, 2000.
Pease, Edward. The History of the Fabian Society. New York: E. P. Dutton & Company
Publishers, 1916.

284

Pelling, Henry. The Origins of the British Labour Party, 1880-1900. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1965.
Pickering, Mary. Auguste Comte: An Intellectual Biography, Vol. I. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1993.
Pierson, Stanley. British Socialists: The Journey from Fantasy to Politics. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1979.
----. Hugh Dalton: A Life. London: Jonathan Cape, 1985.
----. Labour and the Left. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Porter, Bernard. The Lion’s Share: A History of British Imperialism, 1850-2011. New York:
Pearson Education Limited, 1975.
Powell, Frederick W. The Politics of Civil Society: Neoliberalism or Social Left? Bristol:
Policy Press, 2007.
Preston, Peter W. Development Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd.,
1997.
Pugh, Martin. Speak for Britain! A New History of the Labour Party. London: Vintage Books,
2011.
Pugh, Paula. Educate, Agitate, Organize: 100 Years of Fabian Socialism. London: Methuen,
1984.
Qualter, Terence. Graham Wallas and the Great Society. London: The MacMillan Press Ltd.,
1980.
Radice, Lisanne. Beatrice and Sidney Webb, Fabian Socialists. New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1984.
Rhodes, Rita. Empire and Cooperation: How the British Empire Used Cooperatives in its
Development Strategies, 1900-1970. Edinburgh: John Donald, 2012.
Riley, Charlotte Lydia. “‘The Winds of Change are Blowing Economically’: The Labour Party
and British Overseas Development, 1940s-1960s.” In Britain, France and the
Decolonization of Africa: Future Imperfect? Edited by Andrew M. W. Smith and Chris
Jeppesen. London: University College Press, 2017: 43-61.
Ritschel, Daniel. The Politics of Planning: The Debate on Economic Planning in Britain in the
1930s. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997.
Rima, Ingrid. Development of Economic Analysis. Oxon: Routledge, 2009.

285

Rossinow, Doug. Visions of Progress: The Left-Liberal Tradition in America. Philadelphia:
The University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008.
Rostow, W. W. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1960.
Rotberg, R. I. Black Heart: Gore-Browne and the Politics of Multi-Racial Zambia. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1978.
Sachs, Wolfgang. The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge and Power. London:
Zed Books, 1992.
Scally, Robert J. The Origins of the Lloyd George Coalition: The Politics of SocialImperialism, 1900-1918. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975.
Scanlon, David G. Education in Uganda. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office,
1965.
Schneer, Jonathan. Ben Tillett: Portrait of a Labour Leader. Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1982.
Schuknecht, Rohland. British Colonial Development Policy after the Second World War. New
Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2010.
Schwarz, Bill. The White Man’s World. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011.
Shaffer, Jack. Historical Dictionary of the Cooperative Movement. Lanham: The Scarecrow
Press Ltd., 1999.
Shepherd, John and Keith Laybourn. Britain’s First Labour Government. Basingstoke:
Palgrave MacMillan, 2006.
Shilaro, Priscilla M. A Failed Eldorado: Colonial Capitalism, Rural Industrialization, African
Land Rights in Kenya, and the Kakamega Gold Rush, 1930-1952. Lanham: University
Press of America, 2008.
Searle, G. R. The Quest for National Efficiency: A Study in British Politics and British Political
Thought, 1899-1914. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1971.
Semmel, Bernard. Imperialism and Social Reform: English Social-Imperial Thought, 18951914. Garden City: Anchor Books Doubleday & Co. Inc., 1968.
Smith, Iain R. The Origins of the South African War 1899-1902. London: Longman Pearson,
1996.

286

Spruyt, Hendrik. Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press, 2005.
Ssekamwa, J. C. History and Development of Education in Uganda. Kampala: Fountain
Publishers, 1997.
Steevens, G. W. With Kitchener to Khartoum. New York: Dodd, Mead and Co., 1898.
Sutton, Alex. The Political Economy of Imperial Relations: Britain, the Sterling Area, and
Malaya, 1945-1960. New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2015.
Tawney, RH The Webbs in Perspective. London: Athlone Press, 1953.
Taylor, R. Lord Salisbury. London: Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1975.
Taylor, R. and T. Steele. British Labour and Higher Education, 1945-2000: Ideologies,
Policies, and Practice. London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2011.
Thompson, Noel. Political Economy and the Labour Party: The Economics of Democratic
Socialism, 1884-2005. London: Routledge, 1996.
Thorpe, Andrew. A History of the Labour Party. Houndmills: Palgrave MacMillan, 1997.
Tillett, Ben. A Brief History of the Docker’s Union. London: n.d.
Tilley, Helen. Africa as a Living Laboratory: Empire, Development, and the Problem of
Scientific Knowledge. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2011.
Tsuzuki, Chushichi. H. M. Hyndman and British Socialism. London: Lawrence and Wishart,
1955.
Tudor, Henry and J. M. Tudor. Marxism and Social Democracy: The Revisionist Debate, 18961898. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.
Tully, John. Silvertown: The Lost Story of a Strike that Shook London and Helped Launch the
Modern Labor Movement. New York: Monthly Review Press, 2012.
Van Beusekom, Monica M. Negotiating Development: African Farmers and Colonial Experts
at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960. Portsmouth: Heinemann Publishing, 2001.
Vickers, Rhiannon. The Labour Party and the World, Volume I: Evolution of Labour’s Foreign
Policy, 1900-51. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003.
Webb, Sidney. Labour on the Threshold. London: The Fabian Society, 1923.
----. Towards Social Democracy? A Study in Social Evolution During the Past Three-Quarters
of a Century. London: The Fabian Society, 1916.

287

----. Twentieth Century Politics: A Policy of National Efficiency. London: The Fabian Society,
1901.
Webb, Sidney and Beatrice. The History of Trade Unionism, 1666-1920. London: Printed by
the Authors for the Trade Unionists of the United Kingdom, 1929.
----. Industrial Democracy. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1902.
Weiss, Samuel A., ed. Bernard Shaw’s Letters to Siegfried Trebitsch. Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 1986.
Welsh, Frank. South Africa: A Narrative History. New York: Kodansha International, 1999.
Whitehead, Clive. Colonial Educators: The British Indian and Colonial Education Service
1858-1983. London: I. B. Tauris, 2003.
Williamson, Philip. National Crisis and National Government: British Politics, the Economy,
and Empire, 1926-1932. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
Winter, J. M. Socialism and the Challenge of War: Ideas and Politics in Britain, 1912-18.
London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.
Wolfe, Willard. From Radicalism to Socialism: Men and Ideas in the Formation of Fabian
Socialist Doctrines, 1881-1889. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975.
Woolf, Leonard. Economic Imperialism. London: The Swarthmore Press Ltd., 1920.
----. Empire and Commerce in Africa: A Study in Economic Imperialism. London: George
Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1920.
Worley, Matthew. Labour Inside the gate: A History of the British Labour Party Between the
Wars. London: I. B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2005.
Yansane, Anguibou Yan. Development Strategies in Africa: Current Economic, Socio-political,
and Institutional Trends and Issues. Westport: Greenwood Press, 1996.
Young, Crawford, et al. Cooperatives and Development: Agricultural politics in Ghana and
Uganda. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1982.

Articles and Book Chapters
Atieno-Odhiambo, E. A. “The Formative Years, 1945-55.” In Decolonization and
Independence in Kenya, 1940-93. Edited by B. A. Ogot and W. R. Ochieng’. London:
James Currey Ltd., 1995.

288

Ball, Stephen. “Imperialism, Social Control and the Colonial Curriculum.” Journal of
Curriculum Studies 15, no. 3 (1983): 237-263.
Bevir, Mark. “Fabianism, Permeation and Independent Labour.” The Historical Journal 39, no.
1 (March 1996): 179-196.
----. “Sidney Webb: Utilitarianism, Positivism, and Social Democracy.” The Journal of
Modern History 74, no. 2 (June 2003): 214-252.
Beech, Matt and Kevin Hickson. “Evan Durbin.” In Labour’s Thinkers: The Intellectual Roots
of Labour, from Tawney to Gordon Brown. London: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007:
77-100.
Biagini, Eugenio. “Gladstone’s Legacy.” In William Gladstone: New Studies and Perspectives.
Edited by R. Quinault, R. Swift, and R. C. Windscheffel, 293-313. London: Routledge,
2016.
Boyle, James. “The New Socialism.” The Forum 44, no. 6 (1910-12): 641-654.
Britt Rasmussen, Kathleen. “Great Britain and American Hegemony.” In A Companion to
Harry S. Truman. Edited by David S. Margolies. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
2012: 305-326.
Callaghan, John. “The Fabian Society since 1945.” In Ideas and Think Tanks in Contemporary
Britain, Volume 2. Edited by M. David Kandiah and A. Seldon. London: Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd., 1996.
Carr, Helen. “Virginia Woolf: Empire and Race.” In The Cambridge Companion to Virginia
Woolf. Edited by Susan Sellers. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010: 197213.
Cell, John. “Lord Hailey and the Making of the African Survey.” African Affairs 88, no. 353
(October 1989): 481-505.
Charnoz, Olivier. “The Local Power Effects of Global Discourses: A Methodological Enquiry
into ‘Community Participation.” In Local Politics, Global Impacts: Steps to a MultiDisciplinary Analysis of Scales. Edited by Olivier Charnoz, Virginia Diaz Pedregal, and
Alan L. Kolata. London: Routledge, 2015: 157-184.
Claeys, Gordon. “Political Thought.” In A Companion to Nineteenth-Century Britain. Edited
by C. Williams. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2004: 189-202.

289

Clarke, Sabine. “A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research,
1940-1960.” Twentieth Century British History 40, no. 4 (2007): 453-480.
Courtney, W. L., ed. “Mr. John Morley.” The Fortnightly Review 70 (July-Dec. 1898): 249316.
Cowen, M. P. and R. W. Shenton. “Agrarian Doctrines of Development, Part II.” The Journal
of Peasant Studies 25, no. 3 (1998): 31-62.
----. “The Origin and Course of Fabian Colonialism in Africa.” Journal of Historical Sociology
4, no. 2 (June 1991): 143-174.
Cowen, Michael and Robert Shenton. “The Invention of Development.” In Power of
Development. Edited by Jonathan Crush. London: Routledge, 1995: 27-43.
Creech Jones, Arthur. “Cooperation as a Factor in Colonial Progress.” Review of International
Cooperation: The Official Organ of the International Cooperative Alliance 36, no. 7
(July 1943): 97-98
----. “Labour’s Achievement in the Colonies.” The Way Forward. London: The Fabian
Society, 1950: 13-25.
Davis, Jonathan. “Labour’s Political Thought: The Soviet Influence in the Interwar Years.” In
British Labour Party and the Wider World: Domestic Politics, Internationalism, and
Foreign Policy. Edited by Paul Corthorn and Jonathan Davies. London: Tauris
Academic Studies, 2012: 64-85.
Davis, Mary. “Labour, Race and Empire: The Trades Union Congress and Colonial Policy,
1945-51.” In The British Labour Movement and Imperialism. Edited by Billy Frank,
Craig Horner, and David Stewart. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2010: 89-106.
Escobar, Arturo. “Imagining a Post-Development Era? Critical Thought, Development, and
Social Movements.” Social Text 31, no. 32 (1992): 20-56.
----. “Power and Visibility: Development and the Invention and Management of the Third
World.” Cultural Anthropology 3, no. 4 (Nov. 1988): 428-443.
Fieldhouse, D. K. “The Labour Governments and the Empire Commonwealth, 1945-51.” In The
Foreign Policy of the British Labour Government. Edited by R. Ovendale. Leicester:
Leicester University Press, 1984: 83-120.

290

Fox, Paul W. and H. Scott Gordon. “The Early Fabian-Economists and Reformers.” The
Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science/Revue Canadienne 17, no. 3 (Aug.
1951): 307-319.
Frank, Billy. “Labour’s ‘New Imperialist Attitude’: State-Sponsored Colonial Development in
Africa, 1940-51.” In The British Labour Movement and Imperialism. Edited by Billy
Frank, Craig Horner, and David Stewart. Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars
Publishing, 2010: 107-129.
Fredericks, L. J. “Free Enterprise and the Cooperative Movement in Malaysian Economic
Development.” The Developing Economies 12, no. 3 (1974): 229-244.
Freeden, Michael. “The Stranger at the Feast: Ideology and Public Policy in Twentieth Century
Britain.” 20th Century British History 1, no. 1 (1990): 9-34.
Goldstein, Alyosha. “The Attributes of Sovereignty: The Cold War, Colonialism, and
Community Education in Puerto Rico.” In Imagining Our Americas: Toward a
Transnational Frame. Edited by S. Shukla and H. Tinsman. Durham: Duke University
Press, 2007: 313-337.
Harris, Jose. “Labour’s Political and Social Thought.” In Labour’s First Century. Edited by
Duncan Tanner, Pat Thane, and Nick Tiratsoo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2000: 8-45.
Harrison, Nick. “Consensus Here, Consensus There…But Not Consensus Everywhere: The
Labour Party, Equality, and Social Policy in the 1950s.” In The Myth of Consensus:
New Views on British History, 1945-1964. Edited by Harriet Jones and Michael Kandiah.
London: Palgrave, 1996: 17-39.
Harrison, Royden. “The War Emergency Workers’ National Committee, 1914-1920.” In Essays
in Labour History 1886-1923. Edited by Asa Briggs and John Saville. Hamden: Archon
Books, 1971: 211-259.
“The Hilton-Young and Wilson Reports on East Africa.” Bulletin of International News 6, no.
10 (Nov. 21, 1929).
Hinds, Alistair. “Sterling and Decolonization in the British Empire, 1945-1958.” Social and
Economic Studies 48, no. 4 (December 1999): 97-116.

291

Hodge, Joseph M. and Gerald Hodl. “Introduction.” In Developing Africa: Concepts and
Practices in Twentieth-Century Colonialism. Edited by Joseph M. Hodge, Gerald Hodl,
and Martina Kopf. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2014: 1-34.
Holford, John. “Mass Education and Community Development in the British Colonies, 19401960: A Study in the Politics of Community Education.” International Journal of
Lifelong Education 7, no. 3 (1988): 163-183.
Hyam, Ronald. “Bureaucracy and ‘Trusteeship’ in Colonial Empire.” In The Oxford History of
the British Empire: The Twentieth Century. Edited by Judith M. Brown and William
Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 255-279.
Jackson, Ben. “Socialism and the New Liberalism.” In Liberalism as Ideology: Essays in
Honour of Michael Freeden. Edited by B. Jackson and M. Stears. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012: 34-52.
Jaures, Jean. “Madness.” Justice (December 2, 1899).
Jensen, Jody and Ferenc Miszlivetz. “Global Civil Society: From Dissident Discourse to World
Bank Parlance.” In The Language of Civil Society. Edited by Peter Wagner. New York:
Berghahn Books, 2006: 177-205.
Jones, Aled. “Workmen’s Advocates: Ideology and Class in a Mid-Victorian Newspapers
System.” In The Victorian Periodical Press: Soundings and Samplings. Edited by J.
Shattock and M. Wolff. Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1982.
Kaarsholm, Preben. “Pro-Boers.” In Patriotism: The Making and Unmaking of British National
Identity, Volume I: History and Politics. Edited by Raphael Samuel. Abingdon:
Routledge, 1989: 110-126.
Kelemen, Paul. “‘Individualism is, Indeed, Running Riot’: Components of the Social
Democratic Model of Development.” In Empire, Development & Colonialism: The Past
in the Present. Edited by M. Duffield and V. Hewitt. Suffolk: James Currey, 2009:
188-202.
----. “Planning for Africa: The British Labour Party’s Colonial Development Policy, 19201964.” Journal of Agrarian Change 7, no. 1 (Jan. 2007): 76-98.
Lawrence, Jon. “Popular Radicalism and the Socialist Revival in Britain.” Journal of British
Studies 31, no. 2 (April 1992): 163-186.

292

Lonsdale, John. “East Africa.” In The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth
Century. Edited by Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1999: 530-544.
----. “Mau Maus of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya.” Journal of African
History 31 (1990): 393-421
“Lord Rosebery’s Leadership.” The Spectator (March 1896): 8-9.
Mahon, J. L. “Trade Unionism.” Murray’s Magazine: A Home and Colonial Periodical for the
General Reader, Volume VIII (July-December 1890): 116-119.
Matthew, H. C. G. “Disraeli, Gladstone, and the Politics of Mid-Victorian Budgets.” Historical
Journal 22, no. 3 (1979): 615-643.
Maxon, Robert M. “The Devonshire Declaration: The Myth of Missionary Intervention.”
History of Africa 18 (1991): 259-270.
Morrell, Gordon W. “The Big Three, the U.N. Trusteeship Council, and the Early Cold War.”
In Imperialism on Trial: Oversight and Colonial Rule in Historical Perspective. Edited
by R. M. Douglas, Michael D. Callahan, and Elizabeth Bishop. Lanham: Rowman &
Littlefield, 2006.
Muendo, Lydia Kanini. “Challenges Facing Local Government in Development in Kenya: The
Case of Machakos District, 1950-1974.” Historical Research Letter 33 (2016): 18-28.
Newton, C. S. S. “The Sterling Crisis of 1947 and the British Response to the Marshall Plan.”
The Economic History Review (New Series) 37, no. 3 (August 1984): 391-408.
Noakes, Richard. “Spiritualism, Science and the Supernatural in Mid-Victorian Britain.” In The
Victorian Supernatural. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004: 23-43.
Okoth, P. G. “The Creation of a Dependent Curriculum.” In The Imperial Curriculum: Racial
Images and Education in the British Colonial Experience. Edited by J. A. Mangan.
London: Routledge, 1993: 135-147.
Olivier, Sydney. “Liberalism and the Fabians.” The Daily News. December 17, 1901.
Otte, T. G. “Lord Salisbury.” In British Conservative Leaders. Edited by C. Clarke, T. James,
T. Bale, and P. Diamond. London: Biteback Publishing, 2015. Amazon Kindle Reader
e-book.

293

Owen, Nicholas. “Critics of Empire in Britain.” In The Oxford History of the British Empire:
The Twentieth Century. Edited by Judith M. Brown and William Roger Louis. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001: 188-211.
Parsons, Timothy. “Dangerous Education? The Army as School in Colonial East Africa.”
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28, no. 1 (January 2000): 112-134.
Riddell, Neil. “‘Age of Cole’? G. D. H. Cole and the British Labour Movement, 1929-1933.”
The Historical Journal 38, no. 4 (December 1995): 937-954.
Rosen, F. “Jeremy Bentham’s Radicalism.” In English Radicalism, 1550-1850: Tradition or
Fabrication? Edited by G. Burgess and M. Festenstein. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007: 217-240.
Rueschemeyer, Dietrich and Ronan Van Rossem. “The Verein fur Sozialpolitik and the Fabian
Society: A Study in the Sociology of Policy-Relevant Knowledge.” In States, Social
Knowledge, and the Origins of Modern Social Policies. Edited by D. Rueschemeyer and
T. Skocpol. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996: 117-162.
Sanders, Anne. “Beveridge, Lord William Henry.” In International Encyclopedia of Civil
Society. Edited by Helmut K. Anheier, Stefan Toepler, and Regina List. New York:
Springer Science and Business Media, 2010): 63.
Simon, David. “Development Reconsidered: New Directions in Development Thinking.”
Geografiska Annaler. Series B, Huamn Geography, 79, no. 4 (1997): 183-201.
Strickland, C. F. “The Cooperative Movement in Africa.” Journal of the Royal African Society
34, no. 134 (January 1935): 738-753.
----. “The Cooperative Movement in the East.” International Affairs (Royal Institute of
International Affairs) 11, no. 6 (November 1932): 812-832.
Sweezy, Paul M. “Fabian Political Economy.” Journal of Political Economy 57, no. 3 (June
1949): 242-248.
Thompson, Gardner. “Colonialism in Crisis: The Uganda Disturbances of 1945.” African
Affairs 91 (1992): 605-624.
Twaddle, Michael. “The Struggle for Political Sovereignty in Eastern Africa, 1945 to
Independence.” In General History of Africa VIII: Africa since 1935. Edited by Ali A.
Mazrui. Oxford: James Currey, 1999: 221-248.

294

Van Beusekom, Monica M. “Disjunctures in Theory and Practice: Making Sense of Change in
Agricultural Development at the Office du Niger, 1920-1960.” The Journal of African
History 41, no. 1 (2000): 79-99.
Watts, Michael. “‘A New Deal in Emotions’: Theory and Practice and the Crisis of
Development.” In Power of Development. Edited by Jonathan Crush. London:
Routledge, 1995: 44-62.
Weiler, Peter. “William Clarke: The Making and Unmaking of a Fabian Socialist.” Journal of
British Studies 14, no. 1 (Nov. 1974): 77-108.
Westcott, N. J. “Closer Union and the Future of East Africa, 1939-1948: A Case Study in the
‘Official Mind of Imperialism.’” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 10, no.
1 (October 1981): 67-88.
Whitehead, Clive. “The Historiography of British Imperial Education Policy, Part II: Africa and
the Rest of the World.” History of Education 34, no. 4 (July 2005): 441-454.
----. “The Impact of the Second World War on Education in Britain’s Colonial Empire.” In
Education and the Second World War: Studies in Schooling and Social Change. Edited
by Roy Lowe. New York: Routledge, 1992.
Wilt, Judith. “The Imperial Mouth: Imperialism, the Gothic and Science Fiction.” The Journal
of Popular Culture 14, no. 4 (Spring 1981): 618-628.
Wright, Thomas. “The Press and the People.” In Our New Masters (London, 1873): 311-358.
Zeleza, Tiyambe. “The Colonial Labour System in Kenya.” In An Economic History of Kenya.
Edited by W. R. Ochieng’ and Robert Maxon. Nairobi: East African Educational
Publishers Ltd., 1992.

Theses and Dissertations
Holdcroft, Lane. “The Rise and Fall of Community Development, 1950-1965.” Master’s thesis,
Michigan State University, 1976.
McCarran, M. Margaret Patricia. “Fabianism and the Political Life of Britain, 1919-1931.” PhD
diss., Catholic University of America, 1954.
Riley, Charlotte Lydia. “Monstrous Predatory Vampires and Beneficent Fairy-Godmothers:
British Post-War Colonial Development in Africa.” PhD diss., University College
London, 2013.

295

Shilaro, Priscilla M. “A Failed Eldorado: British Trusteeship, Luyia Land Rights and the
Kakamega Gold Rush, 1930-52.” PhD diss., West Virginia University, 2000.
Taylor, M. “Radicalism and Patriotism, 1848-1859.” PhD diss., University of Chicago, 1985.

Conference Papers
Hodge, Joseph M. “Missionaries, Colonial ‘Experts’ and the Invention of ‘Community
Development’ in Africa Between the Wars.” Paper presented at the Canadian
Association of African Studies, Annual Conference, Bishop’s University, Sherbrooke,
Quebec, June 1999.
Mason, H. Some comments on the African contribution. Paper presented at the South-East
Treaty Organization (S.E.A.T.O.) Seminar on Community Development, Bangkok,
Thailand, July 19-23, 1965.
Rhodes, Rita. “British Cooperative History.” Paper presented at the Swedish Project,
Stockholm, Sweden, November 30, 2009.

